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ABSTRACT
To some extent, the common assumption of zero-inﬂation steady state in mod-
ern macro models is theoretically ﬂawed, empirically unfounded, and practi-
cally inconsistent. I build a medium-scale Generalised New Keynesian (GNK)
model based on non-zero inﬂation steady state in order to study inﬂation per-
sistence and the eﬀect of trend inﬂation. This GNK model exhibits much more
dynamics than a standard NK model in several ways: a) NKPC becomes ﬂat-
ter and more forward looking as trend inﬂation increases; b) price dispersion
introduces huge inertia into the model as trend rises; c) backward looking fea-
ture is also present in the market wage equation, even though optimal reset
wage is more forward looking. This model is then estimated using a Bayesian
technique with quarterly US data from 1970 to 2017. The estimation results
show the model is capable of capturing macro evidence in the postwar US, and
annual trend inﬂation is estimated to be around 3 percent. Simulations show
trend inﬂation does not generate signiﬁcant alterations to macroeconomic dy-
namics under a moderately high degree of indexation, and this is consistent
with the literature. However, once indexation is switched oﬀ, trend inﬂation
alters the model dynamics in a very signiﬁcant way: 1) in general, output and
inﬂation ﬂuctuate much more heavily with higher trend inﬂation after most
shocks; 2) inﬂation exhibits a hump-shaped response with four percent trend
inﬂation or above after a transitory monetary policy shock; 3) inﬂation reacts
less on impact but becomes much more persistent with higher trend inﬂation
after a monetary shock. The welfare loss, timing of the maximum eﬀect and
inﬂation persistence after a monetary policy shock provide very important
implications to both economists and policy-makers.
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Introduction
The Background Story
Since the 1990s, there has been a large volume of macroeconomic literature
that focuses on using New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE, henceforth) models to study business cycle and monetary policy (
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999); Goodfriend and King (1997); Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997)), these also include central banks in the advanced economies.
In the majority of these researches, the economy is modelled based on the
assumption that inﬂation is zero in the long run steady state, and equations
are therefore approximated linearly around a zero inﬂation steady state. This
has become a standard practice among New Keynesian macroeconomists.
Apparently, there are motivations why macroeconomists tend to and have
been using models that are log-linearised around a zero inﬂation steady state
for monetary policy research, the primary reasons can be summarised into
three categories. First, there is a great temptation in terms of practicality,
in other words, analytical convenience, as suggested by Ascari and Ropele
(2007). Second, the zero inﬂation or nearly zero inﬂation status is optimal in
a cashless economy, and some literatures have indeed shown this (see Good-
friend and King (2001); Woodford (2003); Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007a),
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010)). Third, the above zero inﬂation targeting
only emerged in the late 1990s and did not become so popular among lead-
ing central banks in industrialised countries until the European Central Bank
(ECB) formally adopted it in early 2000s, hence, the issue only started to
attract practical attention since then. However, the zero or nearly zero inﬂa-
tion optimal stabilisation requires some very special conditions both in terms
of microeconomic assumptions and the interaction between monetary and ﬁs-
cal policies (see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007a), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2007b)). Any deviation from these assumptions could lead to the optimal
1
inﬂation rate signiﬁcantly departing from zero.
Given all the above motivations of modelling macroeconomic DSGE models
with zero inﬂation steady state, I believe there are plenty of appealing reasons
to look at the roles of positive and moderate trend inﬂation in these con-
temporary New Keynesian models, which are designed for stabilisation policy
studies. By positive I mean any steady state inﬂation above zero; by moderate
I mean the net annual rate of trend inﬂation is around 2 to 6 percent. First
of all, the assumption of zero long run inﬂation is unrealistic for the period
that macroeconomists and policy makers have been studying for stabilisation
policy: the post World World Two time in the United States. Cogley and
Sbordone (2008) uses a VAR approach and their estimation results show the
trend inﬂation level in the post-war US is considerably above zero, and it was
well above 4 percent during the Great Inﬂation time in the 1970s. Second,
even though studies show near zero inﬂation is optimal under some special
conditions, leading central banks in the advanced economies (including central
banks from some emerging economies) suggest zero inﬂation is not their long
term target (the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of England, the Bank of
Japan). Table 1 gives a brief look at the targets of inﬂation targeting central
banks around the world.
Starting from the industrialised countries, the Federal Reserve, the ECB,
the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan that are usually regarded as four
most important monetary authorities in the world, all set their long term in-
ﬂation target at 2 percent. The same target is also shared by the central banks
of Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland 1. There are three banks in the advanced
economies that tolerate inﬂation within a certain band; namely Australia, New
Zealand and Canada. Therefore, it is more than clear that all the major cen-
tral banks in advanced economies do not view zero inﬂation as their objectives,
with 2 percent as the most popular choice.
1In the Swiss case, the central bank targets 2 percent as a maximum not a midpoint.
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Table 1: Inﬂation Targets of Major Central Banks
Central Banks Inﬂation Targets (percentage)
Developed Economies
Federal Reserve 2
European Central Bank 2
Bank of England 2
Bank of Japan 2
Reserve Bank of Australia 2-3
Reserve Bank of New Zealand 1-3
Sveriges Riksbank (Sweden) 2
Norges Bank (Norway) 2
Swiss National Bank <2
Bank of Canada 1-3
Emerging Economies
Bank of Korea 2
Czech National Bank 2
Banco Central do Brasil 4.5
Banco Central de Chile 2-4
Banco de la República Colombia 3±1
South African Reserve Bank 3-6
National Bank of Poland 2.5±1
Source: various central bank websites, see Appendix C
For the emerging economies, these ﬁgures tend to be even higher, the cen-
tral bank of Brazil has a target of 4.5 percent. Both the central banks of Chile
and South Africa target a band, with the former pursues 2 to 4 percent, and
the latter chases 3 to 6 percent. Both Poland and Colombia set their target
to 2.5 and 3.5 percent, while permitting plus or minus one percent departure
from the target. The targets are relatively lower in the Czech Republic and
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South Korea, but are still signiﬁcantly above zero. Again, no central bank
that conducts explicit inﬂation targeting actually target zero. Thus, the as-
sumption of central bankers should model the economy based zero inﬂation
steady state for monetary stabilisation policy studies is clearly unreasonable
and misleading.
The overlook of positive inﬂation steady state (or trend inﬂation, the two
are interchangeable throughout this thesis) creates both theoretical ﬂaw and
practical inconsistency. Fortunately, this issue started to attract academic
attention in the research of monetary economics in the last decade. Early
researches can trace back to Ascari (2004), Amano, Ambler and Rebei (2007),
and Ascari and Ropele (2007). More recent breakthrough attributes to Cogley
and Sbordone (2008), Ascari and Ropele (2009), Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2011), Ascari and Sbordone (2014), and Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims (2018).
The Issues
The major issues with regards to the presence of trend inﬂation and the dif-
ference it can make to modern New Keynesian models that documented in
existing literature include the following: ﬁrst, the presence of trend inﬂation
alters the macroeconomic dynamics of various macro variables and optimal
monetary response.
Second, due to the presence of trend inﬂation, the probability of satisfying
determinacy drops considerably as trend inﬂation rises, this is true even un-
der diﬀerent monetary policy set-up, extensive discussions can be found from
Ascari and Ropele (2009), and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011). Therefore,
conclusions from the literature on optimal stabilisation that assume zero steady
state inﬂation may become invalid. Under certain parametrisation, by satisfy-
ing the Taylor principle, which is deﬁned as a more than one-to-one response
of nominal interest rate to inﬂation change, is not a suﬃcient condition for
the model to satisfy determinacy condition. In particular, Coibion and Gorod-
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nichenko (2011) ﬁnds that failure to satisfy the Taylor principle is not the only
reason that the Federal Reserve failed to anchor inﬂation during the Great In-
ﬂation time. As a result of the higher level of trend inﬂation experienced in the
1970s, which causes the determinacy region to shrink dramatically, the Fed's
policy was well inside the indeterminacy region for much of the 1970s and it
required the Fed to respond much more aggressively to inﬂation ﬂuctuations
than it was required had trend inﬂation not been so high.
Third, as a result of non-zero inﬂation steady state, for central banks that
are inside the determinacy region, the optimal monetary stabilisation policy
also change. This is well-documented in Ascari and Ropele (2007), and Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2011). In particular, the latter ﬁnds that under moder-
ate trend inﬂation, interest smoothing, aggressive response to output growth,
price level targeting all make positive contributions to good monetary stabil-
isation policy. Nevertheless, heavy responses to output gap produce a huge
destabilising eﬀect to the economy rather than stabilising.
Fourth, in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007-08, a number of
economists (see Blanchard, Dell Ariccia and Mauro (2010); Ball (2013)) argue
that the Federal Reserve should raise its inﬂation target from 2 percent to
4 percent in order to reduce the probability of encountering liquidity trap in
future recessions; and this can provide more room for the Fed to cut interest
rate in order to stimulate the economy. However, by raising the inﬂation target,
this could bring two by-products at the same time. One is the possibility of
failing to anchor inﬂation in normal time and bring the economy subject to self-
fulﬁlling expectations-driven ﬂuctuations. The other is the potential welfare
cost of rising inﬂation target in normal time, which may well exceed the gain
from rising it for the preparation of bad time.
Another critical issue in modern macroeconomic policy research based on
New Keynesian framework is the tendency and attempts among academics
to make particular assumptions and sometimes unreasonable ones to obtain
favourable results in terms of matching empirical evidence for macro variables,
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in particular, the inﬂation persistence observed in postwar United States. In
order to do so, researchers introduce some types of backward looking terms
into the New Keynesian Phillips Curve; the most popular two methods are:
1) some forms of indexation in price setting behaviours of intermediate ﬁrms
and wage setting behaviour of labour unions. This can be found in Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), and Smets and Wouters (2007). 2) a
rule-of-thumb approach as introduced by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000).
Nonetheless, the assumption of price indexation has been heavily criticised by
economists for its lack of empirical evidence and theoretical contradiction with
microeconomic foundation. Put it in simple terms, once indexation is allowed,
then all the prices and wages change every period, and this clearly violates the
nature of nominal rigidity. These criticisms are documented in Chari, Kehoe
and McGrattan (2009), Cogley and Sbordone (2008), Dixon and Kara (2010),
and Woodford (2007) .
In fact, the nature of inﬂation persistence itself is also subject huge debate
among economists. Cogley and Sbordone (2008) incorporates a time-varying
inﬂation trend with a drift into the NKPC and ﬁnd that once the drift in
inﬂation trend is taken into account, the observed inﬂation persistence of in-
ﬂation gap, which is deﬁned as inﬂation deviation from the time-varying trend,
is much less persistent, and the observed persistence is mainly attributed to
the persistence in the trend component. Furthermore, they conclude that the
change in trend inﬂation over time is mainly caused by switches in monetary
policy conduct in the postwar US. Researches share the same implications in-
clude Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). On the
contrary, some other literature found that there is no such "regime change" in
monetary conduct; for example, Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010), Sims
and Zha (2006).
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The Structure
Based on all the facts, evidence and problems discussed above, there is impera-
tive demand for more researches to be done in this area. This thesis attempts to
thoroughly investigate the issue of trend inﬂation and inﬂation persistence by
formulating three independent chapters on a step-by-step basis. More specif-
ically, the introductory Chapter 1 focuses on the issue of trend inﬂation in a
small-scale New Keynesian model, which is based on the well-known Clarida,
Galí and Gertler (1999) study of monetary policy. The purpose is to check how
trend inﬂation alters the ﬁnal equations used to study monetary policy when
the model is log-linearised around a non-zero inﬂation steady state. Also, this
chapter re-examines how trend inﬂation alters macroeconomic dynamics and
optimal monetary policy response when the economy experiences high levels
of trend inﬂation, and evaluate whether the key results from Clarida, Galí and
Gertler (1999) still hold once trend inﬂation is taken into account. Chapter
2 goes one step further by introducing trend inﬂation to a medium-scale New
Keynesian DSGE model with a wide range of nominal and real rigidities. The
chapter reevaluates the prominent Smets and Wouters (2007) model but based
on trend inﬂation, again, the model is log-linearised around a non zero inﬂation
steady state. The model is kept as close to the original model as possible in
order to test the diﬀerence that trend inﬂation makes in the most direct way.
The new generalised version of this medium scale model is then estimated us-
ing a Bayesian technique, the same method as the original Smets and Wouters
(2007), in order to examine whether this generalised model can ﬁt well with
macro data and capture empirical facts for macro variables. This is followed
by the reinvestigation of how macroeconomic dynamics may be impacted by
the presence of trend inﬂation in such medium scale New Keynesian model in
the same chapter. Last, chapter 3 relaxes the heavily-criticised assumption of
backward indexation, and re-estimate this new model using the same Bayesian
technique to see how well this revised version of the generalised model can ﬁt
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macroeconomic data. The second major research question of chapter 3 is to
detect whether trend inﬂation can replace backward indexation as the gener-
ator of inﬂation persistence in such medium-scale New Keynesian models.
The Results
The major results and contributions of this thesis include the following. First,
as similar to a number of previous literature, Chapter 1 ﬁnds that a small scale
NK model exhibits new features when it is log-linearised around a non-zero
inﬂation steady state, agents become more forward looking as trend inﬂation
increases due to the ﬂattening New Keynesian Phillips curve. The additional
term of price dispersion in the NKPC implies the divine coincidence no longer
hold in such generalised NK model. Furthermore, trend inﬂation has huge
impacts on the macroeconomic dynamics of such a model. Chapter 1 ﬁnds
some new quantitative and qualitative implications for the optimal monetary
response under positive trend inﬂation; when trend inﬂation increases, there
are two countering eﬀects for optimal stabilisation policy. On the one hand,
due to the high level of trend inﬂation, it requires more output sacriﬁce for
the central bank in order to stabilise inﬂation ﬂuctuations and this makes the
central bank respond less aggressively to inﬂation. On the other hand, as
trend inﬂation rises, the monetary authority is less concerned about output
deviation, as reﬂected by the declining weight on output stabilisation in the
central bank's objective function. This second eﬀect is ampliﬁed by the rising
price dispersion, which makes inﬂation deviations more costly for the central
bank, and together the second eﬀect makes the central bank to counter inﬂa-
tion more aggressively. The overall eﬀects somehow depend on which eﬀect
is larger and also the parametrisation assumed in the model. This result is
complementary to existing literature on this issue (e.g., Ascari and Ropele
(2007) and Alves (2014)) In addition, a central bank can make considerable
gains from commitment since price setting ﬁrms are now more forward looking
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with trend inﬂation. In addition, most of the results from Clarida, Galí and
Gertler (1999) are still valid.
Chapter 2 ﬁnds that the features shown in Chapter 1 's small scale model
still holds in this medium scale Generalised New Keynesian (GNK) model.
A hybrid NKPC exhibits more forward looking property when trend inﬂation
increases; a ﬂattening NKPC due to trend inﬂation. Some additional and
interesting features are also observed from this medium scale GNK model: 1)
while inﬂation becomes more forward looking, the market wage rate somehow
become more backward looking as trend inﬂation rises; 2) optimal reset wage
for labour union is more concerned with expectation of optimal reset wage
and less concerned with expectation of inﬂation as trend increases in inﬂation.
Bayesian estimation shows that this GNK model can capture macroeconomic
evidence of the postwar US, and the Bayesian posterior mean indicates that
trend inﬂation is around 3.2 percent on average for the sample period from
1970 to 2017, this is in line with existing literature. A sub-sample estimation
ﬁnds that the trend inﬂation ﬂuctuates considerably across three sub-periods:
the Great Inﬂation, the Great Moderation, and the Great Recession, with trend
inﬂation 6.96%, 2.28%, and 2.0%, respectively. In addition, trend inﬂation still
has huge alternating eﬀects on the macroeconomics dynamics in this medium
scale GNK model even with indexation, which is proven to have muting eﬀects
on trend inﬂation. As trend inﬂation increases, inﬂation deviates less on impact
but is much more persistent after a monetary policy shock with higher levels
of trend inﬂation.
Chapter 3 ﬁnds that a medium scale GNKmodel with trend inﬂation but no
indexation is still able to capture the macro facts of the postwar US economy.
Furthermore, the most valuable ﬁnding of this chapter (if not the entire thesis)
is that trend inﬂation with 4 percent or higher can actually generate a hump-
shaped response for inﬂation after a very transitory monetary policy shock (ρ =
0.10). Furthermore, inﬂation reacts less on impact but becomes much more
persistent as trend inﬂation increases. This indicates the incorporation of trend
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inﬂation in such GNK model with no backward indexation can dramatically
improve the model ﬁt in the sense that such model can capture the movement of
inﬂation after monetary shock in a much closer way to the observed evidence.
This has both policy and theoretical implications. On the policy front, it
implies that improper account of trend inﬂation can lead to huge miscalculation
for the timing of maximum policy eﬀect and damaging consequence for the
optimal monetary response, and this ﬁnding has serious policy implications
for central banks. The greater ﬂuctuations caused by higher level of trend
inﬂation should serve as a warning sign for central banks who think about
raising inﬂation target in order to reduce the likelihood of being caught up by
zero lower bound. On the theoretical front, it shows that once trend inﬂation
is properly taken into account, one does not need backward indexation to
generate a hump-shaped response for inﬂation with Calvo price setting. To my
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to do so without additional assumptions2.
2Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims (2018) uses a similar model without indexation, but adding
the roundabout structure of production and extended borrowing, and they attribute the
hump shape to the additional assumptions.
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Chapter 1
Optimal Monetary Policy and
Inﬂation Targeting in a New
Keynesian Model with Moderate
Trend Inﬂation
1.1 Introduction
The better understanding of monetary stabilisation policy and business cy-
cle ﬂuctuations is one of the most fruitful and productive areas of economic
research in the last few decades. Both the design of micro-found macroe-
conomic models that are rich enough to answer the central question of Lucas
critique and the methodology of how to estimate such complicated and medium
scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE, henceforth) models have
advanced considerably. Macroeconomists from both New Classical and New
Keynesian schools of thought have largely converged on method, model de-
sign, reduced-form shock, and principles of policy advice (Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan, 2009). Early works on how to evaluate monetary policy based
on a New Keynesian framework include: Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999),
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Goodfriend and King (1997), and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
The well-known study from Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) has been re-
garded as one of the most important literature of monetary policy researches
in New Keynesian economics, and it provides some valuable insights of how
should the central bank respond to various exogenous shocks in the most
welfare-desirable way, and how change in monetary policy conduct can af-
fect the macroeconomic dynamics under New Keynesian framework. However,
one thing seems common in these early New Keynesian models: long run in-
ﬂation or trend inﬂation is assumed to be zero and therefore all the models
are approximated linearly around a zero inﬂation steady state, despite the
overwhelming evidence that zero inﬂation neither empirically grounded nor a
practical objective for central banks in major economies (Ascari and Ropele,
2007). Unfortunately, this issue has attracted some attention and a number of
researches have been done to directly address this issue in recent years. Early
works can be found in Ascari (2004), Ascari and Ropele (2007), Ascari and
Ropele (2009), Amano, Ambler and Rebei (2007).
The earliest and one of the most cited works on the role of trend inﬂation
dates back to Ascari (2004), the study ﬁnds that steady state level of output
is very much sensitive to the steady state rate of money growth, and very
mild levels of trend inﬂation imply large changes in the steady state output
level. He also shows that short run dynamics of a small scale NK model is
hugely impacted by the change in the level of trend inﬂation. In addition, the
presence of positive trend inﬂation has serious implications for the dynamic
behaviour following a disinﬂation policy. While Ascari (2004) mainly focuses
on the role of trend inﬂation on model dynamics and disinﬂation with Calvo
and Taylor pricing, Amano, Ambler and Rebei (2007) extend the analysis
by examining the movements of deterministic steady states and the stochastic
means when trend inﬂation is present based on three diﬀerent pricing schemes:
Calvo, truncated-Calvo, and Taylor. They show that regardless of pricing
mechanism, trend inﬂation leads to a reduction in the stochastic means of
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output, consumption and employment, and increase in the stochastic mean of
inﬂation beyond its deterministic steady state levels. The mechanism that is
responsible for increasing the spread between deterministic steady states and
stochastic means operates via the price dispersion variable. Their results also
show that with an annualised trend inﬂation of 4 percent, the stochastic mean
of inﬂation is always greater than 4 percent regardless of the pricing scheme.
This implies that adopting a positive inﬂation target leads to an outcome where
inﬂation systematically exceeds its target unless the monetary authority runs
a policy where output, on average, is forced to fall short of its deterministic
steady state value. The discussion of the importance of price dispersion in a
model with non zero inﬂation steady state can be found in Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2007a) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007b).
Ascari and Ropele (2007) is probably the ﬁrst paper that thoroughly ex-
amines the potential change in optimal monetary policy under positive trend
inﬂation. Their research ﬁnds that under discretionary policy, the optimal
condition shows the sacriﬁce of output contraction for inﬂation stabilisation
actually drops as trend inﬂation rises, and the eﬃcient policy deteriorates and
there is no guarantee of determinacy. Furthermore, targeting non-zero inﬂation
can lead to substantial welfare losses even under commitment. The analysis
provides some very useful thoughts on the optimal stabilisation policy under
trend inﬂation, however, the fact that their analysis fails to apply a non zero
inﬂation based quadratic loss function makes some of their conclusion vulner-
able. In addition, Ascari and Ropele (2009) ﬁnds that positive trend inﬂation
shrinks the determinacy region of a basic NK DSGE model when monetary
policy is conducted by a contemporaneous interest rate rule. Neither the Tay-
lor principle nor the generalised Taylor principle is a suﬃcient condition for
local determinacy of equilibrium. Therefore, they argue regardless of the the-
oretical set-up, the monetary literature on interest rate rules cannot disregard
the average long run inﬂation in both theoretical and empirical analysis.
Given all the literature listed above, I believe it is important to start this
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thesis with a relatively small-scale New Keynesian DSGE model with trend
inﬂation and use this model to re-examine the well-known CGG study of mon-
etary policy and to check whether these key results from CGG still holds under
this NK model with trend inﬂation. The analyses and results of this Chapter
1 conﬁrm some of the conclusion from previous literature and complement to
previous ﬁndings. The ﬁndings can be summarised as the following: ﬁrst, the
generalised New Keynesian Phillips curve (GNKPC) becomes ﬂatter as trend
inﬂation increases where inﬂation reacts less to change in output or output gap
as trend inﬂation increases, and agents become more forward looking. Second,
trend inﬂation alters macroeconomic dynamics in a signiﬁcant way, these al-
terations depend on the nature of shocks, the calibrated value of parameters,
and also the persistence levels of shocks. However, in contrast to previous lit-
erature, by applying a welfare loss function that is based on non-zero inﬂation
steady state, the weight of output stabilisation now depends on the level of
trend inﬂation. This generates two countering eﬀects for optimal monetary
response under high levels of trend inﬂation. On the one hand, as the weight
for output stabilisation drops due to higher trend inﬂation, and combined with
the fact that inﬂation ﬂuctuations become much more costly for the central
bank, the central bank should respond to inﬂation deviation more aggressively.
On the other hand, as trend inﬂation increases, more output needs to be sac-
riﬁced in order to keep inﬂation stable as indicated by the optimal condition,
this makes the central bank to react less aggressively to inﬂation ﬂuctuations
and make the inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ even more serious. The overall net
eﬀect really depends on the parametrisation of the model. In addition, the
well-known inﬂationary bias is still present under trend inﬂation, while wel-
fare loss associated with trend inﬂation arises under both discretionary and
commitment regimes.
The rest of this chapter 1 is structured as the following: section 1.2 derives
the generalised version of the baseline model, which is largely based on CGG.
I show how key equations change due to the incorporation of trend inﬂation.
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Section 1.3 provides the calibration of structural parameters and examines the
how the macroeconomic dynamics are aﬀected by trend inﬂation based on a
standard Taylor rule. Then, section 1.4 analyses the eﬀect of trend inﬂation
on optimal monetary policy under discretion and commitment. Section 1.5
concludes this chapter.
1.2 The Generalised New Keynesian Model
This section presents the baseline model used in this chapter for the studies of
the eﬀects of trend inﬂation. This model is largely based on Clarida, Galí and
Gertler (1999) (CGG henceforth) model, and it is completed by log-linearising
the system of equation around a positive inﬂation steady state.
1.2.1 Household's Decision Making
A representative household makes decision by maximising the utility function
subject to the budget constraint
max Ut = Et
∞∑
j=0
βj
[
C1−σt+j
1− σ +
γ
1− b
(
Mt+j
Pt+j
)1−b
− χN
1+η
t+j
1 + η
]
Subject to
Ct +
Mt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
=
(
Wt
Pt
)
·Nt + Mt−1
Pt
+ (1 + it−1) ·
(
Bt−1
Pt
)
+ Πt
Among these variables, Mt and Bt are the money and bond held by the
household, Nt is labour supply in hours, Πt is the proﬁts distributed to house-
holds, and it is the gross return on bonds holding.
First order conditions for present and future consumptions give the Euler
equation, which characterises household's consumption behaviour over time.
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1Cσt
= βEt
[(
Pt
Pt+1
)
(1 + it)
(
1
Cσt+1
)]
(1.1)
The intra-temporal optimal condition, which set MRS equals real wage
Wt
Pt
= χNηt C
σ
t (1.2)
This is also interpreted as the labour supply equation.
1.2.2 Final Goods Producers
At a given point in time t, a perfectly competitive ﬁnal goods ﬁrm produces the
ﬁnal consumption good Yt by combining a continuum of intermediate goods
Yi,t, according to the technology
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Y
−1

i,t di
] 
−1
where Yi,t ∈ (0, 1).
The proﬁt maximisation and the zero proﬁt condition imply that the price
of the ﬁnal good, Pt is a CES aggregate of the prices of the intermediate goods
Pi,t.
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
P 1−i,t
]−
The demand for intermediate good i is therefore given by
Yi,t =
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−
Yt
1.2.3 Intermediate Goods Producers
The production function faced by a representative intermediate goods producer
takes a standard Cobb-Douglas form but without capital, labour is the sole
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input factor, and total factor productivity is represented by At:
Yi,t = AtNi,t
The cost minimisation problem yields the real marginal cost for intermedi-
ate goods producers
mct =
wt
At
(1.3)
Price Setting Behaviour
The representative ﬁrm maximises its proﬁt by setting its price, subject to
the market demand function. In this model, since labour is the only input in
production, hence, wage is the only source of production cost for this ﬁrm, as
reﬂected by the marginal cost equation (1.3).
max Et
∞∑
j=0
Λt,t+jθ
j
[(
P ∗i,t
Pt+j
)
Yi,t+j − Wt
Pt
Yi,t
At
]
subject to
Yi,t+j =
(
P ∗i,t
Pt+j
)−
· Yt+j
Where Λt,t+j ≡ βj λt+jλt is the stochastic discount factor, in which λt represents
the marginal utility of consumption for households in period t. P ∗i,t is the
optimal reset price for a monopolistic ﬁrm. Furthermore, the Calvo parameter
θ is the measure of nominal rigidity, and it implies the proportion of ﬁrms that
cannot reset their prices in a given period (Calvo, 1983).
First order condition of P ∗i,t yields the following optimal condition
=>
P ∗i,t
Pt
=

− 1 ·
Et
∑∞
j=0 θ
j∆t,t+jYt+jpi

t,t+jMCt+j
Et
∑∞
j=0 θ
j∆t,t+jYt+jpi
−1
t,t+j
(1.4)
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Hence, the gross price mark-up is given by µ = 
−1
The aggregate price level in the economy evolves according to
Pt =
[
(1− θ)P 1−t−1 + θP ∗i,t1−
] 1
1−
(1 − θ)P 1−t−1 represents the ﬁrms these are not able to reset their prices in
period t, hence, it is the general price level carried out from t− 1, there is no
price indexation in this model; while θP ∗i,t
1− represents the ﬁrms these have
the chance to reset their prices in period t. Therefore, θ is a measure of the
nominal rigidity in this economy.
Dividing both sides by Pt and letting pit = Pt/Pt−1, we get the real optimal
reset price
p∗i,t =
[
1− θpi−1t
1− θ
] 1
1−
This indicates that the relative optimal reset price is a function of inﬂation
rate, and p∗i,t =
P ∗i,t
Pt
represents the real optimal price.
Now, in order to solve this equation, two auxiliary variables are further
deﬁned
ψt = Et
∞∑
j=0
θj∆t,t+jYt+jpi

t,t+jMCt+j
φt = Et
∞∑
j=0
θj∆t,t+jYt+jpi
−1
t,t+j
So they can also be expressed in recursive forms:
ψt = wtA
−1
T Y
1−σ
t + θβEt
[
pit+1ψt+1
]
φt = Y
1−σ
t + θβEt
[
pi−1t+1φt+1
]
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Now, the real optimal reset price can be expressed as:
p∗i,t =

− 1 ·
ψt
φt
1.2.4 The Central Bank
The central bank in this economy conducts monetary policy by following a
standard Taylor rule
(
1 + it
1 + i¯
)
=
(pit
p¯i
)φpi · ( yt
ynt
)φy
+mt
The equations implies that the central bank adjusts its nominal interest
rate whenever inﬂation deviates from its target level, which is in line with the
trend inﬂation, and also when output deviates from its natural rate. A shock
to the term mt represents the monetary policy shock in the economy.
Aggregation and Price Dispersion
To closely follow the original set-up in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), this
model assumes there is neither investment nor government spending in the
economy. Therefore, the total amount of consumption is equivalent to the
total production generated. The aggregate resource constraint is therefore
given by
Yt = Ct
This constraint implies that consumption at the households level can be
drawn equivalent to the total output at the ﬁrm level.
Assume there are a number of diﬀerentiated labour supplied by a continuum
of households, i ∈ [0, 1]. The market labour demand function can be written
as:
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Ndt =
∫ 1
0
Ndi,t di =
∫ 1
0
(
Yi,t
At
)
di
=
∫ 1
0
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−
di
(
Yt
At
)
= st
(
Yt
At
)
So st =
∫ 1
0
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−
di indicates the level of price dispersion in the economy.
According to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007a) , this price dispersion st
is bounded below by 1. It represents the resource costs due to relative price
dispersion arising from positive long-run inﬂation: the higher st, the more
labour is required to produce a given level of output. The impact on the overall
economy due to the presence of this price dispersion is further discussed in the
following sections. It can also be written in recursive form as
st = (1− θ)
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−
+ θpitst−1
1.2.5 Deterministic Steady State
Assume that p¯i as the trend inﬂation rate. Therefore, if p¯i = 1.00, it means the
steady state inﬂation is zero. If p¯i > 1.00, then it implies there is positive trend
inﬂation. In steady state, we have the following set of deterministic paths:
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Π¯ = β(1 + i) (1.5)
w = χNηY σ (1.6)
p∗i =
[
1− θp¯i−1
1− θ
] 1
1−
(1.7)
p∗i =

− 1 ·
ψ
φ
(1.8)
ψ =
wA−1Y 1−σ
1− θβp¯i (1.9)
φ =
Y 1−σ
1− θβp¯i−1 (1.10)
N = s
[
Y
A
]
(1.11)
s =
1− θ
1− θp¯i (p
∗
i )
− (1.12)
mc =
w
A
(1.13)
First of all, according to equation (1.7), one can see that optimal reset price
increases as trend inﬂation p¯i rises. Hence, higher p¯i pushes up the optimal reset
price in steady state.
Substitute (1.8) into (1.13), price dispersion can be expressed in terms of
the steady state inﬂation rate, namely, trend inﬂation.
=> s =
1− θ
1− θp¯i ·
(
1− θp¯i−1
1− θ
) 
−1
A clear feature from this equation is that the level of price dispersion in
steady state depends on three parameters: the elasticity of substitution of
consumption , the Calvo rigidity parameter θ and trend inﬂation p¯i. One can
see that when prices are fully ﬂexible (θ = 0), the steady state price dispersion
collapse to 1, which implies no price dispersion. When prices are fully ﬂexible,
there should be no dispersion in prices in the steady state. Furthermore, when
trend inﬂation p¯i is 1, the expression on the right hand side collapses to 1 and
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no price dispersion is present in steady state. However, when trend inﬂation
p¯i > 1, which implies positive trend inﬂation, as p¯i increases, the steady state
level of price dispersion also increase. This indicates that the cost of price
dispersion should not be ignored when positive trend inﬂation is present.
The gross mark-up in steady state also depends on the level of trend inﬂa-
tion now
µ =
1
mc
=
[
1− θp¯i−1
1− θ
] 1
−1
[

− 1 ·
1− βθp¯i−1
1− βθp¯i
]
1.2.6 Log-Linearised Equations
Now, the model is log-linearised around a non-zero inﬂation steady state. A
variable with a hat represents its log deviation from the steady state: Xˆt =
lnXt − lnX¯. The completed system of linearised equations are
Yˆt = EtYˆt+1 − 1
σ
(ˆit − Etpˆit+1) (1.14)
wˆt = ηNˆt + σYˆt (1.15)
Yˆt = Aˆt + Nˆt − sˆt (1.16)
iˆt = φpipˆit + φY Yˆt + vt (1.17)
pˆ∗i,t = ψˆt − φˆt (1.18)
pˆ∗i,t =
θp¯i−1
1− θp¯i−1 pˆit (1.19)
ψˆt = (1− θβp¯i)[wˆt − Aˆt + (1− σ)Yˆt] + θβp¯i(Etpˆit+1 + Etψˆt+1) (1.20)
φˆt = (1− σ)(1− θβp¯i−1)Yˆt + θβp¯i−1[(− 1)Etpˆit+1 + Etφˆt+1] (1.21)
sˆt = (θp¯i
 − 1)pˆ∗i,t + θp¯i(pˆit + sˆt+1) (1.22)
Among these, equation (1.14) is the dynamic IS equation in this GNK
model. Also, to have a closer look at the equation (1.16), one can realise that
there is a huge potential issue of under-production in the economy under high
level of trend inﬂation. Due to the presence of substantial price dispersion
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(increasing function of p¯i), the equilibrium level output with positive trend
inﬂation will always be less than the equilibrium output level arises under no
price dispersion. This is also true to this log-linearised expression; for a given
level of technology, more labour is always required to produce the same level
of output when trend inﬂation exists in the steady state. Without growth in
labour input, the total production under high level of trend inﬂation could be
substantially lower than what it would be under zero trend inﬂation.
Starting from the expression of optimal reset price in terms of two auxil-
iary variables, one can eliminate φˆt, and upon replacing the expression of real
marginal cost, the New Keynesian Phillips curve can be written in terms of
output
pˆit = λ(p¯i)Yˆt + b1(p¯i) Etpˆit+1 + κ(p¯i)[ηsˆt − (η + 1)Aˆt]
+ b2(p¯i) [(1− σ)Yˆt − Etψˆt+1] (1.23)
This is the Generalised New Keynesian Phillips curve (GNKPC) in terms of
output, the reason it is called the generalised version is because it obtained by
log-linearising the model around a non-zero inﬂation steady state. Therefore, it
is a generalisation of the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve, so the model
is called a Generalised New Keynesian (GNK) model. This follows the same
terminology of Cogley and Sbordone (2008) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014).
Where κ(p¯i), λ(p¯i), b1, and b2 are composite coeﬃcients that are consist of
structural parameters in the economy.
κ(p¯i) ≡ (1−θp¯i−1)(1−θβp¯i)
θp¯i−1 , when p¯i = 1.00, κ(p¯i) =
(1−θ)(1−θβ)
θ
λ(p¯i) ≡ κ(p¯i)(η + σ), when p¯i = 1.00, λ(p¯i) = (1−θ)(1−θβ)(η+σ)
θ
b1(p¯i) ≡ β[1 + (p¯i − 1)(1− θp¯i−1)], when p¯i = 1.00, b1(p¯i) = β
b2(p¯i) ≡ β (1− θp¯i−1) (1− p¯i), when p¯i = 1.00, b2(p¯i) = 0
There are a few properties that can be immediately spotted from this
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GNKPC. According to the equation, we can see that as trend inﬂation p¯i in-
creases, the value of λ(p¯i) declines, and this clearly makes the GNKPC ﬂatter;
inﬂation respond less to change in output. This is one of the most important
features that trend inﬂation introduces to this Generalised New Keynesian
(GNK) model.
In addition, auxiliary variable ψˆt evolves according to the following equa-
tion.
ψˆt = (1− θβp¯i)[(η + 1)(Yˆt − Aˆt) + ηsˆt] + θβp¯i(Etpˆit+1 + Etψˆt+1) (1.24)
1.2.7 The Flexible Equilibrium
The ﬂexible economy is deﬁned by removing all the nominal rigidities, a state
where θ = 0, and s = p∗i = 1. Following Ascari and Sbordone (2014), here I
deﬁne the output gap under trend inﬂation steady state as the following:
xˆt = Yˆt − η + 1
η + σ
+ x¯ (1.25)
This output gap xˆt is the output gap based on non-zero inﬂation steady
state, and x¯ is deﬁned as the long run output gap due to non zero long run
inﬂation, as in Ascari and Sbordone (2014). The value of x¯ can be derived
from the steady state conditions listed in section 1.2.4.
One can now use the relationship between output gap and output to sub-
stitute actual output, and the system of equations can be rewritten in terms
of output gap.
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1.2.8 The Completed Generalised New Keynesian Model
• Dynamic IS Equation
xˆt = Etxˆt+1 +
1
σ
(ˆit − Etpˆit+1) + gˆt (1.26)
The term gˆt represents an ad hoc demand shock. Here, in order to
keep the model as close to the original CGG model as possible, I do
not introduce the natural interest rate. A similar case based on trend
inﬂation with natural interest rate can be found from Alves (2014), and
Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Wieland (2012).
• Generalised New Keynesian Phillips Curve (GNKPC)
pit = λ(p¯i)
[
xˆt +
η + 1
η + σ
Aˆt − x¯
]
+ κ(p¯i)(ηsˆt − (η + 1)Aˆt) + +b1(p¯i)Etpˆit+1
+ b2(p¯i)
[(
xˆt − x¯+ η + 1
η + σ
Aˆt
)
· (1− σ)− Etψˆt+1
]
+ ut (1.27)
The ut is a cost push that represents a shock to the supply side of the
economy. Price dispersion increases the persistence of output and inﬂa-
tion because there is mutual feedback between inﬂation and price dis-
persion, whose strength is governed by the parameter η.
• Price Dispersion
sˆt = θp¯i
−1
[
p¯i − 1
1− θp¯i−1
]
pˆit + [θp¯i
]sˆt−1 (1.28)
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• The Deﬁnition of ψ
ψˆt = (1− θβp¯i)
[
ηsˆt + (η + 1)
(
xˆt + x¯− 1− σ
σ + η
· Aˆt
)]
+ θβp¯i[Etψˆt+1 + Etpˆit+1] (1.29)
• Shocks
Aˆt = ρAAˆt−1 + eAt (1.30)
gˆt = ρAgˆt−1 + egt (1.31)
ut = ρuut−1 + eut (1.32)
mt = ρmmt−1 + emt (1.33)
This completes the entire small-scale Generalised New Keynesian (GNK)
model.
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1.3 Macroeconomic Dynamics Under Moderate
Trend Inﬂation
This section examines how the presence of positive trend inﬂation aﬀects the
macroeconomic dynamics in this small scale GNK model. Along with the
analysis, I also directly evaluate some of the major results from CGG regard-
ing monetary policy response to various exogenous shocks. In this section,
the monetary policy conduct is characterised by a standard contemporaneous
Taylor rule.
iˆt = ψpipˆi + ψyxˆt +mt (1.34)
This is the Taylor rule corresponding to equation 7.1 1 in CGG, but in
a slightly diﬀerent way. The rule suggests that the central bank responds
to the current inﬂation deviation from its non-zero steady state level p¯i. In
contrast to the one in 7.1 of CGG, the inﬂation target p¯i does not appear in
the Taylor rule and inﬂation deviation from the central bank's target does not
need to be written as pˆit − p¯i, because pˆit is already a measure of the inﬂation
deviation from the trend level, which is assumed to be equal to the central
bank's inﬂation target. This is why this entire GNK model is formed in a
consistent way as how trend inﬂation and inﬂation target should be modelled.
Moreover, equation 1.34 suggests the central bank should also react to output
gap, which is represented by the deviation of actual output from its natural
level under trend inﬂation. In addition, mt captures the monetary policy shock
in this economy.
1Equestion (7.1) on page pp.1695 in CGG: i∗t = α+ γpi(pit − p¯i) + γxxt
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1.3.1 Baseline Calibrations
There are total seven structural parameters in this small model plus the trend
inﬂation term p¯i. The calibration of this model mainly follows chapter 3 in ?.
The elasticity of marginal utility of consumption σ is assumed to be 1.5. At the
same time, the elasticity of labour supply η is set at 1.0. The discount factor β
is assumed to be 0.995, which means the steady state real interest rate is 1.25%
on a quarterly basis. The Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity of substitution among goods
 is set at 9, which implies a gross mark-up of 1.15. The Calvo parameter θ
for price setting is ﬁxed at 0.75, which implies an average price duration of
four quarters. For trend inﬂation p¯i, it is set at four diﬀerent levels, in order to
check how changes in trend inﬂation can aﬀect the macroeconomic dynamics
of the model. The four levels are 1.000, 1.005, 1.010, and 1.015, and they
correspond to annualised trend inﬂation of 0%, 2%, 4%, and 6%, respectively.
The inﬂation response parameter in the Taylor rule ψpi is assumed to be 1.5,
and this ensures that the Taylor principle is satisﬁed. Central bank's response
to output ψy is set at 0.125 on a quarterly basis. Table 1.1 summarises these
calibrated parameters.
Table 1.1: Calibrated Parameters
Description Parameter Calibrated value
Elast. of marginal utility of con. σ 1.5
Elast. of labour supply η 1.0
Elast. of substitution among goods  9
Calvo probability θ 0.75
Discount factor β 0.995
Inﬂation response ψpi 1.50
Output gap response ψy 0.125
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1.3.2 Equilibrium Dynamics
Changes in the level of trend inﬂation considerably aﬀect the macroeconomic
dynamics. In order to see what these eﬀects are, this section analyses the model
dynamics in case of three exogenous shock: shock to total factor productivity,
monetary policy shock and a shock to the GNKPC. The persistence parameter
of all three shocks are set at 0.50, i.e., ρa = ρm = ρu = 0.50, which implies
moderately persistent shocks.
Productivity Shock
Figure 1.1: Impulse response functions to a one percent productivity shock
(ρa = 0.50)
Figure 1.1 shows the impulse response functions (IRFs) of output, inﬂation,
nominal interest rate and price dispersion after a positive one percent shock
to total factor productivity. In general, there are two oﬀetting eﬀects of trend
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inﬂation after a technology shock. The ﬁrst thing to realise is that trend
inﬂation has a dampening eﬀect that technology shock makes on output and
inﬂation, due to the property that NKPC is ﬂatter with a higher level of trend
inﬂation. This is why inﬂation actually deviates less with higher levels of
trend inﬂation immediately after TFP shock. However, there is a second eﬀect
emerging from higher trend inﬂation: price setting agents become more forward
looking due to rise in trend inﬂation, therefore, trend inﬂation ampliﬁes this
the impact that this productivity shock can make to output and inﬂation.
This explains why output with higher inﬂation reacts more to this shock with
higher trend inﬂation throughout the entire forecast horizon (10 quarters).
Ascari and Sbordone (2014) demonstrates this issue by evaluating the IRFs
after two extreme productivity shocks: a purely transitory shock (ρa = 0) and a
highly-persistent shock (ρa = 0.95), their IRFs show exactly these two extreme
scenarios. When ρa = 0, the ﬂattening Phillips curve dominates; while when
ρa = 0.95, the forward looking eﬀect dominates. This analysis is a complement
to Ascari and Sbordone (2014)'s studies. Here, I show that when persistence
level is moderately persistent (ρa = 0.50, a more neutral scenario), output
is dominated by the forward looking eﬀect from the beginning; as it shows
greater response with higher trend inﬂation. The response of inﬂation shows
that the ﬂattening Phillips curve impact outplays the other eﬀect at the start,
but soon the situation is reversed after two quarters. As one can see from the
IRF of inﬂation, inﬂation generates an increasingly high level of ﬂuctuations
with higher trend inﬂation towards the end of the forecast horizon.
In addition, there is an extra feedback eﬀect on inﬂation from price disper-
sion, but it is not captured by inﬂation at the beginning. As price dispersion
is about to reach its maximum deviation in the third and fourth quarter, this
feedback eﬀect is strong enough so that inﬂation is pushed to a greater level
of deviation with high trend inﬂation.
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Monetary Policy Shock
Figure 1.2: Impulse response functions to a one percent contractionary mone-
tary policy shock (ρm = 0.50)
Figure 1.2 reports the impulse response functions (IRFs) of four key macroeco-
nomic variables: output, inﬂation, nominal interest rate, and price dispersion,
after a one percentage point contractionary monetary policy shock. Under
higher level of trend inﬂation, agents are less concerned with the current state
of the economy, and become more forward looking. Hence, agents feel the
signal of contraction in the economy and lower their expectation of inﬂation
to a greater extent with higher trend inﬂation, this lowers value of Etpˆit+1 and
leads to a higher output level according to the IS equation. Given a ρm = 0.50
persistence level, inﬂation initially drops to a lower level with higher trend
inﬂation due to more forward looking generated by trend inﬂation. Then,
large negative deviation in price dispersion feeds back to inﬂation and leads to
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even lower inﬂation with higher trend inﬂation. Combined with the ﬂattening
Phillips curve eﬀect, inﬂation becomes more independent from output. This
decline in inﬂation is so great with higher levels of trend inﬂation that the
central bank needs to relax the rise in nominal interest rate with higher trend
inﬂation in order to stabilise the economy, as suggested by the Taylor rule.
Therefore, this ultimately leads to a lower decline in output and a smaller rise
in nominal interest rate with higher levels of trend inﬂation throughout the
entire forecast horizon.
Cost Push Shock
Figure 1.3: Impulse response functions to a one percent cost push shock (ρu =
0.50)
Figure 1.3 summarises the impulse response functions of the same four macro
variables after a one percent cost push shock. At initiation, inﬂation is pushed
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up further with higher trend inﬂation due to agents become more forward
looking, and a cost push shock certainly makes price setting ﬁrms more con-
cerned about future price level growth. This is reﬂected by higher expected
inﬂation Etpˆit+1 and higher current inﬂation, as suggested by the GNKPC with
ut . Output is dampened further with higher trend due to higher Etpˆit+1 as in-
dicated by the dynamic IS equation. Price dispersion is still making damaging
eﬀects on inﬂation, and the central bank needs to raise nominal interest rate
to a higher level with greater trend inﬂation in order to stabilise the economy.
Furthermore, in this cost push case, it is not hard to ﬁnd that the alterations
of equilibrium dynamics are asymmetrical to change in trend inﬂation levels:
increase in macro variables ﬂuctuations due to rise in trend inﬂation are much
higher when trend inﬂation is already high (4 percent to 6 percent) than in-
crease in ﬂuctuations when trend inﬂation is at a lower level (2 percent to 4
percent).
To sum up, as the above studies show us, trend inﬂation can make con-
siderable impacts on the macroeconomic dynamics of this GNK model. As
a result of the change in inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ faced monetary authority,
this can leads to further eﬀects on the optimal monetary policy practice, and
this is what the next section focuses.
1.4 Optimal Monetary Policy
The prominent Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) study of monetary policy pro-
duces a comprehensive survey and evaluation of the optimal stabilisation policy
under New Keynesian framework. This section attempts to re-examine the key
results and implications of CGG and investigate whether these key results still
hold under a similar-in-scale, but Generalised New Keynesian (GNK) model
with moderate trend inﬂation.
The exercise starts with the description of monetary policy conduct of a
representative central bank, then followed by separate discussions and evalua-
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tions of optimal monetary stabilisation policy under diﬀerent regimes. The two
monetary conducts examined in this chapter include the discretionary policy
and rule-based commitment policy.
1.4.1 Policy Speciﬁcations
As in a series of literatures and standard textbooks on monetary economics,
for example, Woodford (2003) and Walsh (2017); a central bank that adopts
optimisation-based monetary policy rule seeks to maximise its objective func-
tion, which is typically represented by a quadratic loss function, subject to the
constraint, which is usually characterised by a New Keynesian Philips curve.
As in Ch.3 of Woodford (2003), I assume a quadratic loss function of the
monetary authority, which is approximated from a representative household's
utility function, it takes the following form:
ω =
1
2
Et
∞∑
j=0
βj[χxˆ2t+j + pˆi
2
t+j]
where χ represents the weight assigned by the central bank to output sta-
bilisation relative to inﬂation stabilisation, and this can be seen as an indicator
of the hawkishness of this central bank. Output gap xˆt is the log-diﬀerence
of actual output from the natural output level, therefore, it assumes the cen-
tral bank views the natural output level as the target. This pˆit now stands
for the inﬂation gap, which is deﬁned as the inﬂation deviation from its non
zero steady state level2. Since it is linearised around trend inﬂation, hence it
directly implies by how much inﬂation deviate from the central bank's target,
a correct and consistent measure of welfare loss from inﬂation, but it is not the
case in the original CGG where inﬂation stands for deviation from zero steady
state. This issue becomes even more ﬂawed when one adds an inﬂation target
to the loss function in a standard NK model, which means the bank targets
2This deﬁnition can be easily found from other literature on trend inﬂation and inﬂation
persistence. For example, Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010), Cogley and Sbordone (2008)
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positive inﬂation while the economy is modelled around zero inﬂation steady
state, a completely illogical practice.
Another issue arises with the presence of trend inﬂation. This original
quadratic loss function from Woodford (2003) is indeed approximated around
a zero inﬂation state, hence, it is not an accurate measure of the loss in so-
cial welfare when steady state inﬂation is non-zero, as noted by Ascari and
Ropele (2007). There are a couple of issues with studying optimal monetary
policy based on a quadratic loss function that is approximate around a zero
inﬂation steady state, as summarised by Alves (2014): ﬁrst, a second order
approximation around zero inﬂation SS underestimates the true curvature of
the welfare function when the SS inﬂation is indeed around a positive trend.
Second, such second order approximation based on a non-zero inﬂation SS fails
to endogenise the welfare loss incurred when trend inﬂation is indeed positive.
He also pointed out that when the optimal monetary policy is achieved by sta-
bilising inﬂation at this positive value through inﬂation targeting, the above
issues suggest that a more accurate policy evaluation is obtained when such
approximation is done around a non-zero inﬂation steady state. Alves (2014),
therefore, develop a second order approximation of households' utility function
around a non-zero inﬂation steady state, the major diﬀerence with the Wood-
ford (2003) loss function is the weight for output gap stabilisation χ. Based
on the parameter and utility function, it can be expressed as:
χ(p¯i) =
1− θp¯i−1
1− θp¯i ·
λ(p¯i)

To have a closer look at this composite coeﬃcient χ(p¯i), the term trend
inﬂation p¯i now appear in the output gap weight, and therefore it aﬀects the
weight directly. More speciﬁcally, as the level of trend inﬂation grows, the
value of χ(p¯i) drops, this eﬀect is ampliﬁed by the decline in λ(p¯i) caused by
increasing trend inﬂation, as discusses in previous sections. This implies that
the central bank should take stabilising inﬂation more seriously when trend
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inﬂation is present than when it is absent, also, there is more demand for
less response to the output gap. Thus, the weight χ from the central bank's
objective function is replaced by this χ(p¯i) for the rest of the optimal monetary
policy studies. One needs to realise that any composite coeﬃcient followed by
a p¯i in the bracket, directly relies on the level of trend inﬂation.
1.4.2 Optimal Monetary Policy under Discretion
To follow the original CGG paper closely, this chapter also mainly focus on
two optimisation-based monetary policy rules: discretionary policy and com-
mitment policy. The former is hardly a rule because the central bank is not
constrained from the past behaviour in any credible way, and the latter takes
the speciﬁc mechanism of what Woodford (2003) deﬁnes as the timeless per-
spective commitment rule. As CGG points out that to better understand
the gains from commitment policy-making, it is necessary to understand how
inﬂation may aﬀect the optimal response under a benchmark case with no
commitment.
A discretionary central bank minimises its loss function subject to the
GNKPC for the current period, and ﬁnd the optimal condition (Walsh, 2017).
Then plug this optimality condition back into the dynamic IS equation to
obtain the implied monetary policy feedback rule. Due to the lack of credibility
to the public, a discretionary central bank re-optimises when it arrives every
single period, practically, the bank is only concerned with the current economic
circumstances. This behaviour is usually described as "lean against the wind"
by economists.
In order to exercise the study in a more straightforward manner, I set the
elasticity of substitution in consumption σ = 1 (which implies log utility for
consumption), therefore, the GNKPC becomes
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pit = κ(p¯i)ηsˆt + λ(p¯i)(xˆt − x¯) + b1(p¯i)Etpˆit+1 − b2Etψˆt+1 + ut (1.35)
Since a discretionary central bank only focuses on the current period, therefore,
this becomes a single period static choice for the bank. In each period, the
central bank chooses a set of three variables xˆt, pˆit, iˆt, two targeting variables
and the policy instrument, to maximise the objective function subject to the
GNKPC and the dynamic IS equation. Practically, this optimisation problem
consists of two states: in the ﬁrst stage, the central bank obtains the optimal
value of xˆt and pˆit that maximise its objective, subject to constraints. In the
second stage, conditional on the optimal values of xˆt and pˆit, the bank deter-
mines the value of iˆt implied by the dynamic IS equation. More speciﬁcally,
since the bank is not able to make any credible promise to the public, hence
it is in its best interests to ﬁnd the optimal value of xˆt and pˆit that maximise
its objective in the current period only. In addition, the central bank has to
take the private sector expectations as given as it has no control over public
beliefs. The static optimisation problem can be written as the following
L =
1
2
(χ(p¯i)xˆ2t+pˆi
2
t )+Γt
[
pˆit − κ(p¯i)ηsˆt − λ(p¯i)(xˆt − x¯)− b1Etpˆit+1 + b2ψˆt+1
]
(1.36)
The ﬁrst order conditions and solution to the ﬁrst stage problem yield the
following optimal condition
xˆt = −λ(p¯i)
χ(p¯i)
· pˆit
The solution is very similar to the one obtain in original CGG and Ascari
and Ropele (2007). However, they are diﬀerent in the way that both λ(p¯i) and
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χ(p¯i) now depend on the value of p¯i. The CGG does not take into account the
eﬀect of trend inﬂation, while the Ascari and Ropele (2007) study uses a ﬁxed
χ, which does not take into account the eﬀect of p¯i. Recall the deﬁnition of
χ(p¯i) = 1−θp¯i
−1
1−θp¯i · λ(p¯i) , one can replace χ(p¯i) in the above optimality condition
and obtain that
xˆt = −(1− θp¯i
) · 
1− θp¯i−1 · pˆit
This expression becomes much more straightforward in terms of the eﬀect
from rising trend inﬂation, it implies that as trend inﬂation p¯i increases, the
coeﬃcient for inﬂation pˆi becomes larger in absolute value, i.e., more negative.
Therefore, this implies more output needs to be sacriﬁced in order to stabilise
inﬂation deviation from the central bank's target. This is not completely in
line with the results from Ascari and Ropele (2007), as they fail to take into
account the change in the deﬁnition of χ due to the presence of trend inﬂation.
There are now two very important countering eﬀects here: on the one
hand, as the coeﬃcient for inﬂation in the optimal condition become larger
with higher trend inﬂation, the central bank should respond less to inﬂation
deviation from target because the sacriﬁce of output is dramatically increased
compared with no trend inﬂation. This suggests the monetary authority should
be less aggressive to inﬂation ﬂuctuations. On the other hand, since χ(p¯i) be-
comes smaller with higher trend, therefore, the stabilisation of output becomes
much less important for the central bank with higher trend inﬂation, and inﬂa-
tion ﬂuctuations become much more costly; the central bank should be much
less concerned with the decline in output compared with the increase in in-
ﬂation, and this suggests the central bank should be more aggressive to a
inﬂationary shock.
Furthermore, inﬂation deviation is more costly under higher trend inﬂation
due to an additional channel from price dispersion caused by higher trend
inﬂation and the mutual feedback between inﬂation and price dispersion, and
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this trade-oﬀ between stabilising inﬂation and stabilising output becomes even
greater here as a result of trend inﬂation. The total eﬀects may yield a situation
where the central bank to cut output level by a greater amount with higher
trend inﬂation in order to keep inﬂation at a lower rate at the cost of output
contraction, as the cost of inﬂation is hugely ampliﬁed. But these overall eﬀects
are largely determined by the value of parameters in the model.
Stabilisation under Discretion - Cost Push Shock
Figure 1.4: Impulse response functions to a one percent cost push shock under
discretionary policy (ρu = 0.90)
Figure 1.4 shows the impulse response functions of output, inﬂation, real
interest rate and price dispersion after a highly persistent cost push shock
(ρu = 0.90). Clearly, the trade-oﬀ between stabilising output gap and inﬂation
is still present, it means theResult 1 from CGG still hold with trend inﬂation.
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The IRFs in Figure 1.4 conﬁrm the initial inference: the rise in inﬂation
is indeed lower for higher levels of trend inﬂation because it is too costly for
the central bank to tolerate inﬂation now. Quantitatively, inﬂation with 6
percent trend inﬂation is 23 percent lower than inﬂation with 0 percent trend
inﬂation in period 1. Also, in order to control inﬂation with a higher trend,
output is dampened by a greater amount (10 percent more decline in output
for 6 percent trend compared with zero trend) with higher trend inﬂation, as
indicated by the IRF of output.
Stabilisation under Discretion - Productivity Shock
Figure 1.5: Impulse response functions to a one percent productivity shock
under discretionary policy (ρa = 0.90)
Figure 1.5 shows exactly the opposite scenario for the same story. When the
central bank is faced with deﬂationary pressure after a shock to total factor
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productivity, the central bank stabilises the economy by reducing the drop in
inﬂation due to deﬂation is now too costly for the bank combined with large
negative price dispersion. At the same time, output is allowed to deviate to a
greater extent with higher levels of trend inﬂation. These responses of output
and inﬂation justify the analysis in previous paragraphs. In addition, the two
sets of IRFs demonstrate that the Result 2 from CGG still hold; the optimal
policy incorporates inﬂation targeting in the sense that it requires to aim for
convergence of inﬂation to its target over time.
The Result 3 of Taylor principle in CGG is also valid in this GNK model.
In fact, due to the presence of trend inﬂation, satisfying the Taylor Principle
becomes a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for determinacy. As docu-
mented in Ascari and Ropele (2009) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011),
this extension of the Taylor Principle breaks down with positive trend inﬂation
because the slope of the NKPC becomes negative for extremely high levels of
trend inﬂation. Small but positive responses to the output gap lead to lower
minimum responses to inﬂation to achieve determinacy, as it was the case
under zero inﬂation steady state (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2011).
The Classic Inﬂationary Bias Problem
The Result 5 of CGG describe the presence of inﬂationary bias under a dis-
cretionary central bank. As many New Keynesian papers and textbooks of
New Keynesian economics; a discretionary central bank always makes extra
welfare loss due to the short term temptation of pursuing positive output gap.
Suppose a discretionary central bank pursues a positive output gap target,
which implies the monetary authority intentionally keeps actual output above
its natural level. The new objective function for the central bank can be
rewritten as
ω =
1
2
Et
∞∑
j=0
βj[χ(p¯i)(xˆt+j − ξ)2 + pˆi2t+j]
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where ξ is the output gap target, and it satisﬁes ξ > 0.
Optimisation yields the following ﬁrst order condition
xˆξt = −
λ(p¯i)
χ(p¯i)
· pˆiξt + ξ
The superscript ξ stands for the variables in optimal solution under the
scenario when ξ > 0. According to this optimal condition, ξ term is still
in the optimal condition and the inﬂationary bias is still present in this GNK
model. This indicates that if a central bank pursues a policy that pushes output
above its natural level, then it has to accept the fact that inﬂation would be
substantially above its target at the same time with no gain in output.
Subsequently, this implies no matter what level of inﬂation the central bank
targets, as long as the bank seeks to create a positive output gap in the short
run, there is no way it can meet its own target, even when the target is zero.
Thus, the action of ignoring trend inﬂation in the model becomes inevitably
fatal.
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1.4.3 Optimal Monetary Policy under Commitment
A commitment central bank conducts monetary policy by making credible
commitments to the public and strictly follow these promises. Since the central
bank is credible, hence, it is not only concerned about the current state of the
economy, but all the future periods, and a lifetime optimisation has to be
taken into account when it makes decisions. The central bank now maximises
its objective function for its lifetime and subject to constraints in all the future
periods. A dynamic optimisation problem can be written as
L =
1
2
Et{βj[χ(p¯i)xˆ2t+j + pˆi2t+j]
+ Γt+j
[
pˆit+j − κ(p¯i)ηsˆt+j − λ(p¯i)xˆt+j − b1Etpˆit+j+1 + b2ψˆt+j+1
]
(1.37)
In this example, I solve the optimal policy by appyiyng the timeless per-
spective method from Woodford (2003). The timeless perspective commitment
rule is designed to solve the problem of time inconsistency, which arises under
commitment and it suggests the central bank should ignore the optimality for
the initial period and apply the optimal conditions for following periods, as
viewing the problem from inﬁnite future. The optimal solution of timeless
perspective yields
xˆt+i − xˆt+i−1 = −λ(p¯i)
χ(p¯i)
· pˆit+i
for i = 1, 2, 3, ...
This optimal condition is almost identical to equation (4.18) in CGG, the
only diﬀerence is that the two parameters in front of inﬂation pˆit+1 directly
rely on the level of trend inﬂation. The distinction with the optimal condition
under discretion is the central bank now stabilise inﬂation by controlling the
change of output over two consecutive periods. The same rationale obtained
under discretion still hold: as trend inﬂation increases, a commitment central
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bank stabilise inﬂationary pressure by creating a negative change of output
gap, in other words, a drop of output gap from the previous period. However,
due to the credibility it obtains under commitment, the central bank can con-
trol targeting variables by inﬂuencing future expectations in the economy in
the sense that it can make credible promises regarding central bank's future
stabilisation activities. The ampliﬁed trade-oﬀ between stabilisations of inﬂa-
tion and output is still present according to this optimality, the way of central
bank response is diﬀerent, nonetheless. As trend inﬂation increases, the price
setting ﬁrms become more forward looking, this facilitates the policymaker to
use more forward guidance to inﬂuence future expectations.
Stabilisation under Commitment - Cost Push Shock
Figure 1.6: Impulse response functions to a one percent cost push shock under
timeless perspective commitment policy (ρu = 0.90)
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With credibility to the public, a central bank under commitment can better
control inﬂation by inﬂuencing expectations of the future. The best way to
study stabilisation performance and potential gains from commitment policy
is to see how the central bank react after a cost push shock. Figure 1.6 shows
the impulse response functions for a highly persistent cost push shock. Similar
to the case under discretion, inﬂation jumps on impact by less with higher
levels of trend inﬂation. This lower inﬂation for higher trend is due to the fact
that inﬂation becomes much more costly with higher trend through its impact
on χ(p¯i), as demonstrated under the previous case of discretion.
Quantitatively, the initial deviations of inﬂation is much lower than that
under discretion for all four levels of trend inﬂation, huge welfare gains from
commitment on inﬂation can be observed. This is achieved by making credible
promises to the public that the central bank is to conduct disinﬂationary policy
for the future. The price-setting ﬁrms are reluctant to raise prices immediately
after a cost push shock if they expect the monetary authority is to respond
with this promised contractionary policy. For output, the initial decline is
only around half of that under discretion with 6 percent trend inﬂation; a
considerable improvement from the discretionary policy. This is also achieved
by responding to change in output gap rather than directly react to output gap;
inﬂation expectation is anchored in the short run, and according to the optimal
condition under commitment, the contraction in output does not need to be as
large as it is under discretion. Overall, the monetary authority achieves a much
better inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ under commitment by suﬃciently utilising its
ability to inﬂuence inﬂation expectations. In fact, the nominal interest is cut
to negative value from its steady state, and this allows the central bank to oﬀer
more accommodations to output and then soon to raise it as it promises to
the public. This is in contrast toAscari and Ropele (2007) where they assume
a constant χ, which does not depend on the value of p¯i. This eliminates one
of the two channels in this monetary stabilisation process, and it implies the
central bank does not become less concerned with output deviation as trend
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inﬂation rises. Therefore, this study produces very diﬀerent quantitative and
qualitative implications.
Stabilisation under Commitment - Productivity Shock
Figure 1.7: Impulse response functions to a one percent productivity shock
under timeless perspective commitment policy (ρa = 0.90)
Figure 1.7 oﬀers the IRFs of output, inﬂation, nominal interest rate, and price
dispersion after a productivity shock. Again, due to the higher cost of inﬂa-
tion (in this case, deﬂation), the central bank responds more aggressively to
inﬂation with higher trend and lifts inﬂation to a higher level compared with
inﬂation with lower trend. Combined with the credibility to the public, com-
mitment produces a better stabilisation trade-oﬀ than discretion, as the IRF
of output also suggests. Both inﬂation and output deviate quantitatively much
less than they do under discretion. In addition, by comparing IRFs of output
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and inﬂation under commitment with that under discretion, one can notice
that macroeconomic ﬂuctuations are much less persistent under commitment
after shocks with the same persistence level as compared with discretion.
Trend inﬂation has profound quantitative and qualitative impact on the
optimal monetary stabilisation policy in the business cycle. Even though a
majority of the results from CGG sill hold in this GNK model, the quantitative
analyses change drastically once trend inﬂation is taken into account. Some of
the results shown here are subject to a number of uncertainties. For example,
the values of parameters, as shown in section 1.4. When an increase in trend
inﬂation has oﬀsetting eﬀects on the optimal monetary response, the overall net
eﬀects depend on the calibrated values of structural parameters. Furthermore,
in practice, it is hard for the central bank to accurately estimate the true value
of the natural level of output, hence, whether the weight of output stabilisation
χ(p¯i) should be even lower in practice when estimating natural output becomes
increasingly hard is subject to debate. At least, this section demonstrates that
trend inﬂation plays a signiﬁcant role in the New Keynesian Models.
1.5 Conclusion
This opening chapter forms a Generalised New Keynesian (GNK) model. Un-
like the traditional New Keynesian model, this model is log-linearised around a
non-zero inﬂation steady state, hence, it is a generalisation of the standard New
Keynesian model. This GNK solves the empirical inconsistency that long run
inﬂation is far from zero in the postwar industrialised countries, and also the
practical incoherence that no major central bank in the world acutally pursue
a zero inﬂation long run target. This GNK model exhibit a number of fea-
tures. First, the generalised New Keynesian Phillips curve (GNKPC) becomes
ﬂatter as trend inﬂation increases where inﬂation reacts less to change in out-
put or output gap as trend inﬂation increases. Second, the ﬂattening GNKPC
implies that agents are more forward looking as a result of an increase in inﬂa-
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tion. Furthermore, I show that trend inﬂation alters macroeconomic dynamics
in a signiﬁcant way, these alterations depend on the nature of shocks, also the
calibrated value of parameters.
For optimal monetary policy, the quadratic loss function for central bank's
stabilisation practice changes when it is approximated around a non-zero inﬂa-
tion steady state. In particular, the weight of stabilisation for output or output
gap relies on the value of trend inﬂation; monetary authority is less concerned
with output stabilisation as trend inﬂation rises. The generates two countering
eﬀects for optimal monetary response under a high level of trend inﬂation. On
the one hand, as the weight for output stabilisation drops due to higher trend
inﬂation, and combined with the fact that inﬂation ﬂuctuations become much
more costly for the central bank, the central bank should respond to inﬂation
deviation more aggressively. On the other hand, as trend inﬂation increases,
more output needs to be sacriﬁced in order to keep inﬂation stable, this makes
the central bank to react less aggressively to inﬂation ﬂuctuations and make
the inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ even more serious. The overall net eﬀect really
depends on the value of key parameters. In the examples shown in section
1.4, I demonstrate a case where central bank tolerate a huge drop in output in
order to keep inﬂation stable at higher trend inﬂation level under discretion.
However, a commitment monetary authority that can make credible promises
to the public can achieve a much superior stabilisation outcome and better
inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ by inﬂuencing expectations about the future.
This chapter provides a cornerstone and indicator for the rest of this thesis
regarding the role of trend inﬂation in New Keynesian DSGE models. The next
two chapters are to study and evaluate this issue in a much more sophisticated
environment and complicated model set-ups.
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Chapter 2
Shocks, Frictions, and Trend
Inﬂation in a Medium-Scale
Generalised New Keynesian
Model: A Bayesian DSGE
Approach
2.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has shown that trend inﬂation has a huge impact on
the overall dynamics of macroeconomic variables and optimal monetary re-
sponse in a small-scale New Keynesian model with Calvo price setting. This
chapter goes one step further by extending the analysis to a medium-scale NK
DSGE model. There is very limited literature that uses medium scale New
Keynesian model for the purpose of studying trend inﬂation. There are a few
reasons behind this tendency. First, for implementation-related motivations,
it is practically challenging to log-linearise a system of equations based on a
medium-scale model around a non-zero inﬂation steady state, even though the
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presence of trend inﬂation only aﬀects equations for price and wage setting
behaviour. Second, for a medium-scale GNK model, it is not possible to con-
duct determinacy analysis like Ascari and Ropele (2009) analytically, and the
only solution is to rely on numerical methods. The eﬀect of trend inﬂation on
macro dynamics has been proven and evaluated in literature, however, there is
no guarantee that such impact can be replicated in the same way based a much
more complicated model. By changing one parameter (p¯i) with a tiny fraction,
it may not impact a model that involve around 20 structural parameters in
any signiﬁcant way.
Previous literature with relevant work including Arias, Ascari, Branzoli
and Castelnuovo (2018) where they use a medium-scale New Keynesian model
based on Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2007) but without price or wage indexation. They ﬁnd that the probability
of determinacy drops considerably conditional on model-free estimates of the
monetary policy rule based on real-time data, and this is largely due to the
heavy response to output gap in the estimated policy rule. However, their work
does not include anything about the impact from trend inﬂation on macroe-
conomic dynamics. Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims (2018) apply a medium-scale
NK model with trend inﬂation by adding a few new features: trend growth
in investment-speciﬁc technology, extended working capital channel, round-
about production function structure. They argue that trend inﬂation plays a
signiﬁcant role in this model due to these newly-added features.
Based on this limited literature, I think it is important to look at the is-
sue of trend inﬂation based an estimated medium-scale New Keynesian model
and I believe the best way to execute this is to re-develop the famous Smets
and Wouters (2007) (SW07 henceforth) based on trend inﬂation. This model
is regarded as a state-of-the-art framework for New Keynesian monetary eco-
nomics and has been widely cited in a large number of papers. Furthermore, as
other authors have found that trend inﬂation interacts signiﬁcantly with new
additional features of such model (Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims, 2018), I think
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it is essential to keep the model as close to the original SW07 framework as
possible, and just to correct its inconsistency with regards to the assumption
of zero-inﬂation steady state.
Therefore, the primary research questions of this Chapter 2 are: 1) whether
a medium-scale New Keynesian model like Smets andWouters (2007)
with trend inﬂation can capture the macro data in postwar US? and
2) what impact does trend inﬂation make to macro variables and
dynamics in such a medium-scale Generalised NK model?
In order to answer the ﬁrst question, I also estimate this medium-scale
GNK model using a Bayesian technique, the same method as original SW07.
The model I develop in this chapter inherits most of the key features of the
SW07, but based on a non-zero inﬂation steady state, which is absent from
their original model. First, my model combines non-zero steady state inﬂa-
tion with nominal price and wage rigidities and also partial indexation in both
price and wage settings. Second, there are several real frictions in this model:
habit formation in consumption preferences, adjustment cost in investment,
and variable capital utilisation rate. Third, it incorporates real output growth
per capita generated from total factor productivity growth. Fourth, the Kim-
ball (1995) aggregator is replaced by the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) index, in
order to obtain the assumption of CES. Fifth, the central bank conducts mone-
tary policy by setting nominal interest rate according to an inertial Taylor-type
policy rule.
The intention of this study is to keep the assumptions as close to the orig-
inal SW07 in order to evaluate how much diﬀerence does trend inﬂation alone
can make. Therefore, I keep the assumption of backward indexation in the
model used in this chapter. However, as a few studies have shown that the
degree of indexation has a huge inﬂuence on the eﬀect of trend inﬂation in such
models. Ascari and Branzoli (2015) point out that when indexation is zero,
inﬂation persistence depends only on the level of trend inﬂation, the inﬂation
gap is purely forward-looking and trend inﬂation aﬀects the model dynamics
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inducing inertia in the adjustment through price dispersion which is a back-
ward looking variable. Nevertheless, full indexation makes the inﬂation gap
persistent, eliminates the eﬀects of trend inﬂation on macroeconomic dynamics
of the model. Thus, it is worth to look at the two diﬀerent cases where index-
ation is present and not. For this reason, I add a new parameter to the model
that controls the overall degree of indexation, so that in the next chapter I can
switch indexation oﬀ and to check the diﬀerence that indexation makes on the
role of trend inﬂation for the model dynamics.
The rest of this chapter is organised as the following: section 2.2 develops a
medium-scale Generalised New Keynesian model, then followed by section 2.3
where the Bayesian estimation is presented and discussed. Section 2.4 conducts
a sub-sample estimation in order to see whether the level of trend inﬂation
changes over time. Then, section 2.5 focuses on the impact of trend inﬂation
on macro dynamics. Finally, section 2.6 draws some concluding remarks.
2.2 The Medium Scale New Keynesian DSGE
Model with Trend Inﬂation
This section presents the medium-scale Generalised New Keynesian (GNK)
DSGE model with the explicit modelling of trend inﬂation. It is largely based
on the Smets and Wouters (2007) model with a number of modiﬁcations, which
are discussed in detail in the following sub-sections. Throughout this thesis,
I refer this GNK model with indexation and trend inﬂation as the benchmark
model, there are three more diﬀerent versions derived from this benchmark
model are formed for further studies in later sections and chapter.
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2.2.1 Decision-Making by Firms, Households and the Gov-
ernment
Final Goods Producers
The ﬁnal goods producers face a perfectly competitive market, where ﬁrms
are price takers. Nevertheless, unlike the SW07 model where they use Kimball
(1995) aggregator, here, I assume a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) style aggrega-
tor, which implies a constant elasticity of substitution (CES). The subscript
i represents individual intermediate good producer, and there is a continuum
of intermediate goods ﬁrms, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. At a given point in time t,
a perfectly competitive ﬁnal goods ﬁrm produces the ﬁnal consumption good
Yt by combining a continuum of intermediate goods Yt(i), according to the
technology
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
1
1+λp,t di
)1+λp,t
The problem for a representative ﬁnal goods ﬁrm is to maximise its proﬁt
maxYt,Yt(i) PtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di
where Pt(i) is the price of the ith intermediate goods and Pt is the aggregate
good price in the economy. The ﬁrst order condition with respect to Yt(i)
implies the following demand function for the ith intermediate goods:
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)− 1+λp,t
λp,t
Yt
and aggregate price index
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
− 1
λp,t
]−λp,t
The parameter λp,t determines the degree of mark-up of intermediate goods
ﬁrms and can be considered as a measure of market power in the intermediate
53
goods market. A shock to λp,t represents a price mark-up shock.
Intermediate Goods Producers
The intermediate goods sector is a monopolistic competition market and ﬁrms
optimise their prices in each period subject to Calvo (1983) contract. In con-
trast to the original SW07 set-up, there is no labour-augmenting deterministic
trend growth in the economy. F stands for the ﬁxed cost of the produc-
tion process, and the intermediate goods producer's production process can be
characterised by a standard Cobb-Douglas function.
Yt(i) = ZtK
s
t (i)
αLt(i)
1−α − F (2.1)
where Kst (i) is the capital service used by individual producer i. Zt is the total
factor productivity, and an exogenous shock to Zt represents a technology
shock.
Firm's proﬁt function is given by:
Πt = Pt(i)Yt(i)−WtLt(i)−RktKst (i)
The ﬁrst order condition of proﬁt maximisation problem yields the following
optimalities:
Kst =
(
α
1− α
)
Wt
Rkt
· Lt (2.2)
MCt = α
−α(1− α)α−1Z−1t ·W 1−αt (Rkt )−α (2.3)
Where MCt is the nominal marginal cost for intermediate ﬁrms, and it is
the same across ﬁrms, therefore, the subscript i can be dropped.
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Price Resetting Firms
A minor change from the original SW07 model regarding the prices and wages
indexation is the introduction of a new parameter, the total degree of index-
ation, which is governed by a separate parameter χ. The reason behind this
assumption of partial indexation in price and wage settings is that it can be
easily used to switch oﬀ indexation in later chapters by simply setting χ = 0,
this is just for practical convenience. This generalisation has further beneﬁts
when I conduct trend inﬂation exercise in later sections and chapter. As ex-
plained by Ascari and Branzoli (2015) and Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims (2018),
full indexation would nullify the eﬀects of trend inﬂation, and limits to second
order eﬀects of price dispersion, which is one of the most crucial variables in
this model.
Even though SW07 claims that their set-up of indexation is partial as a
result of the weighted average of past inﬂation and steady state inﬂation, the
price would change in every period no matter how much weight is assigned to
past inﬂation, the price is simply indexed to steady state inﬂation, which is
similar to one of the two options in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)
model. A similar way of indexing to steady state inﬂation can also be found
in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) and Yun (1996).
The optimal price reset problem for intermediate ﬁrms can be written as
maxP˜t(i) Et
∞∑
s=0
ζsp
[
βΞt+sPt
ΞtPt+s
]
·
(
P˜t(i)
s∏
l=1
(pi
lp
t+l−1p¯i
(1−lp))χ −MCt+s
)
Yt+s(i)
subject to
Yt+s(i) = Yt+s
(
Pt+s(i)
Pt+s
)− 1+λp,t+s
λp,t+s
Pt+s(i) = Pt(i)
s∏
l=1
(pi
lp
t+l−1p¯i
(1−lp))χ = Pt(i)Xt,s
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Where P˜t(i) is the optimal reset price in a given period t, and ζp is the
Calvo nominal rigidity parameter and it deﬁnes the probably that a ﬁrm is
not allowed to reset its price in a given period. Πt =
Pt−1
Pt
is deﬁned as the
gross inﬂation rate. βΞt+sPt
ΞPt+s
is the stochastic discount factor for ﬁrms.
First order condition with respect to P˜t(i) yields
Et
∞∑
s=0
ζsp
[
βsΞt+sPt
ΞtPt+s
]
· Yt+s(i) ·
(
1
λp,t+s
)
[(1 + λp,t+s)MCt+s − P˜t(i)Xt,s] = 0
(2.4)
The aggregate price index in the economy is given by
Pt =
[
(1− ζp)P˜
− 1
λp,t
t + ζp((pi
lp
t−1p¯i
1−lp)χPt−1)
− 1
λp,t
]−λp,t
2.2.2 Households
There is a continuum of households, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], and the representa-
tive household attempts to maximise the lifetime utility
Et
∞∑
s=0
βsp
[
1
1− σc (Ct+s(j)− λCt+s−1(j))
1−σc
]
· exp
(
σc − 1
1 + σl
· Lt+s(j)1+σl
)
Subject to the corresponding lifetime budget constraint
Ct+s(j) + It+s(j) +
Bt+s(j)
Rt+sPt+s
− Tt+s
=
Bt+s−1(j)
Pt+s
+
Wt+s(j)Lt+s(j)
Pt+s
+
Rkt+sUt+s(j)Kt+s(j)
Pt+s−1
−a(ut+s(j)Kt+s−1(j) + Divt+s
Pt+s
The utility function takes exactly the same form as the original SW07
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model, where λ is the parameter that governs habit formation in consumption
preference. Bt is the government bonds holding, with a gross return rate of
Rt. Divt+s is the proﬁts redistributed to households for the share they hold in
ﬁrms. Note, utilities in consumption and leisure are non-separable.
Meanwhile, the capital accumulation process can be deﬁned as the follow-
ing:
Kt(j) = (1− δ) ·Kt−1(j) +
[
1− µtS
(
It(j)
It−1(j)
)]
· It(j)
S(·) is the capital adjustment cost function, with the property of S(1) =
1, S ′(1) = 1, and S ′′(·) > 1. µt represents the shock to the relative price
of investment to consumption goods, and it can also be interpreted as the
marginal eﬃciency of investment, as described by Justiniano and Primiceri
(2008). A shock to this µt represents a marginal eﬃciency of investment (MEI)
shock.
Since all the households make the same optimal decision, thus, the sub-
scripts (j) can be dropped from now on. First order conditions of households
utility maximisation problem gives the marginal cost equation
W ht
Pt
= − 1
Ξt
[
1
1− σc (Ct − λCt−1)
1−σc
]
exp
(
σc − 1
1 + σl
· L1+σlt+s
)
· (1 + σl)Lσlt
This implies that MRT = MRS; the right hand side is the marginal
disutility of labour, which is identical across all households.
Intermediate Labour Unions and Wage Setting
In contrast to Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), where households are as-
sumed to provide heterogenous labour. This model assumes households supply
homogeneous labour to labour unions, which they have monopolistic power
over ﬁrms. There is a continuum of labour unions in labour market, indexed
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by l ∈ [0, 1]. Labour union diﬀerentiates labour services and set wages subject
to Calvo (1983) contract, then sell these labour to labour packers. Labour
used by the intermediate goods producers Lt is a composite:
Lt =
[∫ 1
0
Lt(l)
1
1+λw dl
]1+λw
This is also the labour supply, unlike SW07, this set-up for labour markets
follows Del Negro et al. (2007) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008). λw is now
a ﬁxed parameter rather than a variable, and this model does not consider
shock to wage mark-up.
Following the diﬀerentiation and wage setting from labour unions, labour
packers purchase the labour from unions, package Lt, and resell these labour to
the intermediate goods producer. These labour packers attempt to maximise
their proﬁts in a perfectly competitive market. The ﬁrst order conditions for
labour packers yield the labour demand equation
Lt(l) =
(
Wt(l)
Wt
)− 1+λw
λw · Lt
Combining this with the zero proﬁt condition (packers), one can obtain the
wage cost expression for intermediate goods producers:
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
Wt(l)
− 1
λw , dl
]−λw
λw is the wage mark-up charged labour unions, and it implies the amount
that unions charge ﬁrms over what they actually pay the households. Labour
packers buy labour from the unions. Here, the unions serve as an intermediary
between households and labour packers. The unions have market power by
diﬀerentiating and allocating labour services from households. They can choose
wage subject to the labour demand equation and Calvo (1983) probability.
The probability that a union can readjust its wages in a given period is
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1 − ζw, hence, ζw is the likelihood that a union is stuck during the resetting
process. For those who cannot readjust wages, Wt(l) adjusts with a weighted
average of the steady state inﬂation p¯i, and the inﬂation rate carried out from
last period pit−1.
For those who have the chance to re-optimise, the problem is to choose a
wage W˜t(l) such that it can maximise the wage income in all states of nature
where the union is stuck with that wage in the future.
max Et
∞∑
s=0
ζsw
[
βΞt+sPt
ΞtPt+s
]
· [Wt+s(l)−W ht+s]Lt+s(l)
subject to
Lt+s(l) =
(
Wt+s(l)
Wt+s
)− 1+λw
λw · Lt+s
with
Wt+s(l) = W˜t(l) ·
s∏
l=1
(pilwt+l−1p¯i
1−lw)χ = W˜t(i)Xt,s
Since the wage setting decision is identical across individuals, therefore, the
subscript (l) can be dropped, optimisation problem yields the following ﬁrst
order condition:
Et
∞∑
s=0
ζsw
[
βΞt+sPt
ΞtPt+s
]
· Lt+s(l)
(
1
λw,t+s
)
[(1 + λw,t+s)W
h
t+s −Xt,sW˜t(l)] = 0
The aggregate wage index is given by
Wt =
[
(1− ζw)W˜
− 1
λw,t
t + ζw((pi
lw
t−1p¯i
1−lw)χWt−1)
− 1
λw,t
]−λw,t
This above setting permits the model to capture the behaviour of wage
setting, which later plays a crucial role in determining the eﬀects of trend
inﬂation on model dynamics.
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2.2.3 The Central Bank
Finally, the monetary authority conducts monetary policy by following a Tay-
lor style rule, which is characterised by the following equation. Nominal inter-
est rate is adjusted in response to deviation of inﬂation from its steady state
level, and output deviation from the natural rate, also the change in output
gap over time.
Rt
R¯
=
(
Rt−1
R¯
)ρR [(pit
p¯i
)ψpi ( Yt
Y n
)ψy]1−ρR ( Yt/Yt−1
Y nt /Y
n
t−1
)ψ∆y
·Mt
where
R¯ is the steady sate nominal interest rate in gross term
p¯i is the steady state inﬂation
Y n is the natural output level
ρr is the degree of interest rate smoothing
Mt captures the monetary policy shock
Here, the central bank supplies money that demanded by households to
support the desired nominal interest rate in the market.
2.2.4 Resource Constraint, Aggregations and Price Dis-
persion
For the ﬁnal goods market, market clearing condition is obtained by integrating
the household budget constraint across all households and combine it with the
government's budget constraint. Then, aggregation yields
PtCt+PtIt+PtGt = Πt+
∫
Wt(j)Lt(j)dj+R
k
t
∫
Kt(j)dj−Pta(ut)
∫
Kt−1(j)dj
Recall that Πt =
∫
Πt(i)di =
∫
Pt(i)Yt(i)di −WtLt − RktKt, where Lt =∫
Lt(i)di is the total labour supplied by the labour packers.
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Replacing the deﬁnition of Πt in the household budget constraint, and
combining it with the capital accumulation process and labour packers' zero-
proﬁt condition, we get
WtLt =
∫
Wt(j)Lt(j)dj =
∫
W ht (j)Lt(j)dj +Divt
where Wt(j) is the wage rate paid by ﬁrms, and W
h
t (j) is the wage rate
received by households, the diﬀerence between the two is reﬂected by level of
wage markup.
Combining this with the zero-proﬁt condition for ﬁnal goods market, one
can obtain the real term expression
Ct + It +Gt + a(ut) ·Kt−1 = Yt
This is the aggregate resource constraint.
Price Dispersion
One of the most important variables of this GNK model is the level of price
dispersion. It is expressed as the following
st =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)− 1+λp
λp(1−α)
di
According to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007a), the relative price disper-
sion (with Calvo contract) st is bounded below by one, and it represents the
resource costs as a consequence of relative price dispersion with long-run in-
ﬂation.
By accounting for the presence of price dispersion, one can obtain the true
production level given all the inputs:
Lt =
(
Yt
AtKs
α
t
) 1
1−α
· st
The higher the level of price dispersion is, more labour is needed in order to
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produce the same amount of output. Therefore, for the same level of output,
price dispersion cause equilibrium real wage to increase and so does the real
marginal cost of the ﬁrm (Ascari and Sbordone, 2014).
Under the assumption of Calvo (1983) price setting mechanism, the expres-
sion for st can be rewritten in a recursive form:
st = ζpp˜t(i)
− (1+λp)
λp(1−α) + (1− ζp)p¯i−
(1+λp)χ(1−lp)
λp(1−α) pi
− (1+λp)χlp
λp(1−α)
t−1 pi
(1+λp)
λp(1−α)
t st−1 (2.5)
where p˜t(i) is the real optimal reset price. Also, p˜t(i) satisﬁes the condition
of
1 = [(1− ζp)p˜p
1
λp + ζp(pi
lpχ
t−1p¯i
(1−lp)χpi−1t )
1
λp ]λp
.
When price indexation is removed (χ = 0), the expression of price disper-
sion collapses to
st = ζpp˜t(i)
− (1+λp)
λ(1−α) + (1− ζp)pi
(1+λp)
λp(1−α)
t st−1
According to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007a), this state variable st rep-
resents the resource costs triggered by the ineﬃcient dispersion of price of price
in equilibrium and it must satisfy three conditions: ﬁrst, st is bounded below
by 1, this implies that price dispersion is always distortionary and costly to the
overall economy 1. Second, in an economy where the non-stochastic level of
inﬂation is zero (i.e., p¯i = 1) or where prices are fully indexed to any variable
such as ωt with the property that its deterministic steady-state level equals
the deterministic steady state value of inﬂation (i.e., ω¯ = p¯i), then the variable
of price dispersion st = 1 follows, up to ﬁrst order, the univariate autoregres-
sive process sˆt = αsˆt−1. In such cases, the studies that restrict attention to
1To see the proof of this condition, please refer to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007a) and
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007b) for detailed derivations and discussion.
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linear approximations to the equilibrium conditions are justiﬁed to ignore this
variable st if the model features no price dispersion in the deterministic steady
state. However, even though the model is approximated up to ﬁrst order in this
study, the fact and assumption of positive trend inﬂation (i.e., p¯i > 1) clearly
show the second condition does not apply in this model with trend inﬂation,
and this variable must not be ignored here. Last, when prices are fully ﬂexible,
ζp = 0, which implies p˜t(i) = 1 and we will have st = 1, because there is no
price dispersion in a fully ﬂexible economy (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2007a).
In addition, based on equation (2.5), one can see that this term provides
some extra dynamics to the model, as price dispersion depends on it lagged
own term st−1.
2.2.5 Exogenous Shocks
In this model, there are totally ﬁve shocks, which are two less than that of the
original SW07 model. The shocks that are ignored include wage mark-up shock
and shock to investment premium. The ignorance of these two shocks are due
to their lack of microeconomic foundation, as discussed by Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan (2009).
All the ﬁve variables, total factor productivity, government spending, mon-
etary policy term, price mark-up, and investment relative price follow a ﬁrst
order autoregressive process, except government spending and price mark-up,
which both follow a ﬁrst order ARMA (1,1) process. Unlike Del Negro et al.
(2007) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), I assume the shocks are all sta-
tionary in this model, subsequently, stationary data is used for estimation.
The following equations specify the motions of these ﬁve variables related to
exogenous shocks.
• Technology Shock
lnZt = ρzlnZt−1 + εzt (2.6)
63
• Government Spending Shock
lngt = ρglngt−1 + ρgzlnZt − ρgzZt−1 + εgt (2.7)
• Monetary Policy Shock
lnMt = ρmlnMt−1 + εmt (2.8)
• Price Mark-up Shock
lnλp,t = (1− ρp)lnλp + ρplnλp,t−1 − θpεpt−1 + εpt (2.9)
• Investment Relative Price
lnµt = ρµlnµt−1 + ε
µ
t (2.10)
All ﬁve εt's satisfy εt ∼ N(0, σ2εt), i.i.d.
2.2.6 The Log-Linearised Model
yˆt =
c¯
y¯
· cˆt + i¯
y¯
· iˆ+ g¯
y¯
· gˆt + r¯
kk
y¯
· uˆt (2.11)
This is the aggregate resourse constraint, aggregate output (yˆt) in the econ-
omy is made of consumption (cˆt), private investment (ˆit), government spending
(gˆt) and capital utilisation costs (uˆt). The steady state fraction in front of each
variables represents their corresponding shares in the economy.
cˆt =
1
1 + λ
Etcˆt+1 +
λ
1 + λ
cˆt−1 − 1− λ
σc(1 + λ)
· [Rˆt − Etpˆit+1]− (σc − 1)w¯
hL¯/c¯
σc(1 + λ))
[EtLˆt+1 − Lˆt]
(2.12)
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This equation deﬁnes the dynamics of consumption. According to the equation,
current consumption depends on a weighted average of past and expected
future consumptions. It is also negatively correlated with the change in labour
hours (EtLˆt+1 − Lˆt) and the real interest rate (Rˆt − Etpˆit+1).
iˆt =
1
1 + β
iˆt−1 +
1
1 + β
Etiˆt+1 +
1
(1 + β)ψ
· Qˆkt (2.13)
This equation deﬁne the dynamics of investment. It depends on both the past
and future investments.
Qkt =
1− δ
r¯k
· EtQkt+1 +
r¯k
r¯k + 1− δ · Etrˆ
k
t+1 (2.14)
Qkt is a measure of capital stock. The current level of this capital stock is
positively correlated with expected future real interest rate and the expected
future value of itself.
yˆt = αkˆ
s
t + (1− α)(Lˆt − sˆt) + Zˆt (2.15)
Output (yˆt) is produced by using capital service (kˆ
s
t ), labour (hours) (Lˆt), and
also determined by the level of total factor productivity (Zˆt). In addition, it
is negative aﬀected by the level of price dispersion in the economy, and this
variable plays a crucial part of the dynamics in the model.
kˆst = uˆt + kˆt−1 (2.16)
The installed capital used in production process depends on the past capital
stock and also utilisation level of capital service.
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kˆt = (1− δ)kt−1 + i¯
y¯
· iˆt (2.17)
Capital stock is a function of past undepreciated capital and new invest-
ment
uˆt =
1− η
η
· rˆkt (2.18)
Capital utilisation equation is determined by capital rental rate.
rˆkt = Lˆt − kˆt + wˆt (2.19)
The rental rate of capital is a function of labour hour, capital and real wage
rate.
sˆt = − 1 + λp
λp(1− α) ·
[
1− ζpp¯i
(1−χ)(1+λp)
λp(1−α)
]
· ˆ˜pt + ζpp¯i
(1−χ)(1+λp)
λp(1−α)
·
[(
1 + λp
λp(1− α)
)
· pˆit −
(
1 + λp
λp(1− α)
)
· lpχpˆit−1 + sˆt−1
]
(2.20)
where
ˆ˜pt =
ζpp¯i
1−χ
λ¯p
1− ζpp¯i
1−χ
λ¯p
· [pˆit − lpχpˆit−1]
This equation indicates that the overall price dispersion in the economy
depends not only on the Calvo probability of price reset ζp as the basic price
stickiness theory suggests, but also on the current and past inﬂation rates, as
well as the past value of price dispersion itself sˆt−1. The presence of pˆit−1 and
sˆt−1 introduces more overall dynamics into the model. This is consistent with
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all the previous literature on trend inﬂation, for example, Amano, Ambler and
Rebei (2007). As trend inﬂation increases, its corresponding marginal eﬀects
on price dispersion from all variables are reinforced, and therefore making price
dispersion a more serious issue for a given set of values of the variables.
To analyse this equation further, one can ﬁnd the eﬀect of diﬀerent lev-
els of trend inﬂation p¯i is governed by a few parameters: the total degree of
indexation χ, price mark-up λp, and the capital share of production cost α.
More speciﬁcally, a lower degree of indexation, a lower level of price mark-
up and a larger share of capital in production function all amplify the eﬀects
of trend inﬂation on price dispersion, and therefore, a higher degree of price
dispersion. Among all three, a full indexation χ = 1 can actually kill oﬀ the
eﬀect of trend inﬂation, and a lower level of indexation can strengthen the ef-
fect of trend inﬂation on the overall macroeconomic dynamics. This property
of price indexation regarding trend inﬂation is extensively discussed in Ascari
and Branzoli (2015) and Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims (2018).
wˆht =
1
1− λ · cˆt −
λ
1− λ · cˆt−1 + σlLˆt (2.21)
This is the marginal product of labour (MPL) and it represents the real wage
rate that is received by the representative household, which is diﬀerent from
the real wage that is paid by ﬁrms due to the fact labour unions charge a
mark-up over what they pay households.
mˆct = (1− α)wˆt + αrˆkt − Zˆt (2.22)
This is the real marginal cost. It depends positively on the real wage paid
by ﬁrms and the rental rate of capital. Meanwhile, an increase in total factor
productivity reduces the real marginal cost of ﬁrms.
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pˆit =
lpχ
1 + ζpβlpχ+ βlpχp¯i
(χ−1)(1+λp)
λp − ζpβlpχp¯iχ−1
· pˆit−1
+
ζpβ + βp¯i
(χ−1)(1+λp)
λp − ζpβp¯iχ−1
1 + ζpβlpχ+ βlpχp¯i
(χ−1)(1+λp)
λp − ζpβlpχp¯iχ−1
· Etpˆit+1
+
(1− ζpβ)(1− ζpp¯i
1−χ
λp )[
1 + ζpβlpχ+ (1− ζp)βlpχp¯i
(χ−1)(1−λp)
λp
]
· ζp
· mˆct + λˆp,t (2.23)
This is the hybrid version Generalised New Keynesian Phillips Curve (GNKPC)
based on positive steady state inﬂation (the term GNKPC and NKPC are in-
terchangeable in the rest of this thesis). It does not look considerably diﬀerent
from the prototype from Galí and Gertler (1999) and the more sophisticated
SW07 version. The ﬁrst thing to notice is that once the trend inﬂation term
p¯i is set equal to one (no trend, zero steady state inﬂation), this expression
collapses to the standard case as it is in the original SW07 model. Moreover,
one needs to pay attention to this new deﬁnition of inﬂation gap pˆi (again,
this is interchangeable with inﬂation for the rest of this thesis 2), which is the
deviation of inﬂation from its non-zero steady state level. As it is referred to
in various trend inﬂation literature 3.
In addition, due to the presence of trend inﬂation p¯i, as trend inﬂation
increases, the weights of terms in the NKPC also change accordingly. In par-
ticular, the weight on expected inﬂation Etpˆit+1, which is represented by a com-
posite coeﬃcient in front of Etpˆit+1 increases, while the weights on backward-
looking inﬂation Etpˆit−1 and current real marginal cost mˆct, both drop. There-
fore, agents become more forward looking in a world with trend inﬂation, and
the GNKPC becomes ﬂatter, this is the same property as shown in the small
2In fact, when p¯i = 1, inﬂation gap is equivalent to inﬂation.
3See Sbordone (2007), Cogley and Sbordone (2008), Ascari and Sbordone (2014) for the
initial deﬁnition and discussion
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scale GNK model in chapter 1. This gives a clear look of how the level of trend
inﬂation aﬀects the whole economy, and this has been conﬁrmed by a number
of previous literature. (See Ascari and Ropele (2007); Ascari and Sbordone
(2014); Cogley and Sbordone (2008) ). As analysed by Ascari and Ropele
(2007), the optimal price setting under positive trend inﬂation reﬂects future
economic conditions or expectations more than the short-run economic fun-
damentals and cyclical ﬂuctuations. Price re-optimising ﬁrms clearly become
more forward-looking than they are without trend inﬂation.
wˆt = (1− ζwp¯i
1−χ
λ¯w ) ˆ˜wt + ζwp¯i
1−χ
λ¯w [lwχpˆit−1 − pˆit + wˆt−1] (2.24)
This equation shows the aggregate market wage in the economy, and there
are a few things need to be noticed. First of all, as trend inﬂation p¯i increases,
the composite coeﬃcient in front of the current period optimal reset wage
decreases, which means the market wage will put fewer weights on the current
optimal reset wage ˆ˜wt. Nonetheless, as trend inﬂation rises, the composite
coeﬃcient in front of the square bracket also increase, this implies that the
current inﬂation is more weighted to the part of the economy that is not able
to re-optimise its prices and therefore is only able to index to the past inﬂation.
This overall eﬀect makes the aggregate real wage rate more backward looking,
which is in contrast to inﬂation where an increase in trend inﬂation makes
inﬂation more forward looking.
However, one should also realise that once trend inﬂation p¯i becomes too
high and exceeds a certain threshold, the coeﬃcient for optimal reset wage
1 − ζwp¯i
1−χ
λ¯w could turn to negative, and the market wage rate wˆt can even be
negatively correlated with the current optimal reset wage ˆ˜wt. It is not hard to
see that 1−ζwp¯i
1−χ
λw can easily go negative for high level of trend inﬂation when
wage mark-up λw and the degree of wage indexation are small. In fact, as p¯i
is always tied with Calvo wage setting parameter ζw, for a given level of ζw,
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an increase in p¯i signiﬁcantly increases the probability of wage being stuck in a
given time, and ultimately makes the market wage rate more backward looking.
In turn, this also indicates that the optimal price re-optimised today will have
a larger impact on the market wage tomorrow, and therefore introduce more
dynamics into the entire model.
ˆ˜wt = (1− ζwβ)wˆht + ζwβEt ˆ˜wt+1 + ζwβp¯iχ−1(Etpˆit+1 − lwχpˆit) (2.25)
This is the log-linearised version of the optimal wage resetting decision.
According to (2.25), the only way that trend inﬂation can aﬀect optimal re-
set wage is through the diﬀerence between expected future inﬂation and the
indexed current inﬂation rate, however, this eﬀect from inﬂation diﬀerential
shrinks as the level of trend inﬂation grows. In fact, as trend inﬂation in-
creases, the marginal eﬀect of inﬂation diﬀerential Etpˆit+1 − lwχpˆit on optimal
reset wage declines. Unions or households are more concerned with the cur-
rent economic fundamentals such as the marginal product of labour wˆht and the
expected optimal reset price ˆ˜wt+1. The possible interpretation of this can be
drawn from the nature of Calvo pricing contract. As Dixon and Kara (2010)
explained, with Calvo scheme, price or wage setting agents are usually more
forward looking since they do not know what is the next time they will be
able to update their prices or wages, therefore, as trend inﬂation increases, the
potential inﬂation diﬀerential in the very near future tends to be less impor-
tant as they see through to the inﬁnite future. Together these eﬀects make
wage resetting agents to shift their focuses to more fundamental issues. Here,
I give an opposite interpretation as Amano, Ambler and Rebei (2007) where
they argue as trend inﬂation rises, ﬁrms become more sensitive to ﬂuctuations
in inﬂation and relatively less sensitive to ﬂuctuations in macroeconomic con-
ditions and this is the reason that inﬂation becomes more persistent as trend
inﬂation increases. Later in this thesis, I show inﬂation indeed become more
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persistent as the trend goes up and so does optimal reset wage, but this rein-
forced persistence in inﬂation is largely driven by the backward looking nature
of real market wage and great persistence in price dispersion with higher levels
of the trend.
Rt = ρRRt−1 + (1− ρR)(ψpipˆit + ψy(yˆt − yˆt−1))
+ ψ∆y(yˆ − yˆt−1 − (yˆflex − yˆflext−1 )) +mt (2.26)
This is the log-linearised Taylor rule, the central bank stabilises the econ-
omy by responding to inﬂation deviation from steady state, output gap, and
also the change of output gap. A shock to the term mt represents a monetary
policy shock.
2.2.7 The Flexible Economy
In order to obtain the second best level of output, or the natural level, a
ﬂexible version of the economy needs to be deﬁned. In this ﬂexible economy,
monopolistic competition in intermediate goods and labour unions still exist,
nonetheless, prices and wages are allowed to adjust freely and hence all nominal
frictions are removed.
The ﬂexible economy can be summarised as the following set of equations
yˆflext =
c¯
y¯
· cˆflext +
i¯
y¯
· iˆ+ g¯
y¯
· gˆt + r¯
kk
y¯
· uˆflext (2.27)
cˆflext =
1
1 + λ
Etcˆ
flex
t+1 +
λ
1 + λ
cˆflext−1 −
1− λ
σc(1 + λ)
· Rˆflext
− (σc − 1)w¯
hL¯/c¯
σc(1 + λ))
[EtLˆ
flex
t+1 − Lˆflext ] (2.28)
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iˆflext =
1
1 + β
iˆflext−1 +
1
1 + β
Etiˆ
flex
t+1 +
1
(1 + β)ψ
· ˆQk,flext (2.29)
yˆflext = αkˆ
s,flex
t + (1− α)Lˆflext + Zˆt (2.30)
kˆs,flext = uˆ
flex
t + kˆ
flex
t−1 (2.31)
kˆflext = (1− δ)kflext−1 +
i¯
y¯
· iˆflext (2.32)
uˆflext =
1− η
η
· rˆk,flext (2.33)
rˆk,flext = Lˆ
flex
t − kˆflext + wˆflext (2.34)
(1− α)wˆflext + αrˆk,flext = Zˆt (2.35)
Note, when prices are fully ﬂexible, the marginal cost expressed in terms of
deviation from the steady state becomes zero.
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wˆflext =
1
1− λ · cˆ
flex
t −
λ
1− λ · cˆ
flex
t−1 + σlLˆ
flex
t (2.36)
In a fully ﬂexible economy, the market wage equals the optimal reset wage,
which in turn equal the wage rate that received by households.
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2.3 Bayesian Estimations
This completed medium-scale GNK model with trend inﬂation is then esti-
mated using a Bayesian technique with four essential macroeconomic variables
in the US economy as observables: real gross domestic product (GDP), eﬀec-
tive federal fund rate, inﬂation rate, which is based on the US GDP deﬂator,
and labour hours that measured as the non-farm business sector average weekly
hours 4.
The reason behind the selection of these four particular observables are
three-folded. First, as the presence of trend inﬂation is the core of this study,
inﬂation is undoubtedly the most crucial observable. Second, as this thesis
is designed to detect how changes in trend inﬂation aﬀect macro dynamics
and monetary policy response, hence the inclusion of nominal interest rate is
also essential. Last, as labour hour is closely associated with price dispersion,
which is the variable that trend inﬂation is most likely to aﬀect, hence, labour
hour is also added to the list of observables.
The data covers from the ﬁrst quarter of 1970, which is a slightly later
starting year compared with SW07 where they use data back to 1964. The
ending observation is the fourth quarter of 2017, and this is the longest time
span can be possibly covered at the time this chapter is written. Furthermore,
compared with the SW07, this is a longer time spell and it is then further
divided into three periods for sub-sample studies, which is discussed in section
2.4.
2.3.1 The Bayesian Method
In the last two decades, Bayesian method for DSGE model estimation has
become the most popular and dominant choice among economists. The rea-
sons behind this trend and the theoretical advantages of Bayesian estimation
can be summarised as the following. First, the likelihood of DSGE models is
4Please refer to the Appendix B for detailed data description.
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a highly dimensional object with a large number (in a medium-scale DSGE
model) of parameters. Any research in such a high dimensional function would
be extremely concerning, especially, likelihoods of DSGE models are full of lo-
cal maxima and minima and of almost ﬂat surfaces. Therefore, even the most
sophisticated optimisation algorithms like simulation annealing or the simplex
method are likely to run into serious diﬃculties when maximising the likeli-
hoods of such dynamic models (Fernández-Villaverde, 2010). Moreover, the
standard errors of the estimates are recognisably diﬃcult to compute and the
usual sample size of DSGE estimation does not satisfy the asymptotic distribu-
tion requirement and therefore yield a very poor approximation. Nonetheless,
Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods have a much more comfortable time ex-
ploring the likelihood of DSGE models and generate a comprehensive view of
the object of interests (Fernández-Villaverde, 2010).
The technique of Bayesian estimation is based on the fundamental theorem
of Bayesian inference. Recall the basic elements in Bayes' theorem; ﬁrst, there
are some data set yT = yTt,t=1 ∈ <N×T . Second, there is a model that is based
on economic theory, for instance, a completed DSGE model. There are some
restrictions to the model either due to statistical factors or economic factors.
For example, the inﬂation response parameter in the Taylor style monetary
policy rule needs to be greater than one, in order to satisfy the Taylor Principle
and ensure the model meets its determinacy. Hence, the model is consist of
three elements Koop, Poirier and Tobias (2007):
1. A parameter set, Θi ∈ <k, which deﬁnes the upper and lower bounds of
the parameters that index the functions in the model. Some of the re-
strictions come from statistics. For instance, standard deviation must be
positive. Others may come from economics, for instance, Calvo param-
eters must be bounded by zero and one in order to have any economic
meaning for nominal rigidities.
2. A likelihood function p(yT | θ, i) : <N×T × Θi → <+, which implies the
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probability that the model assigns to each observation conditional on
some parameter values.
3. A prior distribution pi(θ | i) : Θi → R+, which captures pre-sample
beliefs about the true value of the parameters to be estimated.
According to the Bayes's theorem, the posterior distribution of the param-
eters is given by:
pi(θ | yT , i) = p(y
T | θ, i)pi(θ | i)∫
p(yT | θ, i)pi(θ | i)dθ
Consequently, one only need to know the distribution and therefore the
likelihood of the parameter of interests, then provide the prior, and one can
obtain the posterior.
Furthermore, the practical attractiveness of Bayesian estimation for DSGE
model are summarised by Fernández-Villaverde (2010) as the following: ﬁrst,
Bayesian econometrics provides a number of answers that are directly related
to researchers' questions. Particularly for policymakers, they would be able to
interpret the results for policy makings. With Bayesian estimation results, a
central bank governor would be able to know the probability of making right
decision by cutting nominal interest rate by ﬁfty basis points, conditional on
the observed sample. Second, for most of the research in New Keynesian DSGE
models, the pre-sample and therefore the priors are really rich and considered
useful by macroeconomists, hence, if it would not be rational to simply ig-
nore such pre-sample information. This is not going to deny the fact that
the researcher needs to pay careful attention when these micro evidence are
converted into macro priors, negligence could lead to huge misinterpretation of
the estimated posteriors. Yes, there are academics on the opposite side argu-
ing that Bayesian inference relies too heavily on the priors, however, how can
one argue that this is worse than the situation when one does not even have
any information about one's parameter of interests. Third, Bayesian estima-
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tion allows a direct computation of many objects of interest while capturing
in these computed objects all the existing uncertainties regarding parameter
values. Last, Bayesian estimation can deal with misspeciﬁed models in a rel-
atively natural way. In theory, there is no model which is perfectly speciﬁed,
all models are misspeciﬁed to some extent, but some are practically useful for
policymaking. Thus, being able to generate some good description of the data
is practically useful.
2.3.2 Data Treatment and Detrending
All the raw data for these four macro observables have been de-trended by
applying a one-sided Hodrick and Prescott (1997) (H-P henceforth) ﬁlter and
thereafter all pass the augmented Dicky-Fuller test for stationarity. The reason
why this method is used rather than the ﬁrst diﬀerencing technique as SW07
originally does is due to the intention of using stationary macro data. For the
sample period I estimate (1970 Q1 to 2017 Q4), ﬁrst diﬀerencing detrending
cannot generate stationary results. After a couple of experiments on both
ﬁrst diﬀerencing and second diﬀerencing, I found that in no occasion can the
ﬁltered data pass a ADF test, thus, an alternative method has to be applied
and luckily a one-sided H-P ﬁlter does just that. The method of polynomial
detrending (up to 4th order) is also tested but it does not produce any good
result either. The combination of the two sample periods with few structural
breaks in later 1970s and 2000s may be to blame for this non-stationarity
trouble. After the detrending of raw data, each of the detrended observations
enters the measurement equation based on a one-to-one relationship with these
four variables deﬁned in the model.
2.3.3 Prior Distribution of Parameters
The priors for some of the parameters and stochastic processes in my esti-
mation follow the same priors as SW07, but some others are based on the
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posterior means from SW07 estimation results. This should not be an unrea-
sonable practice as their results have been cited in a large number of papers.
All the standard deviations of these ﬁve innovations are assumed to fol-
low an inverse-gamma distribution with standard deviations 2.0, which are
the same as the volatility assumed by SW07, these are rather loose priors.
The priors of all the shock standard errors are based on the posterior means
of SW07 estimation. The persistence parameters of these stochastic shocks
are to follow a beta distribution with mean 0.50 and standard deviation of
0.20, these are exactly the same as SW07, except the feedback of productiv-
ity shock on government spending, which is set with mean 1/3 and standard
deviation of 0.10, in order to limit the interaction between productivity shock
and government spending shock.
On the households side, the habit formation parameter λ is also assumed
to follow a Beta distribution with mean 0.71, which is the posterior mean
of SW07 estimation, and standard deviation of 0.15. The inverse elasticity
of substitution for consumption goods (σc) and labour supply elasticity (σl)
are to follow a normal distribution with mean 1.50 and standard deviation
0.375 for consumption and mean 2.0 and standard deviation of 0.75 for labour
supply, exactly the same as SW07.
On the ﬁrm side, the production share of capital α is allowed to vary, and
it is assumed to follow a Beta distribution with mean equals 1/3 and standard
deviation 0.5, in contrast to SW07, which α is ﬁxed at 0.19. The degree of total
indexation χ, cost of capital utilisation η are both assumed to follow a beta
distribution with means 0.50 and 0.54, respectively, and standard deviations
both equal 0.15. The relative weights of price and wage indexation on past
inﬂation lp and lw are both to follow a Beta distribution with a standard devi-
ation of 0.10. While lp is assumed to have a prior mean of 0.40, lw is believed
to have a prior mean of 0.60, both are consistent with the most literature on
empirical studies as most of them ﬁnd indexation is a relatively more plausible
phenomenon for wages than for prices. Finally, the Calvo parameters for price
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rigidity ζp and wage rigidity ζw are both to follow a Beta distribution with
standard deviation of 0.05, the former has a prior mean of 0.50 and the latter
has a mean of 0.70, nonetheless. Again, this is what empirical literature sug-
gests regarding the evidence that wages tend to be more rigid than prices. For
example, Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008), Justiniano and Primiceri (2008),
and Smets and Wouters (2007).
The most important parameter of all, trend inﬂation (p¯i), is to be estimated
along with other structural variables, and it is assumed to follow a normal
distribution with a mean of 1.0078, which correspond to an annual rate of
3.12% inﬂation in steady state and standard deviation of 0.10. This prior
mean is slightly less than the arithmetic average of inﬂation rate in these 192
quarters from Q1 1970 to Q4 2017. For the monetary policy rule, the response
parameter for inﬂation deviation from steady state ψpi, output gap ψy, and
change in output gap ψ∆y all follow a normal distribution but with diﬀerent
means and standard deviations. In particular, ψpi has a mean of 1.75 and
standard deviation of 0.25, both ψy and ψ∆y have mean 0.12 and standard
deviation of 0.10 for ψy and 0.05 for ψ∆y. All follow the same priors as SW07.
A summary of prior distributions and descriptions of the structural parameters
and shock processes is presented in table 2.1 and 2.2.
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Table 2.1: Prior Distribution of Structural Parameters and Shock Processes
Description Parameter Distribution Prior Mean St. Dev.
Capital Share α Beta 1/3 0.05
Habit Formation λ Beta 0.71 0.15
Elas. of Sub in Con σc Normal 1.50 0.375
Elastic of Lab Sub σl Normal 2.00 0.75
Adjustment Cost Ψ Normal 5.74 1.50
Degree of Indexation χ Beta 0.50 0.15
Capital Utilisation η Beta 0.54 0.15
Price Indexation lp Beta 0.40 0.10
Wage Indexation lw Beta 0.60 0.10
Calvo for Price ζp Beta 0.50 0.05
Calvo for Wage ζw Beta 0.70 0.05
Trend Inﬂation p¯i Normal 1.0078 0.10
Inﬂation Response ψpi Normal 1.75 0.25
Output Response ψy Normal 0.12 0.10
Output Gap Response ψ∆y Normal 0.12 0.05
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Table 2.2: Prior Distribution of Shocks Processes
Description Parameter Prior Distribution Prior Mean St. Dev.
Tech. shock ρz Beta 0.50 0.20
Gov. spending shock ρg Beta 0.50 0.20
Mnetary solicy shock ρm Beta 0.50 0.20
Price mark-up shock ρp Beta 0.50 0.20
gt to zt response ρgz Beta 1/3 0.10
MA(1) mark-up shock θp Beta 0.50 0.20
Investment shock ρinv Beta 0.50 0.20
Tech. shock εz Inverse Gamma 0.45 2.0
Gov. spending Shock εg Inverse Gamma 0.53 2.0
Monetary policy shock εm Inverse Gamma 0.24 2.0
Price mark-up shock εp Inverse Gamma 0.14 2.0
Investment shock εinv Inverse Gamma 0.45 2.0
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In addition to the priors set above, there are seven parameters ﬁxed during
the estimation process and therefore not estimated. They are discount factor
β, which is ﬁxed at 0.995 and this is a standard setup and it implies that the
real interest rate is around 1.25% in steady state on a quarterly basis. Then,
the depreciation rate δ is pre-set at 0.025 and this is assumed on a quarterly
basis. The exogenous government spending to GDP ratio g¯
y¯
is ﬁxed at around
0.20, and this is consistent with empirical evidence of this ratio for the time of
this estimation period. Correspondingly, the consumption to GDP ratio is set
at around 0.65, and again this is consistent with what is observed during these
192 quarters. Finally, the degree of interest rate smoothing parameter ρi is
set at 0.81, which is what SW07 posterior mean suggests. Finally, the implied
gross price and wage mark-ups are set at 1.25, these two values are broadly
consistent with literature with a similar framework, such as Gertler, Sala and
Trigari (2008), Lindé, Smets and Wouters (2016). All the above information
regarding calibrated parameters is summarised in table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Calibrated Parameters
Description Parameter Calibrated value
Discount Factor β 0.995
Capital Depreciation Rate δ 0.025
Government Spending Ratio g¯/y¯ 0.20
Consumption Spending Ratio c¯/y¯ 0.65
Interest Rate Smoothing ρi 0.81
Price Mark-up λp 0.25
Wage Mark-up λw 0.25
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2.3.4 Posterior Estimates of Parameters in Benchmark
Model
The posterior distribution is estimated using the Metropolis-Hastings algo-
rithm, after 250,000 iterations with two Markov Chains (totally 500,000 iter-
ations), the main results of Bayesian estimation are summarised in table 2.4
and 2.5. The acceptance ratio of the two chains are: 24.56% for chain 1 and
24.29% for chain 2, and 200,000 draws per chain were kept. Table 2.4 and 2.5
show the posterior means, the standard deviations of the posterior mean, and 5
and 95 percentile of the posterior distribution of the 15 structural parameters,
7 persistence parameter and 5 exogenous shock processes. In addition, the last
columns of table 2.4 and 2.5 are the Posterior means of SW07.
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Table 2.4: Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters
Parameter Post. Mean Post. St.D 5% 95% SW Mean
α 0.259 0.038 0.194 0.324 0.19†
λ 0.698 0.054 0.632 0.761 0.71
σc 2.499 0.378 2.114 2.951 1.38
σl 1.259 0.568 0.251 2.115 1.83
Ψ 6.869 1.260 4.838 8.820 5.74
η 0.396 0.105 0.450 0.734 0.54
χ 0.594 0.116 0.236 0.548 1.00†
lp 0.293 0.094 0.147 0.432 0.24
lw 0.589 0.100 0.430 0.763 0.58
ζp 0.773 0.028 0.729 0.816 0.66
ζw 0.748 0.054 0.652 0.847 0.70
p¯i 1.008 0.009 1.762 2.356 1.0078‡
ψpi 2.069 0.185 1.718 2.327 2.04
ψy 0.185 0.066 0.079 0.293 0.08
ψ∆y 0.201 0.037 0.139 0.260 0.22
† Pre-ﬁxed parameters in SW07
‡ Estimated in a diﬀerent way
According to table 2.4, the capital share in production α has a mean of
0.259, which comes with no big surprise, however, this parameter is ﬁxed at
0.19 in SW07. The habit formation parameter λ is estimated to be around
0.698, and this is extremely close to the SW07 estimate of 0.71; this implies a
similar level of persistence in households' consumption preference. The inverse
elasticity of substitution for consumption goods is at 2.499, which is much
larger than the SW07 estimate of 1.38. At the same time, the elasticity of
labour supply is at 1.259, which in turn to be much smaller than the SW07
result, and it suggests a much more inelastic labour supply for the sample
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period.
The degree of price stickiness is estimated to be much larger than the SW
result of ζp; according to the estimation result, 77.3% of the ﬁrms cannot re-
optimise their prices in a given quarter, compared to 66% in SW estimation.
This measure implies an extremely high level of rigidity in the intermediate
good sector. For the labour market, the estimated mean of ζw is 0.748, which
indicates that around 74.8% of the labour unions are not able to re-optimise
their wages in a given period, this is also a higher value compared with the
SW07 estimate of 70%, but not by a signiﬁcant margin. Therefore, the esti-
mates suggest that both prices and wages are more rigid compared with the
SW07 model, however, one needs to remember the fact that given the assump-
tion of price and wage indexations, the interpretations of both Calvo parameter
are subject to caution. This is merely a measure of how many ﬁrms and unions
are able to re-optimise their prices and wages in a given quarter, but not a
legitimate measure of the overall rigidity in the economy.
The adjustment cost of investment Ψ is estimated to be 6.869, which is sig-
niﬁcantly higher than the SW07 estimate of 5.74, and it suggests that house-
holds would ﬁnd it more costly to adjust their investment over time. The
estimate for capital utilisation rate of ﬁrm η is 0.396, this is a lower value com-
pared with SW07, and it indicates higher level of eﬃciency in capital utilisation
process.
The overall degree of price and wage indexation χ is estimated to be around
0.594, which is close to the prior mean of 0.50. The estimate of weight assigned
to past inﬂation is around 0.293 for price setting and 0.589 for wage setting.
This result conﬁrms what is usually obtained in literature; wage indexation is
generally more plausible than price indexation. Nonetheless, due to the extra
layer of indexation χ, the same value of lp or lw would imply a much less overall
eﬀect of indexation to past inﬂation. Furthermore, given that lp is less than
0.50, one can interpret that ﬁrms view trend inﬂation more than they view
past inﬂation when they index their prices. Meanwhile, as lw is greater than
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0.5, hence it seems that labour unions view past inﬂation more than trend
inﬂation. Trend inﬂation tends to play a signiﬁcant role in ﬁrms' price setting
behaviour.
The most crucial parameter in this study, steady state inﬂation rate p¯i has
an estimated value of 1.0080, which corresponds to an annualised inﬂation rate
of 3.20%, and also close to its prior. This result suggests that the annual level
of inﬂation in steady state has been annually 3.2% on average from 1970 to
the end of 2017. This is roughly in line with the literature, SW07 estimate
a value of 1.0078, which converts to an annual rate of 3.12%. However, one
needs to realise that SW07 models this trend inﬂation in a completely diﬀerent
way as this model; it treats the diﬀerence between observable inﬂation and
inﬂation from the model as the source of trend inﬂation, but does not model
it explicitly. Hence, from a theoretical point of view, their result does not tell
much about the long run trend. Moreover, to better analyse this estimated
trend inﬂation, this chapter will further conduct a sub-sample estimation across
three diﬀerent time spans: the Great Inﬂation, the Great Moderation, and the
Great Recession. Further studies ﬁnd that this trend varies considerably across
these three periods that had very diﬀerent macroeconomic fundamentals, and
this is discussed extensively in section 4 of this chapter.
For the Taylor rule, the inﬂation response parameter is estimated to be
2.069, which indicates a roughly similar toughness of central bank towards
inﬂation deviation as the SW07 result suggests. Furthermore, the response
parameter of change in output is estimated to be 0.185, and this is a much
higher value than the SW07 result, which is 0.08. This implies a more hawkish
view from the Federal Reserve towards the output deviation from its steady
state. Finally, the response parameter of change in output gap is around 0.201,
which is very close to the SW07 result of 0.22.
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Table 2.5: Posterior Distribution of Shocks Processes
Parameter Posterior Mean Post. St. Dev 5% 95% SW Mean
ρz 0.989 0.043 0.979 0.9997 0.95
ρg 0.856 0.030 0.810 0.910 0.97
ρm 0.097 0.047 0.026 0.162 0.15
ρp 0.758 0.055 0.655 0.865 0.89
ρgz 0.587 0.355 0.518 0.667 0.52
θp 0.406 0.166 0.138 0.673 0.69
ρinv 0.514 0.194 0.184 0.837 0.71
εz 0.487 0.024 0.446 0.529 0.45
εg 0.395 0.029 0.347 0.441 0.54
εm 0.197 0.011 0.179 0.215 0.24
εp 0.190 0.066 0.097 0.285 0.14
εinv 0.361 0.439 0.105 0.643 0.45
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For the estimated results of the shock processes, which are presented in
table 2.5, these results suggest that the size of three of the shocks are relatively
close to the SW07 result: productivity, monetary policy and price mark-up
shocks. However, the other two shocks are considerably diﬀerent from the
SW07 results: government spending and investment-speciﬁc technology shock.
The size of the shock to productivity is around 0.487, which is in line with
the estimate from SW07 of 0.45 and the monetary shock is 0.197 is not far
from the SW07 result of 0.24. The price mark-up shock of 0.19 is also not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the SW07 estimate of 0.14. On the contrary, the
exogenous government spending stock is about 0.395, which is much lower
than the SW07 result of 0.53. Furthermore, the standard deviation of the
investment relative price shock is signiﬁcantly higher than the estimate of the
volatilities of all the other four shocks; this is consistent with Justiniano and
Primiceri (2008)'s conclusion that shocks to investment are extremely volatile
in the postwar US data.
2.3.5 Estimation When Trend Inﬂation is Removed
After estimating the benchmark model with trend inﬂation, I estimate the
entire model again but without the explicit modelling of trend inﬂation. This
is a rather simple process, one can construct a "new version" of the benchmark
model without trend inﬂation by setting the steady state inﬂation rate p¯i equals
1; it implies that the gross inﬂation rate is 1 in steady state and trend inﬂation
is zero in steady state. From here onwards, I refer to this new version as the
benchmark model without trend inﬂation. The estimation results are shown in
table 2.6 and 2.7. Compared with the estimation results in the previous case
where trend inﬂation is assumed to be positive, one can ﬁnd that although
most of the parameters stay similar to the benchmark model, few of them
change quite dramatically.
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Table 2.6: Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters in Benchmark
Model with No Trend Inﬂation
Parameter Mean (p¯i > 1) Mean p¯i = 1 SDs p¯i > 1 SDs p¯i = 1
α 0.259 0.214 0.036 0.034
λ 0.698 0.768 0.037 0.037
σc 2.499 2.185 0.259 0.280
σl 1.259 1.198 0.405 0.704
Ψ 6.869 6.916 1.146 1.215
χ 0.395 0.377 0.083 0.093
η 0.594 0.473 0.072 0.090
lp 0.293 0.303 0.069 0.090
lw 0.589 0.570 0.098 0.102
ζp 0.773 0.758 0.027 0.029
ζw 0.748 0.817 0.055 0.048
p¯i 1.008 1.000 0.012 NA
ψpi 2.069 1.883 0.177 0.184
ψy 0.185 0.174 0.062 0.062
ψ∆y 0.201 0.139 0.029 0.033
SDs stand for standard deviations
More speciﬁcally, the capital share production cost α drops from 0.26 to
0.21, which implies a lower share of capital in the production function. The
habit formation parameter λ increases from 0.698 to 0.768, this indicates a
greater persistence in households' consumption preference. Both the inverse
elasticity of substitution for consumption goods and labour supply elasticity
decline, while all the three parameters associated with price and wage indexa-
tion, χ, lp, and lw plus the capital adjustment cost Ψ stays roughly the same.
The Calvo probability price setting drops from 77.3% to 75.8%, on the
contrary, the probability of labour union not being able to reset wages increases
from 74.8% to 81.7%.
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For parameters in the Taylor rule, the response parameter of central bank
ψpi to inﬂation deviation from steady state drops to 1.883, the response to
output deviation ψy also decrease slightly to 0.174. In addition, the response
to changes in output gap ψ∆y decline to 0.139, and therefore, once trend in-
ﬂation is removed or artiﬁcially ﬁxed to zero, central bank responds less to all
measurements.
Table 2.7: Posterior Distribution of Shocks Processes without Trend Inﬂation
Parameter Mean with p¯i Mean no p¯i SDs p¯i SDs no p¯i
ρz 0.989 0.640 0.007 0.053
ρg 0.856 0.844 0.027 0.030
ρm 0.097 0.100 0.044 0.043
ρp 0.758 0.786 0.060 0.056
ρzg 0.587 0.646 0.046 0.019
θp 0.758 0.362 0.083 0.151
ρinv 0.514 0.498 0.179 0.199
εz 0.487 0.466 0.025 0.024
εg 0.395 0.434 0.030 0.028
εm 0.197 0.195 0.011 0.011
εp 0.190 0.171 0.058 0.052
εinv 0.476 0.400 0.211 0.317
SDs stand for standard deviations
The estimates of most of the shock processes do not change much across
the two versions of the model, the only exception is the persistence parameter
for productivity shock ρz and government spending shock g. The shock to
productivity becomes much less persistent in the new model (without trend
inﬂation), while the size of the shock to government purchases increases con-
siderably in this new estimation.
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2.3.6 Cross Model Comparison
Bayesian Factors
In order to examine whether such an assumption of trend inﬂation would make
any signiﬁcant diﬀerence in terms of DSGE modelling, I have to compare
the model with trend inﬂation with the one without this set-up. One of the
methods to compare them is the statistic called Bayesian factors. The usual
statistic that economists use is the Log data density computed by using Laplace
approximation, which is reported in the Bayesian estimation results. The rule
of thumb is that the greater this log density is, the better the modelling is
from a Bayesian estimation point of view.
Table 2.8: Bayesian Factors Comparison
Log data density With trend inﬂation Without trend inﬂation
Laplace Approximation -297.9649 -298.1405
The statistical measures of Bayesian factors for the two models are sum-
marised in the table above. It can be found seen that for the Bayesian factor
computed by Laplace approximation, the trend inﬂation model is preferred to
the model with no trend inﬂation, even just marginally.
2.3.7 Applications of the Benchmark Model
Shock Decomposition: What are the main driving forces over the
business cycle?
Figure 2.1 and ﬁgure 2.2 provide the historical shock decomposition for output
and inﬂation.
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Figure 2.1: Historical Shock Decomposition for Output
According to ﬁgure 2.1 and 2.2, the recession in the early 1970s (5th-20th
quarters) is led by monetary policy shock, which may reﬂect a slack in the Fed-
eral Reserve's policy at the time. Then the recession is worsened by produc-
tivity and demand shocks (exogenous government spending) and then pushed
to the bottom by the supply shock, which may reﬂect the soaring oil price at
the time. Overall, this is a recession initiated by loose monetary policy and by
the rocketing oil price. While the recession in the early 1980s (40th quarter)
brings a very mixed picture of three types of shocks, the recession in early
1990s (80th quarter) and the beginning of the new millennium (120th quarter)
happens initially due to demand and mark-up shocks.
92
Figure 2.2: Shock Decomposition for Inﬂation
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2.3.8 Macroeconomic Dynamics of the Benchmark Model
It is also worth to look at how the macroeconomic variables perform under
diﬀerent exogenous shocks, and compare them with the dynamics in the SW07
model. Figure 2.3 through to ﬁgure 2.6 give the impulse response functions
of four macro variables when the economy is hit by four exogenous shocks:
productivity shock, government expenditure shock, monetary policy shock and
shock to price mark-up. The solid lines are the impulse response functions and
the shadow areas represent the 5% and 95% conﬁdence interval of the posterior
estimation.
Figure 2.3: The estimated IRFs to a productivity shock
According to ﬁgure 2.3, a productivity shock of 0.487 creates a positive
output deviation from its steady state. The initial deviation is around 0.4,
which is slightly larger than the SW07 value, and then it peaks in the 7th
quarter, similar to the SW07 peak of 8th quarter, and the response in output
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in my model is slightly more persistent than the SW07 one. Inﬂation initially
deviates from the steady state by just over 0.05, which is relatively less than
the SW07, however, this should not be hard to understand. Due to the fact
that this inﬂation gap is now the deviation of inﬂation from a non-zero steady
state, hence, the deviation should be smaller than the case that steady state
is assumed to be zero for inﬂation. Moreover, the inﬂation gap shows less
persistence compared with SW07; it bounds back to the steady state after just
5 quarters, in comparison with nearly 10 quarters in the SW07. In addition,
a productivity shock in this model can generate a much smaller decline in
hours worked. The reason behind this is that the presence of trend inﬂation
in this model primarily serves as a negative productivity shock in macroeco-
nomic dynamics (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2007a). As Ascari and Sbordone
(2014) explained, this is done through the channel of price dispersion, and this
negative productivity eﬀect of trend inﬂation counteracts with the positive
shock in productivity and makes the overall eﬀect on labour hour ﬂuctuations
considerably less.
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Figure 2.4: The estimated IRFs to a government spending shock
Figure 2.4 gives the impulse response functions of a exogenous government
spending shock of 0.395. All four variables exhibit very similar patterns and
magnitude as the SW07.
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Figure 2.5: The estimated IRFs to a monetary policy shock
The main focus of the contractionary monetary policy shock is captured
by Figure 2.5. The impulse response functions of a 0.197 shock to the Taylor
rule show output drops initially by 0.09 from its steady state level and the
deviation peaks at -0.15 in the third quarter, which is the same time as SW07,
however, the magnitude is much smaller than the SW07, albeit with a very
similar level of persistence in output. Inﬂation dives to over -0.06 on impact,
and this is actually a larger impact compared with SW07 of -0.045. This
diﬀerence is primarily due to the diﬀerence in the size of the monetary shock
in my estimation (0.197) and SW07 estimation (0.14). This GNK model is able
to generate a hump-shaped response for inﬂation and it peaks in the second
quarter after the shock, one quarter earlier than SW07. This diﬀerence may
attribute to the eﬀect of indexation on past inﬂation and trend inﬂation. As
illustrated by Ascari and Branzoli (2015), one of the major eﬀects of indexation
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on the macroeconomic dynamics of such GNK model is that the persistence in
the inﬂation gap relies directly on the overall degree of indexation. The higher
the level of price indexation, the lower the inﬂation persistence in inﬂation gap,
partly due to the reduced persistence in price dispersion term. The degree of
indexation is estimated to be 0.589 and thus it is reasonable to imagine that
inﬂation persistence becomes smaller compared with SW07. Furthermore, the
impact of the shock on inﬂation dies out after about 14 quarters, whereas
SW07's inﬂation persists to nearly until the 20th quarter.
Figure 2.6: The estimated IRFs to a price mark-up shock
Last, the impulse response functions of a price mark-up is summarised in
ﬁgure 2.6. All the four variables look very close to SW07.
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2.4 Sub-Sample Analysis: the Great Inﬂation,
the Great Moderation, and the Great Re-
cession
Since the time covered in Bayesian estimation stretched cross almost ﬁve
decades; 1970s-2010s. During the ﬁve decades, the 1970s and early 1980s
experienced highly volatile ﬂuctuations in price level and it is regarded as the
Great Inﬂation period by economists, and the later saw much more stable price
level and lower inﬂation rate on average and labelled by macroeconomists as
the Great Moderation time. The new term of the Great Recession only came in
more recent years as a description of the time following the 2007-08 ﬁnancial
crisis. Thus, it is worth to consider estimating the model again by dividing
the sample into three sub-sample periods and analyse them accordingly. The
three sub-sample periods are divided as the Great Inﬂation which last from
the ﬁrst quarter of 1970 to the last quarter of 1983. The Great Moderation
which stretch from the ﬁrst quarter of 1985 until the second quarter of 2007.
The Great recession covers from the third quarter of 2007 to the last quarter of
2017. The Bayesian estimation results of key structural parameters and shocks
are presented in the following two tables:
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Table 2.9: Posterior distribution for sub-sample estimates
Parameters Great Inﬂation Great Moderation Great Recession
α 0.285 0.257 0.213
λ 0.748 0.783 0.712
σc 1.843 1.965 1.040
σl 1.887 1.341 1.000†
Ψ 5.965 7.160 5.362
χ 0.484 0.420 0.481
η 0.393 0.579 0.589
lp 0.384 0.320 0.383
lw 0.595 0.581 0.592
ζp 0.635 0.706 0.752
ζw 0.723 0.745 0.720
p¯i 1.0174 1.0057 1.0040
ψpi 2.095 1.818 1.125†
ψy 0.159 0.194 0.125†
ψ∆y 0.135 0.099 0.105†
† Pre-ﬁxed parameters
100
Table 2.10: Posterior Distribution of Shocks Processes
Parameters Great Inﬂation Great Moderation Great Recession
ρz 0.507 0.666 0.717
ρg 0.761 0.852 0.835
ρm 0.097 0.357 0.100
ρp 0.853 0.778 0.435
ρgz 0.561 0.587 0.601
θp 0.369 0.417 0.376
ρinv 0.492 0.503 0.499
εz 0.538 0.400 0.395
εg 0.639 0.331 0.256
εm 0.335 0.088 0.050
εp 0.354 0.168 0.225
εinv 0.422 0.598 0.429
Table 2.10 and 2.11 summarise the main results of this sub-sample estima-
tion and provides a clear look of how these parameters and stochastic shocks
evolve across the three periods. It clearly shows that the most crucial pa-
rameter in this thesis p¯i is estimated to be 1.0174, which corresponds to an
annualised trend in inﬂation of 6.96% in the Great Inﬂation time from 1970s
to early 1980s. This ﬁgure comes with no big surprise if one recalls how high
inﬂation was in the 1970s. However, the measure drops considerably to 1.0057,
which implies an annual rate of 2.28% during the Great Moderation time. It
reﬂects a much more stable and moderate level of inﬂation rate during the time
and reﬂecting why it is characterised as a moderation period by economists.
Finally, the steady state inﬂation declines even further during the Great Reces-
sion time, the estimate of 1.0040 for p¯i translates to an annual trend inﬂation
of just 1.6%. Nevertheless, these results are in sharp contrast with the SW07
estimation where they ﬁnd the rate merely dropped from 2.9% in the Great
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Inﬂation to 2.6% in the Great Moderation. This may due to the completely
diﬀerent methodology of how this trend inﬂation is incorporated in their model
and in this GNK model, where the trend is explicitly modelled.
For the structural parameters, there are some interesting points to be no-
ticed. While the inverse elasticity of substitution in consumption goods in-
creases from the Great Inﬂation to the Great Moderation, the elasticity of
labour supply drops signiﬁcantly in the same time. This is not what SW07
ﬁnds as both parameters increase over time in their estimation. The adjust-
ment cost of investment rises dramatically from the Great Inﬂation to the
Great Moderation, this is consistent with the SW07 ﬁnding. However, it drops
again during the Great Recession time. All the three price and wage indexa-
tion parameters χ, lp, and lw all stay quite stable across the three sub-sample
periods, so does the utilisation rate of capital η. As shown in a number of
literature, both Calvo parameters ζp and ζw increased from the Great Inﬂation
to the Great Moderation, while ζp rises further in the Great Recession and ζw
starts to decline in the same time.
By examining the change of response parameters in the Taylor rule, one
would notice that as the level of trend inﬂation declines from theGreat Inﬂation
to the Great Moderation time, the central bank's estimated inﬂation response
and output gap response both drop at the same time. This result conﬁrms what
Arias et al. (2018), Ascari and Ropele (2009), and Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2011) ﬁnd; as trend inﬂation declines, the Taylor rule should respond less
aggressively towards inﬂation, though the Taylor rule used here is slightly
diﬀerent from their trend inﬂation immune Taylor rule (TIIT).
Furthermore, the most signiﬁcant diﬀerences between these three sub-
sample periods are the standard errors of the stochastic processes. Especially
the size of exogenous government spending and monetary policy shock. These
two shocks have continuously declined in size throughout these three sub-
sample periods. This result is also conﬁrmed by SW07 sub-sample analysis.
The interesting thing here is that the productivity shock also decreases con-
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siderably from the Great Inﬂation to the Great Moderation, however, it stays
almost unchanged from the time onwards to the Great Recession. The shock
to price mark-up has captured a U-shape change, it drops from the ﬁrst sub-
sample periods to the second, but it climbs again in the last sub-sample time.
Overall, one should pay less attention to the Great Recession estimates due to
both its limited sample and number of pre-ﬁxed parameter values.
2.5 The Eﬀects of Trend Inﬂation on Macroeco-
nomic Dynamics in the Benchmark Model
Next, the focus turns to another core research question of this thesis: how
diﬀerent levels of trend inﬂation or potential levels of inﬂation target for central
would alter the macroeconomic dynamics when the economy is hit by various
shocks. To conduct this exercise in line with the baseline estimation of the
benchmark model, I set the shocks' persistence parameters to the Bayesian
posterior means, but the standard deviation of each shock to 1, in order to see
the same magnitude of shocks that happen to the economy. Then, by changing
the level of trend inﬂation, I examine how the key macroeconomic variables
respond diﬀerently to these shocks under diﬀerent levels of inﬂation steady
state. The macro variables to be analysed including output, inﬂation, nominal
interest rate, real market wage rate, and price dispersion. The levels of trend
inﬂation to be tested are 0%, 2%, 4%, 6% and 8%.
2.5.1 Productivity Shock
Figure 2.7 shows the impulse response functions (IRFs henceforth) of 1 stan-
dard deviation productivity shock with persistence parameter equals 0.989,
therefore, a highly persistent shock to the total factor productivity.
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Figure 2.7: IRFs to a productivity shock (εz = 1, ρz = 0.989, ρzg = 0.587)
The ﬁrst thing to notice is that under higher level of trend inﬂation, pro-
ductivity shock always causes a greater degree of price dispersion on both sides
of the steady state. Second, the IRF of output illustrates that output responds
to a TFP shock with roughly the same magnitude under all levels of trend in-
ﬂation up to the 5th quarter. However, since the 6th quarter, output reacts
more to the shock under higher level of trend inﬂation, and this discrepancy
keeps enlarging and reaches its maximum at around 12th quarter, 3 years af-
ter the shock. Then the gap between output reactions to diﬀerent levels of
trend inﬂation starts to shrink and remains open for this 20 quarters forecast
horizon. The overall picture for output is that output reacts more heavily to
productivity shock after one and half years and the reaction is more persistent
with higher level of trend inﬂation.
The IRF of inﬂation provides a more interesting picture; inﬂation responds
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less on impact with higher level of trend inﬂation. Nonetheless, it becomes
signiﬁcantly higher soon after the second quarter, and the size of inﬂation
deviation under 8 percent becomes about twice as large as it is with 0 percent in
the fourth quarter. Moreover, inﬂation goes back to the steady state level after
the ﬁfth quarter with zero trend inﬂation but persists until the seventh quarter
with 8 percent, hence a half year delay. The same story happens to later time
as inﬂation bounds above steady state, inﬂation is more persistent under higher
level of trend inﬂation throughout the entire forecast horizon. This IRF also
looks very similar to the IRF of price dispersion, and this conﬁrms their mutual
feedback eﬀect in this case.
Next, as demonstrated in section 2 that aggregate wage rate becomes more
backward looking as trend inﬂation increases, the IRF of market wage rate
clearly conﬁrms this nature of wage innertia. Again, market wage rate re-
sponds less on impact, however, it persists much longer under higher level of
trend inﬂation. Combined with the IRF of inﬂation, it is fair to say that this
signiﬁcant inertia in wage rate caused by higher trend inﬂation has apparent
propagation eﬀects to the rest of the supply side of the economy.
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2.5.2 Government Spending Shock
Figure 2.8: IRFs to a government spending shock (εg = 1, ρg = 0.856)
According to ﬁgure 2.8, after a government spending shock, the similar story
happens to output, inﬂation, and market wage rate as in the previous case
of productivity shock. Initially, output responds by roughly the same mag-
nitude under all levels of trend inﬂation, however, the diﬀerence starts to
emerge among diﬀerent trend inﬂation and output becomes more persistent
with higher trend inﬂation, even though the diﬀerence is trivial. Only a two
quarters delay of going back to steady state under 8 percent trend inﬂation
compared with zero trend inﬂation.
Both inﬂation and market wage rate react less on impact with higher trend
inﬂation, the patterns are reversed after ﬁve quarters for wage rate and six
quarters for inﬂation. Both inﬂation and market wage rate are much more
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persistent under higher inﬂation steady state than they are when steady state
inﬂation is zero. The backward looking nature of market wage still plays a
crucial part in the aggregate economy.
2.5.3 Monetary Policy Shock
The impulse response functions of a 1 standard deviation expansionary mon-
etary policy shock in Figure 2.9 captures a more interesting story.
Figure 2.9: IRFs to a monetary policy shock (εm = 0.197, ρm = 0.097)
Output responds to the same level for almost all ﬁve diﬀerent levels of trend
inﬂation on impact. Nonetheless, in distinction to the previous productivity
and government spending shock cases, this obvious discrepancy of output re-
action among diﬀerent levels of trend inﬂation starts to emerge after just two
quarters and this dispersion remains considerable for almost three years. Then
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output reverts to steady state after around thirteen quarters under zero trend
inﬂation, but persists until the ﬁfteenth quarter with 8 percent trend, so a half
year delay of returning to the origin. Again, the timing and persistence of
discrepancy diﬀer from the productivity and demand shocks, this IRF shows
that output deviation is larger and more persistent under higher level of trend
inﬂation compared with assuming zero inﬂation steady state.
It is always worth to look at the IRF of the market wage rate as it is one of
the main sources of inertia in this medium scale GNK model. The discrepancy
of market wage among diﬀerent levels of trend inﬂation begins to present after
just two quarters and keeps enlarging to a great extent. Market wage rate is
obviously more persistent with even just moderate trend inﬂation 4 percent,
represented by the red solid line in Figure 2.10. More precisely, real market
wage goes back to steady state after the ﬁfteenth quarter with zero trend,
and it persists until just before the nineteenth quarter, an entire year of delay
is captured here. For the forecast horizon of 20 quarters observed here, this
dispersion of response under diﬀerent trend levels remains signiﬁcantly large.
The IRF of inﬂation indicates that inﬂation reacts much less on impact
under higher trend inﬂation. The initial deviation of inﬂation under 8 percent
trend inﬂation is just over a half of the initial deviation of inﬂation under zero
trend inﬂation. Therefore, a central bank would assume a much larger eﬀect of
monetary policy change on impact when it believes the long run steady state
of inﬂation is zero, compared with the same central bank but who can actually
realise its long run inﬂation is obviously above zero. Moreover, according to the
baseline calibrations based on Bayesian posteriors, inﬂation deviation peaks in
the second quarter under zero, two and four percent inﬂation steady states.
However, under both 6, and 8 percent trends, inﬂation peaks in the third
quarter after the shock, which is more consistent with empirical evidence.
In addition, by comparing the black line with circles and the cyan line with
crosses, one should realise that inﬂation returns to the steady state level in the
thirteenth quarter under zero trend inﬂation, nevertheless, inﬂation persists
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until the eighteenth quarter when the trend is assumed to be 8 percent. An
astonishing ﬁve quarters delay with just a ρm = 0.10 persistence level monetary
policy shock. The overall picture this IRF tells us is that under high level of
long run inﬂation steady state, a monetary policy shock causes much less
response of inﬂation on impact compared with the case with very low or zero
trend inﬂation, however, this response from inﬂation is much more persistent in
high trend environment than it is the case under zero trend. This quantitative
result captures a long-believed wisdom in monetary economics study: the eﬀect
on inﬂation after a monetary policy shock does not happen on impact, and this
eﬀect is also highly persistent (Mankiw and Reis, 2002).
To brieﬂy sum up what is learnt from the IRFs of this expansionary mon-
etary policy shock, this study provides some new enrichments to the current
understanding of inﬂation persistence in monetary economics by showing that
higher trend inﬂation can explain this empirical norm from a diﬀerent stand-
point (through introducing more inertia in market wage), and central banks
should not ignore the presence of trend inﬂation when they conduct policy
research.
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2.5.4 Price Mark-up Shock
Figure 2.10: IRFs to a price mark-up shock (εm = 1, ρp = 0.758)
A supply side shock is captured by a shock to the Generalised NKPC, namely,
price mark-up shock. Figure 2.10 summarises the IRFs after a price mark-up
shock. A similar story to the previous monetary policy shock can be seen here.
In general, output reacts much more under higher trend inﬂation, and this
discrepancy enlarges from the third quarter while reaches it maximum around
the ninth quarter. The only diﬀerence is that under baseline calibration, output
with diﬀerent levels of trend inﬂation all goes back to the steady state at around
the same time, hence persistence of output is quite the same across all trend
levels. But higher trend inﬂation generates much more volatility in output and
presumably more welfare cost.
Inﬂation reacts more to this price mark-up shock with higher level of trend
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inﬂation from the beginning of the shock until inﬂation returns to its steady
state level. The gap between the timing that inﬂation reaches steady state
under zero and 8 percent trend is one quarter, which means inﬂation persistence
is fairly close in this case compared with the previous monetary policy shock
case. Nevertheless, the persistence of real market wage is still drastically larger
with high trend inﬂation as the previous cases. It conﬁrms the backward
looking nature of this variable presents in every single case of this study.
Overall, under the baseline calibration of a moderately high degree of price
indexation (χ = 0.60), the impact of a change in trend inﬂation level on
macroeconomic dynamics can be clearly observed in all exogenous shocks, even
though they are very small in some cases. In particular, inﬂation is much more
persistent with a high level of trend inﬂation after a monetary policy shock.
A clear delay of the maximum eﬀect can be found at 6 and 8 percent trend in-
ﬂation case, which conﬁrms the conventional monetary economic wisdom that
the eﬀects of monetary policy shock do not happen on impact, and also eﬀects
are quite persistent. One of the main contributions to this improved persis-
tence of macro variables can be found through the eﬀects of trend inﬂation on
market wage rate, as conﬁrmed by the IRFs of wage rate in all four cases.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter constructs a medium-scale GNK model based on the work from
Smets and Wouters (2007), but with the explicit modelling of trend inﬂation.
The model is log-linearised around a non-zero inﬂation steady state while keep-
ing most of the feature from the original SW07 model.
This new framework, the benchmark model shows some very interesting
properties. The Generalised NKPC becomes ﬂatter as trend inﬂation increases;
the weights assigned to expected inﬂation becomes larger, while the weights on
real marginal cost and past inﬂation become smaller, and making the GNKPC
more forward looking. Moreover, as trend inﬂation increases, the real market
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wage rate in the aggregate economy is tied more to the past wage carried
forward, or those who are not able to re-optimise their wages, and less to the
current optimal reset wage. Therefore, it makes the market wage rate more
backward looking and introduces more inertia to the wage movements. The
overall eﬀects on the whole model is a huge amount of increased dynamics.
This Generalised New Keynesian model is then estimated using a Bayesian
technique with US quarterly data from 1970 Q1 to 2017 Q4. The estimation
results, the impulse response functions and one period ahead forecast all indi-
cate that this GNK model is able to capture the main macro features in the
post-war United States. In addition, the Bayesian posterior on trend inﬂation
shows the long run steady state inﬂation is about 3.2% annually during the
time. An estimate that is largely in line with previous literature, but with the
explicit modelling of trend inﬂation.
Based on the baseline calibration from Bayesian posteriors, the simulations
demonstrate that rising trend inﬂation from zero to 6 or 8 percent can have
a profound impact on the overall macroeconomic dynamics. More speciﬁcally,
both output and inﬂation become more persistent as trend inﬂation rises; this
is associated with a substantial increase in the persistence of market wage
rate at the same time. Particularly for monetary policy shock, at the baseline
calibration of 0.10 level of persistence, inﬂation can persist 5 quarters longer
under 8 percent trend inﬂation than it can under zero trend inﬂation. In
addition, the peak of the hump in inﬂation is delayed for one quarter with
6 percent trend inﬂation or higher, a substantial improvement in terms of
capturing the macro evidence.
All the above result are obtained based on a calibrated degree of indexation
of χ = 0.60. As reﬂected in previous literature on trend inﬂation that index-
ation has a muting eﬀect on the role that trend inﬂation can play to macroe-
conomic dynamics 5. While as the degree of indexation becomes smaller the
5More discussion can be found in Ascari and Branzoli (2015); Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims
(2018)
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impact that trend inﬂation makes on equilibrium dynamics turns larger, de-
clining degree of indexation can also cause reduced persistence and backward
looking feature in the model. Thus, it is worth to look at how macro dynamics
are changed once indexation is removed from this GNK model, and this is one
of the central research questions of Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Trend Inﬂation, Price Indexation
and Inﬂation Persistence in a
Generalised New Keynesian Model
3.1 Introduction
The model's implication that individual prices should continuously adjust in
response to changes in prices elsewhere in the economy ﬂies in the face of the
survey evidence that many (though not all) individual prices remain unchanged
in money terms for several months, or even longerthat has always provided
one of the main arguments for supposing that prices are not continuously re-
optimized.
Michael Woodford (2007) on price indexation
For a long period of time, there is a general agreement among leading
macroeconomists that inﬂation has been showing a high degree of persistence
in the post-war United States, and to ﬁnd a model with features that can gen-
erate enough persistence in inﬂation became an essential criteria of evaluating
whether one's model can successfully capture the empirical fact. Put it diﬀer-
ently, whether it is a good DSGE model. Nonetheless, since the early 2000s,
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many researchers started to study whether this observed inﬂation persistence
is intrinsic in inﬂation or it is just due to some unobserved component in the
inﬂation dynamics. Prominent literature regarding this issue includes: Cogley
and Sargent (2001), Cogley and Sargent (2005), Cogley and Sbordone (2008),
Primiceri (2006), Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010), and Stock and Watson
(2007).
Earlier works such as Cogley and Sargent (2001), Cogley and Sargent (2005)
were fruitful in terms of raising the issue but was unsuccessful in terms of dis-
tinguishing between inﬂation and time-varying inﬂation gap, as acknowledged
in their own later work Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010). The latter,
however, successfully address this distinction. By deﬁning a measure of per-
sistence in terms of inﬂation gap predictability 1, they ﬁnd that inﬂation gap,
deﬁned in their own term as the diﬀerence between inﬂation and its long run
steady state or Federal Reserve's long run target, is weakly persistent when
the eﬀects of shocks die out quickly, and it is strongly persistent when these
shocks' eﬀects decay slowly. Therefore, based on their study, the persistence of
inﬂation completely depends on how persistent the shocks that aﬀect inﬂation
are. In other words, inﬂation is intrinsically persistence because it inherits
some persistence from the shocks.
One of the key assumptions required by macroeconomists to deliver such
inﬂation persistence in DSGE models is the pricing behaviour of backward
indexation. Therefore, the ﬁrst issue I want to look at in this chapter is the
importance of backward indexation in this medium-scale Generalised
New Keynesian (GNK) model. Put it diﬀerently, whether the removal of
indexation can cause the results obtained from Chapter 2 become invalid.
As illustrated in the previous chapter that the major motivations behind the
design of price and wage indexation is to generate some backward-looking
terms in a hybrid NKPC and therefore it can produce enough persistence in
1This predictability is deﬁned as the fraction of total inﬂation gap variation j quarters
ahead that is due to past shocks.
115
macroeconomic variables, particularly in inﬂation, as observed in empirical
data.
Backward indexation states that for these price setting ﬁrms (or wage set-
ting unions or households) who are not able to reset their prices (or wage),
simply index the new prices as a function of last period inﬂation or steady
state inﬂation rate, this can be found from Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(2005), Smets and Wouters (2007). An alternative mechanism of some rule-of
thumb-behaviour approach is used in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000). How-
ever, such backward indexation assumption received heavy criticism from a
wide range of researchers, from both theoretical and empirical standpoints.
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2009) argue that this feature is ﬂatly incon-
sistent with the US data and counterfactual. These empirical analyses can
be traced back to Golosov and Lucas Jr (2007), as well as Midrigan (2011).
Furthermore, Dixon and Kara (2010) argue that a model with full or even par-
tial indexation implies that every ﬁrm adjusts its price every period, and this
clearly falls foul of the micro data. Therefore, a model with such backward
indexation assumption can lead to huge trouble with the estimate of the Calvo
probability of changing a price in an economy in which, because of backward
indexation, all prices change in every period so that Calvo probability becomes
an invalid estimate of overall rigidity in the economy. Just as reﬂected in the
quote at the beginning of this chapter, Woodford (2007) points out that the
assumption of indexation is simply inconsistent with micro survey data. In
addition, Cogley and Sbordone (2008) criticise indexation's lack of microeco-
nomic foundation by stating that "speciﬁcations of the Calvo model involving
an indexation component are hard to reconcile with their evidence. When
indexation is assumed, every ﬁrm changes price every quarter, some optimally
rebalancing marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost, others mechanically marking
up prices in accordance with the indexation rule. Unless the optimal rebalanc-
ing happened to result in a zero price change, or lagged inﬂation was exactly
zero, conditions that are very unlikely, no ﬁrm would fail to adjust its nominal
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price."
To make this trouble even worse in a GNK model, a high degree of indexa-
tion would mute the dynamic eﬀects of trend inﬂation in a model where steady
state inﬂation is correctly assumed to be non-zero in the long run. A number
of researchers have found that the eﬀects of trend inﬂation are dramatically
reduced once a high degree of backward indexation is assumed. Both Ascari
and Branzoli (2015), and Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims (2018) ﬁnd a strong neg-
ative relationship between the degree of indexation and the magnitude that
trend inﬂation can make to macroeconomic dynamics. Hence, the assumption
of indexation can only make things worse in terms of a model's theoretical
consistency, once we realise how important trend inﬂation is. The reason why
indexation is so crucial to these macro models with trend inﬂation is the fact
that when prices are fully ﬂexible due to full indexation (χ = 1), price disper-
sion disappears in the deterministic steady state (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe,
2007b). When (χ < 1), any deviation from zero inﬂation entails price disper-
sion, and the lower the degree of indexation, the higher is the price dispersion
associated with a given level of inﬂation.
Therefore, it is essential for a model, which is designed to study the eﬀects
of trend inﬂation, to exclude the assumption of backward price indexation. For
both theoretical consistency with micro foundation and empirical consistency
with micro survey data, and also for the proper account of the eﬀects of trend
inﬂation in the economy.
Cogley and Sbordone (2008) formulate a time-varying drift in the trend
inﬂation term and log-linearise a New Keynesian DSGE model around this
time-varying inﬂation trend. They ﬁnd that their estimates of the backward
looking indexation parameter concentrate on zero, which implies that indexa-
tion is unnecessary once drift in trend inﬂation is taken into account. Further-
more, their model provides a good ﬁt to the inﬂation gap, and the estimates
of price adjustment frequency are broadly consistent with micro level studies.
In addition, as trend inﬂation increases, the weight on forward-looking terms
117
is enhanced, while that on current marginal cost is eﬀectively muted, all the
features that are conﬁrmed by the GNKPC developed in Chapter 2. There-
fore, it is worth to study whether such medium scale GNK model with
time-invariant trend inﬂation can also capture the observed inﬂation
persistence without the sacriﬁce of assuming backward indexation.
The last issue I want to focus on in this chapter is the optimal response
of monetary policy under a high level of trend inﬂation. A typical
contemporaneous Taylor rule usually involves the response to targeting vari-
ables such as inﬂation, output gap, output growth, and interest rate smooth-
ing. Works by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) ﬁnd that heavy response
to inﬂation, output growth and also a high degree of interest rate smoothing
can improve the probability of securing the uniqueness of rational expectation
equilibrium (REE), and avoid sunspot self-fulﬁlling ﬂuctuations. This paper
tests the optimal monetary response to these targeting variables conditional
on satisfying the uniqueness of REE when the economy is experiencing a high
level of trend inﬂation (8 percent).
The structure of this chapter is divided as the following: section 2 gives
the general description of this new benchmark model without indexation and
explains what diﬀerence these modiﬁcations are expected to make to the model.
This is followed by section 3, which provides the Bayesian estimation results
of this new model and the estimated equilibrium dynamics of the estimation.
Section 4 conducts a simulation exercise of how the change in the level of
trend inﬂation aﬀects the macroeconomic dynamics when the economy is hit
by various shocks. Section 5 focuses on the optimal monetary response under
a high level of trend inﬂation conditional on determinacy. The last section
draws some concluding remarks.
118
3.2 The Benchmark Model without Indexations
As a result of the ﬂexible set-up of this GNK benchmark model, the feature of
price and wage indexations can be easily switched oﬀ by setting χ = 0. Upon
removing the two indexations, expression of price dispersion becomes
sˆt = − 1 + λp
λp(1− α) ·
(
1− ζpp¯i
1+λp
λp(1−α)
)
· ˆ˜pt + ζpp¯i
1+λp
λp(1−α)
·
[(
1 + λp
λp(1− α)
)
· pˆit + sˆt−1
]
(3.1)
where
ˆ˜pt =
ζpp¯i
1
λ¯p
1− ζpp¯i
1
λ¯p
· pˆit
Based on this new expression for price dispersion, one can easily ﬁnd that
past inﬂation does not appear in the equation anymore, hence, past inﬂation
no longer has any impact on the current price dispersion. Furthermore, the
past inﬂation is also missing from the optimal reset price equation ˆ˜pt. The
only eﬀect of past inﬂation on current price dispersion is through its impact
on past price dispersion sˆt−1. Therefore, price dispersion loses some backward
looking feature as a result of the removal of indexation.
From this new expression of price dispersion, one can detect the role that
played by several key parameters on the magnitude of trend inﬂation on price
dispersion in this equation. Due to the exclusion of price indexation, the
marginal impact of trend inﬂation becomes much larger (power changes from
1 − χ to 1). This implies for the same values of parameters λp, α, and ζp, as
trend inﬂation increases, the mutual feedback eﬀect between price dispersion sˆt
and inﬂation pˆit becomes greater, and therefore, for the same level of inﬂation,
a higher level of trend inﬂation now lead to a larger degree of price dispersion
in the economy, this causes severe welfare loss. In addition, the same eﬀect
happens to the feedback coeﬃcient of past price dispersion sˆt−1, therefore, even
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though past inﬂation pˆit−1 disappears from this expression after indexation is
removed, the motion of sˆt becomes no less dynamic.
The Generalised New Keynesian Phillips curve becomes
pˆit =
[
ζp + p¯i
− (1+λp)
λp − ζpp¯i−1
]
β ·Etpˆit+1 + (1− ζpβ)(1− ζpp¯i
1
λp )
ζp
· mˆct + λˆp,t
(3.2)
The ﬁrst thing to notice from this new version of the GNKPC is that
it becomes a purely forward looking Phillips curve in terms of inﬂation, the
backward looking term pˆit−1 disappears once price indexation χ is set to zero.
However, the same eﬀects of trend inﬂation still hold in this new GNKPC. As
the level of trend inﬂation p¯i increases, even though the composite coeﬃcients
in front of both expected inﬂation Etpˆit+1 and real marginal cost mˆct drop,
the relative weight on pit+1 becomes much larger relative to the weight on mˆct,
again, the GNKPC becomes more forward looking and ﬂatter as trend inﬂation
p¯i rises. This result is consistent with the GNKPC based on time-varying trend
inﬂation in Cogley and Sbordone (2008) and also Ascari and Sbordone (2014)'s
ﬁnding.
The equation for aggregate real wage rate changes to
wˆt = (1− ζwp¯i
1
λ¯w ) ˆ˜wt + ζwp¯i
1
λ¯w [lwχpˆit−1 − pˆit + wˆt−1] (3.3)
The same conclusion from the original GNKPC of the previous chapter
also hold, and the eﬀect of trend inﬂation on the dynamics of real market
wage rate clearly becomes larger as χ disappear. In general, the market wage
become more backward looking after indexation is removed, this now intro-
duces tremendous inertia in real market wage.
The optimal reset wage for labour union becomes
120
ˆ˜wt = (1− ζwβ)wˆht + ζwβ ˆ˜wt+1 +
ζwβ
p¯i
Etpˆit+1 (3.4)
Again, the term of current inﬂation is gone after indexation is switched oﬀ.
This implies the optimal reset wage is no longer aﬀected by current inﬂation,
and agents are more concerned with the current marginal product of labour,
expected future optimal reset price and less concerned about the expected
inﬂation when they have the chance to re-optimise their wages. This can be
interpreted as that due to the presence of trend inﬂation, wage-setting agents
feel inﬂation is harder to predict with accuracy and instead focus on more
the fundamental factor, such as, the productivity of labour and expected reset
wage.
3.3 Bayesian Estimation of the Benchmark Model
Without Indexation
Now, the new GNK model without indexation is re-estimated using a Bayesian
technique based on the same sample period from the ﬁrst quarter of 1970 to the
fourth quarter of 2017 with the same observables. The estimation is performed
in exactly the same way as the one in Chapter 2 : two models are estimated
separately with one has p¯i being estimated and the other one has p¯i pre-ﬁxed
to 1.000, which implies zero inﬂation steady state. The results are reported in
Table 3.1 and 3.2.
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Table 3.1: Posterior Distribution of Parameters in Benchmark Model With No
Indexation
Parameter Mean (p¯i > 1) St.Dev (p¯i > 1) Mean (p¯i = 1) St.Dev ( p¯i = 1)
α 0.261 0.042 0.261 0.040
λ 0.696 0.041 0695 0.039
σc 2.494 0.253 2.523 0.252
σl 1.273 0.617 1.367 0.626
Ψ 6.943 1.230 6.899 1.216
η 0.586 0.089 0.588 0.087
ζp 0.776 0.026 0.778 0.026
ζw 0.740 0.060 0.751 0.057
p¯i 1.0073 0.012 1.000† NA
ψpi 2.082 0.189 2.069 0.194
ψy 0.185 0.062 0.185 0.061
ψ∆y 0.197 0.038 0.202 0.035
† Pre-ﬁxed parameters in SW07
Table 3.1 and 3.2 show the posterior estimates of the structural parameter
for both versions of the same model. The ﬁrst two columns report the Bayesian
posterior means and standard deviations of the benchmark model without in-
dexation, the last columns summarise the means and standard deviations of
the benchmark model with no indexation and no trend, the direct comparison
between the two models can be seen from the table.
Capital share of production α stays similar to the benchmark model es-
timate of 0.261, and it is exactly the same across two versions. The habit
formation parameter λ is estimated to be around 0.696 in the benchmark
without indexation model. Both α and λ are very close to the estimates of
benchmark model. While both the inverse elasticity of substitution for con-
sumption goods σc and labour supply elasticity σl stays close to the estimates
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in benchmark model, both parameters become higher in this new model with
no trend inﬂation. The adjustment cost is relatively large in both model, with
an estimate of 6.94 in the trend model and 6.90 in the no trend version. The
capital utilisation rate is roughly the same across two models.
Interestingly, after removing price and wage indexations, the estimates of
ζp and ζw can now be interpreted as the true measures of nominal rigidities in
price and wage, since for those who are not able to re-optimise their prices and
wages, now they would simply carry on with previous prices and wages without
any indexing behaviour. The price rigidity ζp is estimated to be 0.78, along
with ζw of 0.74 implies very similar estimates of these two Calvo probabilities
with the benchmark model. Even though the estimates look similar to the
previous results, the economic interpretation is completely diﬀerent.
For the trend inﬂation estimates, the estimate of p¯i becomes 1.0073, which
translates to a 2.92% annual rate. A slight decline from the previous estimate
of benchmark model, possible interpretation can be that once indexation is
removed, the model exhibits less price ﬂexibility at the aggregate level, there-
fore, the overall prices and wages do not change as frequently as the benchmark
model, subsequently, this may lead to a slightly lower value of estimated steady
state inﬂation.
For the monetary policy response parameters, the central bank's response
to inﬂation becomes slightly larger, 2.082, compared with 2.069 in the bench-
mark model. Furthermore, the central bank's responses to output gap and
change in output gap do not change much across these four versions.
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Table 3.2: Posterior Distribution of Shocks Processes with No Indexation
Parameter Mean (p¯i > 1) St.Dev (p¯i > 1) Mean (p¯i = 1) St.Dev ( p¯i = 1)
ρz 0.986 0.035 0.991 0.008
ρg 0.857 0.029 0.858 0.028
ρm 0.100 0.044 0.100 0.045
ρp 0.802 0.049 0.801 0.050
ρzg 0.587 0.051 0.586 0.050
θp 0.376 0.160 0.383 0.172
ρinv 0.492 0.199 0.509 0.199
εz 0.467 0.026 0.488 0.025
εg 0.497 0.029 0.393 0.028
εm 0.191 0.011 0.196 0.011
εp 0.169 0.054 0.180 0.081
εinv 0.380 0.269 0.389 0.267
The estimates of shock processes and persistence parameters provide some
positive results. After removing the backward indexation assumption in both
price and wage settings, the estimated shock standard deviations and persis-
tence parameters do not change much. The shock to total factor productivity
has a persistence parameter close to one (0.986), the monetary policy shock is
as persistent as it in the benchmark model (0.10). The only noticeable change
is the standard deviation government expenditure becomes much larger, 0.497,
compared with 0.395 in the benchmark model estimates. All other estimates
stay roughly the same. A similar result is obtained here: investment-speciﬁc
technology shock has a much larger estimated volatility than all other shocks.
A result conﬁrmed by Justiniano and Primiceri (2008).
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Importance of Key Features
Diﬀerent features in DSGE model plays a very diﬀerent role in terms of gen-
erating these observed macroeconomic dynamics. Among these set-ups, price
stickiness plays a far less signiﬁcant role than wage stickiness in terms of gen-
erating these macroeconomic dynamics. The removal of price stickiness makes
almost no signiﬁcant diﬀerence to the dynamics of the model, however, the ex-
clusion of wage stickiness wipes out a large part of the dynamics. This is in line
with most of the literature on similar models; both Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) draw a similar conclusion.
Variable capital utilisation is crucial in terms of generating observed persis-
tence in output and inﬂation inertia. The degree of steady state price and wage
mark-ups play no signiﬁcant role in producing the macro dynamics. Again, all
these ﬁndings are consistent with existing literature.
Macroeconomic Dynamics
One of the motivations behind the introduction of backward indexation is its
assistance for generating enough persistence in macro variables, particularly
output and inﬂation. Hence, it is worth to look at how macroeconomic dy-
namics change after indexation is removed.
Figure 3.1 and 3.2 summarise the estimated impulse response functions
(IRFs) of the same four macro variables: output, inﬂation, nominal interest
rate, labour hours, after two exogenous shocks: productivity shock and mon-
etary policy shock.
Figure 3.1 shows that both output and inﬂation have similar patterns in
their IRFs as in Chapter 2. More speciﬁcally, both output and inﬂation have
less response immediately after the TFP shock, they both become more per-
sistent now, nevertheless. Output peaks in the tenth quarter and stays at
around 0.5 deviations after twenty quarters, while inﬂation returns to steady
state after ten quarters, this is actually much closer to the SW07 estimation.
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Furthermore, both nominal interest and labour supply produce better results
in terms of matching SW07 result than the benchmark model in Chapter 2.
Figure 3.1: Impulse Response Functions to a 0.485 Productivity shock (ρz =
0.986)
1Shadow area represents the 90 percent conﬁdence interval
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Figure 3.2: Impulse Response Functions to a 0.197 Monetary Policy shock
ρm = 0.100
Figure 3.2 shows that IRFs after a contractionary monetary policy shock.
Output and inﬂation again show very similar responses as the benchmark model
response. Output drops downwards by slightly more than 0.1 on impact, then
decline further to around -0.23 in the fourth quarter, which means the maxi-
mum eﬀect in this estimated IRF is even later than the SW07 IRF. The eﬀect
of this monetary policy shock on output persists longer than the benchmark
model estimation, it bounds back to the steady state after twenty quarters,
which is exactly the same as SW07's estimation. Moreover, the IRF of in-
ﬂation also shows some promising result. Even though this IRF does not
generate an obvious hump-shaped response for inﬂation, it can be seen that
the maximum eﬀect inﬂation does not happen on the ﬁrst quarter and then
soon die out. The maximum impact persists to the second quarter and then
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inﬂation gradually returns to steady state after more than twenty quarters,
again, a much similar picture as SW07 than the benchmark model. Overall,
this GNK model without indexation produces some very promising results in
terms of replicating the macro dynamics estimated from SW07 without the
hugely-ﬂawed assumption of backward indexation.
3.4 The Eﬀects of Trend Inﬂation on Macroeco-
nomic Dynamics without Indexation
Chapter 2 shows the presence of trend inﬂation can have some moderate ef-
fects on the model dynamics with an intermediate degree of price and wage
indexation (χ = 0.60). This section is to conduct the same exercise but based
on this GNK model without indexation. In order to do so, I test how macroe-
conomic variables react to exogenous shock diﬀerently under diﬀerent levels of
long run inﬂation steady state.
Figure 3.3 through to Figure 3.7 summarise how output, inﬂation, nomi-
nal interest rate, market wage, investment, and price dispersion, react to ﬁve
shocks under ﬁve diﬀerent level of trend inﬂation: 0%, 2%, 4%, 6% and 8%.
The ﬁrst thing to realise from the initial glance at these ﬁve sets of impulse
response functions is that the impact of trend inﬂation on macroeconomic
dynamics is undoubtedly more noticeable than the IRFs when indexation is
present, like in Chapter 2.
3.4.1 Productivity Shock
According to Figure 3.3, output with higher trend inﬂation responds slightly
less on impact, and the gap between outputs under high and low trend in-
ﬂation begins to enlarge after two quarters. After eight quarter, output with
high trend inﬂation becomes dominant and generates a much higher level of
deviations compared with its lower trend inﬂation counterparts. It also shows
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a much greater degree of persistence with high trend inﬂation throughout the
20 quarters forecast horizon.
Figure 3.3: Impulse response functions to a productivity shock(εz = 1,
ρz = 0.986, ρzg = 0.587)
The similar story happens to inﬂation, inﬂation with higher trend inﬂation
reacts much less on impact after this productivity shock, however, the pattern
soon reverse after three quarters. High trend inﬂation clearly produces more
inﬂation ﬂuctuations than lower trends and inﬂation also come back to steady
state later. More speciﬁcally, inﬂation with zero trend inﬂation returns to the
origin after just six quarters, in the 8 percent trend inﬂation, it comes back to
steady state in the eleventh quarter, an extraordinary ﬁve quarters of delay.
Market wage has a slightly diﬀerent story, the wage rate jumps less on
impact and clearly shows more inertia with higher level of trend inﬂation, as
the wage equation exhibits more backward looking feature with higher trend
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inﬂation. This lag of response in real wage is present until the sixteenth quar-
ter, after which it becomes more volatile and this pattern persists for the rest
of the forecast horizon.
3.4.2 Government Spending Shock
Figure 3.4: Impulse response functions to a government spending shock(εg =
1, ρg = 0.857)
The response of output after a government spending shock is more straightfor-
ward. Output with all levels of trend inﬂation respond by almost exactly the
same amount on impact, then the discrepancy starts to emerge and enlarge,
and ﬁnally reaches its maximum in the ninth quarter. Output with higher
level of trend inﬂation is more persistent: output goes back to steady state
after 13 quarters for 8% trend inﬂation, and it returns to the origin after only
10 quarters.
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Inﬂation jumps less but is much more persistent with higher levels of trend
inﬂation. With 8 percent trend, inﬂation reacts by just a third of its reaction
with zero percent (0.09 v.s. 0.27), however, the latter returns to steady state
after just 10 quarters, and the former comes back after 20 quarters. Therefore,
a stunning 10 quarters delay for inﬂation happens here, with the baseline
calibration. A similar story can be found from the IRF of the market wage
rate, even though the delay is not as large as it is for inﬂation.
3.4.3 Monetary Policy Shock
The IRFs of monetary policy shock produce yet another very interesting set of
pictures. According to Figure 3.5, output jumps by roughly the same amount
for all levels of trend inﬂation immediately after the shock, however, the move-
ments start to disperse soon after the second quarter, then keeps expanding.
The discrepancy reaches its maximum at the sixth quarter and is kept until
the tenth quarter before it starts to narrow. Quantitatively, output with zero
percent trend inﬂation returns to its steady state level after fourteen quarters,
while the inﬂation with 4 percent trend inﬂation comes back only in the 17th
quarter, so exactly a year of lag between the two zero and four percent trends.
For the entire forecast horizon with positive output deviation, output with
higher trend inﬂation always ﬂuctuates more and generates signiﬁcantly larger
persistence. Subsequently, the economy experiences a much greater welfare
loss due to higher level of trend inﬂation.
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Figure 3.5: Impulse response functions to a monetary policy shock(εm = 1,
ρm = 0.10)
The IRF of inﬂation in Figure 3.5 yields one of the most valuable (if not the)
results in this thesis. Overall, inﬂation with higher trend reacts to a monetary
policy shock much less on impact compared with inﬂation under zero trend or
very moderate trend inﬂation levels, but it persists for a much longer period.
More speciﬁcally, by comparing the dashed navy blue line with star and the
solid black line with circle one can ﬁnd that inﬂation with 6 percent trend
(0.20) reacts by just half of the reaction from inﬂation with 0 percent trend
inﬂation (0.40) on impact. Then, inﬂation starts to decline with absolutely
no comeback with 0 and 2 percent trend inﬂation. However, for inﬂation with
trend inﬂation of 4 percent or above, the largest impact is delayed until the
second quarter for 4 and 6 percent trend inﬂation. Most strikingly, inﬂation
with 8 percent trend inﬂation peaks between the third and fourth quarter, a
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clear and beautiful hump can be observed here for 4, 6, 8 percent of trend
inﬂation.
Regarding the hump shape of inﬂation, Dixon and Kara (2010) analyse
four diﬀerent types of price setting behaviour and ﬁnd that without indexation
behaviour (also no trend inﬂation in their model), a Calvo price setting model
cannot generate a hump shape, the largest response of inﬂation to a monetary
policy shock always happen on impact. However, here I successfully generate a
hump-shaped response of inﬂation to a very transitory (ρm = 0.10) monetary
shock using a model without the assumption of backward indexation behaviour
or any other extra features, even just for moderate trend inﬂation of 4 percent.
In fact, a further experiment to test the relationship between the eﬀect of
trend inﬂation and the persistence level of monetary policy shock ﬁnd that
the two are highly positively correlated. Figure 3.6 summarises that IRFs of
inﬂation after a monetary policy with four diﬀerent shock persistence levels:
ρm = 0.30, ρm = 0.60, ρm = 0.90, ρm = 0.99. The ﬁrst thing to notice
from the IRFs is that with no trend inﬂation (p¯i = 1), inﬂation never exhibits
a humped-shape after monetary policy under any persistence level. Second,
with a highly persistent monetary shock (ρm = 0.90), even inﬂation with just
2 percent trend inﬂation can generate a slight hump which peaks in the second
quarter, while the maximum eﬀect of this shock on inﬂation with 4 percent
trend is delayed to the fourth quarter after the shock. Therefore, it is clear
to say that the timing of the maximum eﬀect on inﬂation is highly positively
correlated with the persistence level of this monetary policy.
On the monetary policy front, under high trend inﬂation environment, if a
central bank fails to take into account the positive long run trend inﬂation, a
central bank could completely miscalculate the time it takes for monetary pol-
icy to become eﬀective on inﬂation and how long this eﬀect can last. Therefore,
ignoring trend inﬂation could generate devastating consequences to the stabil-
isation policy for economies that experience considerably above zero trend
inﬂation. This result is in contrast to Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims (2018), where
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they apply a medium scale GNK model and ﬁnd inﬂation with higher trend
react more on impact but is less persistent than inﬂation with lower trends, the
reverse is found in this model. The results shown here are actually consistent
with the work of a small scale GNK model from Ascari and Sbordone (2014).
Again, the analysis of the IRF for market wage rate tends to provide us
with some insights of how this model is able to generate so much inertia as
trend inﬂation level rises. Figure 3.5 shows aggregate wage rate with 4 percent
trend inﬂation reacts by less than a quarter (0.30) of the response of wage rate
(0.39) with 0 percent trend inﬂation. So, a much less reaction on impact, the
same story as inﬂation. Then this pattern is reversed after around two years,
the deviation of the market wage rate becomes much larger with higher levels
of trend inﬂation. Subsequently, inﬂation with zero percent trend comes back
to steady state after 15 quarters while inﬂation with 4 percent trend inﬂation
only returns to steady state after 18 quarters, hence, an obvious delay of 3
quarters for this ρm = 0.10 monetary policy shock. This IRF yet again show
how much inertia can be generated by an increase in trend inﬂation on market
wage rate, and then it turns out to impact the overall economy as a whole.
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Figure 3.6: Impulse response functions to monetary policy shock with diﬀerent
persistence levels (εm = 1, ρm = 0.30, 0.60, 0.90, 0.99)
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3.4.4 Price Mark-up Shock
Figure 3.7: Impulse response functions to a price mark-up shock
(εp = 1, ρp = 0.802, θp = 0.376)
A shock to the supply side of the economy, which is reﬂected by a shock to
the price mark-up in the GNKPC, yields the most straightforward analysis of
output deviations among all ﬁve exogenous shocks. In Figure 3.7, the impulse
response functions of both output and real market wage show that output and
market wage rate both react by roughly the same level for all levels of trend
inﬂation and soon they start to disperse. The only diﬀerence is that market
wage is much more persistent with higher trend inﬂation, however, although
output with higher trend inﬂation produces much more overall ﬂuctuations, it
does not show any greater persistence for the forecast horizon. Price dispersion
responds much more with higher trend inﬂation than it is with lower trend
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inﬂation.
3.4.5 Marginal Eﬃciency of Investment Shock
Figure 3.8: Impulse response functions to a investment-speciﬁc technology
shock
(εinv = 1, ρinv = 0.492)
Figure 3.8 gives the IRFs of an marginal eﬃciency of investment (MEI) shock.
In contrast to most of the cases studies in this thesis so far, higher trend inﬂa-
tion actually generates much less response of output, inﬂation and investment
after an MEI shock. As can be found from Figure 3.8 that output, inﬂation
and investment's reactions are all less for higher levels of trend inﬂation than
they are with lower trends. The price dispersion is the only exception as it is
still worsened as trend inﬂation rises.
Overall, for the ﬁve shocks tested here, trend inﬂation interacts much more
137
with these exogenous shocks than it does when price and wage indexation is
present in chapter 2. This conﬁrms previous studies from Ascari and Branzoli
(2015), and Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims (2018). As indexation increases, the
eﬀect of trend inﬂation on macroeconomic dynamics declines. The IRF of
inﬂation to a monetary policy shock clearly shows two important features:
1) inﬂation responds less on impact with higher levels of trend inﬂation, but
persists for much longer time; 2) there is a hump shape shown in the IRF
of inﬂation for 4 percent or above, which indicates that the largest eﬀect of
inﬂation after a monetary shock does not happen on impact, but it is delayed
for a few quarters. This is consistent with macro evidence on monetary policy
shock and it has profound implications for monetary policy studies. The rise
of inﬂation persistence is again is mainly driven by the increases of persistence
in price dispersion, which eventually feeds back on inﬂation.
3.5 Applications: Monetary Policy Response Un-
der High Trend Inﬂation
The story of how the US economy has evolved from the Great Inﬂation to the
Great Moderation and how the Federal Reserve's policy conduct has changed
over time, so that the US economy moved from highly volatile inﬂation in the
1970s to the stable and moderate inﬂation time in the mid-1980s and through-
out to the pre-ﬁnancial-crisis have attracted much of the attention in both
theoretical and empirical literature. However, the reasons behind this shift
of monetary volatility of monetary stability are not generally agreed among
economists. One the one hand, Taylor (1999), Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000)
and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) have found that there is a regime change
of how the Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy from the pre-1980s to
post-Volcker time. On the other hand, Sims and Zha (2006) and Stock and
Watson (2007) conclude that there was no such change happened, the ma-
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jor cause of moderate inﬂation movement post-Volcker was mainly due to the
lower volatility of shocks for the later period. Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2011) ﬁnd something more interesting. Their research suggests that the same
response to inﬂation by the central bank can lead to determinacy at low lev-
els of inﬂation but indeterminacy at higher levels of inﬂation. Therefore, it
could be that the Volcker disinﬂation of 1979-1982 by lowering average inﬂa-
tion (consequently trend inﬂation), was enough to shift the US economy from
indeterminacy to the determinacy region even with no change in the response
of the central bank to macroeconomic variables.
This paper examines the best monetary policy response under high level
of trend inﬂation, but in a very diﬀerent way from the previous literature on
trend inﬂation. First, I assume the determinacy is satisﬁed in the sense that
local uniqueness of rational expectation equilibrium is guaranteed. Instead of
ﬁnding the best response from monetary authority that maximises the chance
of meeting determinacy, I examine what is the best response to diﬀerent target-
ing variables in the Taylor rule that helps the central bank to stabilise output
and inﬂation.
In order to do this, I take the posterior means of Bayesian estimation from
the last section and calibrate the model based on these Bayesian posteriors, all
the structural parameters and shock persistence follow the posterior means. I
set the trend inﬂation parameter p¯i = 1.02, which implies an annualised trend
inﬂation of 8%, the rate that the US economy suﬀered during on average during
the Great Inﬂation in the 1970s. The next step is to hold all the parameters
in line with the Bayesian posteriors, meanwhile change one of the value of four
response parameters in the Taylor rule: response to inﬂation ψpi, response to
output gap ψy, and response to output growth ψgy, at one time, in order to
check how much should the central bank responds to stabilise the economy.
The Taylor rule that involves this four types of response has received most of
the attention in general literature on monetary economics as well as literature
on monetary stabilisation policy under trend inﬂation. In the rest of this
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section, I investigate how should the central bank respond to various targeting
variables under high level of trend inﬂation.
3.5.1 Monetary Policy Response to Inﬂation
Figure 3.9: IRFs to a 1 standard deviation productivity shock under diﬀerent
response to inﬂation
The ﬁrst case I evaluate is the parameter of inﬂation response in the Taylor
rule. The question for investigation is how aggressively should a central bank
respond to inﬂation under high level of trend inﬂation when the economy is hit
by two exogenous shocks: the shock to total factor productivity and monetary
policy shock. Recall that the productivity shock follows an AR(1) process
with the persistence parameter ρz equals 0.986. Figure 3.5 shows that IRFs of
four variables after a productivity shock under six calibrated value of inﬂation
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response parameter ψpi: 1.25, 1.50, 1.75, 2.00, 2.25, and 2.50. The entire study
is conducted upon an unique rational expectation equilibrium is guaranteed.
The top two IRFs of Figure 3.19 indicate that the central bank faces a clear
trade-oﬀ between stabilising output and stabilising inﬂation after a productiv-
ity shock regarding whether it should respond heavily to inﬂation deviation
from the target. The IRF of output shows that a higher value of ψpi generates
a larger deviation of output, however, the IRF of inﬂation shows the oppo-
site, responding more heavily to inﬂation deﬁnitely helps the central bank to
stabilise inﬂation. By responding more heavily to inﬂation does not neces-
sarily generate the best outcome for both output and inﬂation stabilisations,
therefore, the question is to what extent the central bank is concerned with
inﬂation stabilisation relative to output stabilisation. Put it diﬀerently, how
hawkish is this central bank to inﬂation? If the bank is more hawkish, then
it should respond more to inﬂation and care less about the harm it makes for
output. The reverse holds if the central bank is more dovish. Overall, this is a
preference matter for the monetary authority, but the trade-oﬀ is present here.
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Figure 3.10: IRFs to a 1 standard deviation monetary policy shock under
diﬀerent response to inﬂation
Figure 3.10 provides the IRFs after a monetary policy shock (ρm = 0.10);
this time output and inﬂation IRFs give a uniﬁed recommendation. By re-
sponding more aggressively to deviation in inﬂation helps the central bank
to stabilise both output and inﬂation. Price dispersion is also kept much
lower when the monetary authority reacts more to inﬂation ﬂuctuations after
a monetary shock. Apparently, the central bank does not face the same type
of inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ as with the productivity shock.
Therefore, the overall picture of policy guidance under high trend inﬂa-
tion is the central bank should respond more aggressively to inﬂation after a
monetary shock, however, the bank faces a clear trade-oﬀ between stabilising
output and stabilising inﬂation after a shock to total factor productivity.
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3.5.2 Responding to Output Gap
The debate of whether the central bank should respond to output gap has been
ongoing in monetary policy studies for a long time. Under the assumption of
positive steady state inﬂation, one agreement that is generally reached among
existing literature is that responding more to output gap can lead the central
bank to indeterminacy when the economy is experiencing high level of trend
inﬂation. This has been well-documented in Ascari and Ropele (2009), Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2011), and Ascari, Florio and Gobbi (2017). However,
whether a heavy response to output gap generates worse stabilisation outcome
conditional on determinacy is another matter, and this section examines this
issue.
Figure 3.11: IRFs to a 1 standard deviation productivity shock under diﬀerent
response to output gap
The ﬁrst thing to notice from Figure 3.11 is that responding more aggres-
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sively to output gap is deﬁnitely undesirable in terms of stabilising output,
the black solid line represents ψy = 0, which implies not responding to out-
put gap at all, clearly dominates the rest, and heavy response of one-to-one is
extremely damaging. For inﬂation, it seems that responding more to output
gap can also produce some superior result for the ﬁrst two years, however, this
beneﬁt diminishes too soon afterwards. Also, as the response parameter ψy
increases, the marginal beneﬁt from stabilising inﬂation drops dramatically.
Another potential gain from the response to output gap may come from its
muting eﬀects on price dispersion as it can be seen from the IRF. But the
trade-oﬀ as in productivity shock study is still present here.
Figure 3.12: IRFs to a 1 standard deviation monetary policy shock under
diﬀerent response to output gap
Similar to the story of inﬂation response to monetary policy shock as shown
in Figure 3.12; here, reacting to output gap is deﬁnitely helping the central
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bank to stabilise both output and inﬂation. More speciﬁcally, at the peak,
responding one-to-one to output gap eliminates all the output and inﬂation
ﬂuctuations within eleven quarters, however, they would last much longer and
to a much larger magnitude had the central bank chosen not to respond to
output gap or respond really moderately. The price dispersion is also reduced
by responding more strongly to output gap.
This mini counterfactual experiment concludes that even though it is gen-
erally agreed among researchers that a central bank should not respond heavily
if at all to output gap in order to guarantee determinacy under positive trend
inﬂation, nonetheless, it does not seem that responding to output gap generates
an overwhelmingly inferior stabilisation outcome conditional on determinacy,
particularly in the case of a large monetary policy shock. Certainly, here, the
model assumes that the central bank can accurately estimate the natural level
of output, this is hardly realistic in practice though.
3.5.3 Responding to Output Growth
In contrast to the results from the literature that focuses on determinacy un-
der trend inﬂation, the previous case ﬁnds that responding to output gap can
sometimes be desirable in terms of stabilisation. Hence, it is worth to check
whether this contrast still exists for the response to another output targeting
variable: output growth. Previous works from Walsh (2003), Orphanides and
Williams (2006), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Arias et al. (2018) all
focus on the inclusion of output growth in the Taylor-type rule as it is shown
that output growth targeting is extremely helpful for achieving determinacy.
To determine how much a central bank should respond to this targeting vari-
able, I conduct the following simulations.
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Figure 3.13: IRFs to a 1 standard deviation productivity shock under diﬀerent
response to output growth
Figure 3.13 provides the IRFs to a one standard deviation TFP shock with
8 percent trend inﬂation. Again, the IRFs for output and inﬂation implies
an inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ between, however, in contrary to the previous
two case where a heavy response to inﬂation and output gap helps the central
bank to stabilise inﬂation but dampen the eﬀectiveness of output stabilisation,
the reverse appears in this case. On the one hand, output stabilisation is
apparently enhanced by the aggressive response to output growth, one the
other hand, inﬂation stabilisation is worsened by the heavy response to output
growth under high level of trend inﬂation. Again, the central bank faces a
trade-oﬀ here, but with a reverse dilemma.
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Figure 3.14: IRFs to a 1 standard deviation monetary policy shock under
diﬀerent response to output growth
Figure 3.14 provides the IRFs to a one standard deviation of monetary
policy shock under 8 percent trend inﬂation. Both output and inﬂation stabil-
isations are enhanced by the strong response (represented by a large value of
ψgy) to output growth, particularly in the short run. This superiority shrinks
considerably after two years time for output, and the eﬀect on inﬂation turns
to negative after six quarters in which zero or weak response starts to dominate
strong response to output growth.
The general arguments for a stronger response to output growth regarding
determinacy are usually two-folded, as outlined by Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2011): ﬁrst, responding to the output growth rate eﬀectively makes the policy
reaction function backward-looking since it relies on lagged variables. Second,
responding to expected output growth ampliﬁes the central bank's response to
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inﬂation. Both eﬀects help the central bank to anchor inﬂation expectations.
However, the results here indicate that stronger response to output growth
does not always guarantee better stabilisation outcomes in output and inﬂation
when the economy is experiencing high level of trend inﬂation, at least for the
two shocks investigated here.
To sum up, this parsimonious counter-factual experiment provides some in-
teresting results for monetary policy analysis under high level of trend inﬂation
(8% in this case). The literature on trend inﬂation teaches us that determinacy
is one of the (if not the) most crucial and fatal phenomena in trend inﬂation
studies. As a series articles have documented, aggressive response to inﬂation,
less or no response to output gap, and heavy response to output growth all
help the central bank to improve the probability of ﬁnding unique rational
expectation equilibrium (REE), the eﬀectiveness of these targeting variables
in stabilisation policy can have very diﬀerent pictures.
More speciﬁcally, the heavy policy response to inﬂation generally provides
very robust stabilisation performance for both output inﬂation after a mone-
tary policy shock. However, in case of shocks to productivity, the central bank
is likely to face a trade-oﬀ between stabilising output and stabilising inﬂation,
as the change of policy response generally produces opposite eﬀects for out-
put and inﬂation. In contrast to the studies focusing on determinacy under
high trend inﬂation, this experiment shows that variables that are believed
to be overwhelmingly helpful for improving determinacy: output growth does
not necessarily generate superior stabilisation results under high level of trend
inﬂation conditional on determinacy. Variables that are treated as poor target-
ing variable such as the output gap can sometimes improve the central bank's
stabilisation performance.
Nonetheless, this experiment is subject to many limitations: ﬁrst, param-
eter uncertainty, the parameters are estimated in which it is subject to model
misspeciﬁcation; response parameters are ﬁxed at Bayesian posterior means,
there is no guarantee that once some of the other parameters in the Taylor rule
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are changed, how would this aﬀect the results obtained here. Especially the
value of ψpi is ﬁxed at 2.082, which is as high as it is always able to guarantee the
local uniqueness of REE. A much lower value of ψpi may produce signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent results. Second, the result of the response obtained regarding output
gap is based on the assumption that the central bank has perfect information
about the natural output level, this is hardly realistic in practice, nevertheless.
Further studies based on relaxed assumptions are highly desirable.
3.6 Future Studies
Unfortunately, this thesis did not have the chance to thoroughly investigate
the issue of determinacy regarding trend inﬂation for this medium-scale GNK
model, and this shall be the focus of my future research. Moreover, further
studies of trend inﬂation based on more sophisticated assumptions are also
in demand. For example, the role of trend inﬂation in models with leverage
restrictions, where Christiano and Ikeda (2013) provides a useful framework.
The account of unemployment in such GNK models is also highly desirable,
and the recent work from Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2016) may
provide some positive indications. Alves (2018) also raises some interesting
thoughts regarding the interaction between trend inﬂation and labour market
variables.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter modiﬁed the medium-scale Generalised New Keynesian (GNK)
model constructed from the previous chapter by removing the heavily criti-
cised assumption of backward indexation in both price and wage settings. The
assumption of indexation is ﬂawed due to its lack of evidence in micro survey
data, and also the inconsistency with the microeconomic foundation of individ-
ual price and wage settings behaviour. Upon removing backward indexation,
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the GNKPC becomes more forward-looking, and the market wage equations
become more backward looking, together they make the entire model more
dynamic. A new response variable is added to the Taylor rule; the response
to output growth, a variable that has been shown critical to the probability of
determinacy under high level of trend inﬂation (Coibion and Gorodnichenko,
2011). Then a new estimation using Bayesian technique is performed on this
modiﬁed benchmark model without indexation. This time the estimates for
most of the parameters and shock processes stay fairly close to the previous
benchmark model estimation results.
The IRFs and one period ahead forecast suggest the model can capture
the macro data in the postwar United States. The performance for some
variables is even closer to the SW07 result than the benchmark model. The
only shortcoming is the IRF of inﬂation after a monetary policy shock lacks
a hump shape response, but all other features are retained. Again, based on
the Bayesian statistic, this new version of the model is slightly preferred to the
same version but without positive trend inﬂation.
A study of the interaction between trend inﬂation and exogenous shocks
ﬁnd that change in the level of trend inﬂation drastically alters the dynam-
ics of key macroeconomic variables after all ﬁve exogenous shocks. This is in
contrast to some previous literature, for example, Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims
(2018). They found that trend inﬂation does not signiﬁcantly interact with
productivity and monetary policy shock, but here I ﬁnd it does. More speciﬁ-
cally, both output and inﬂation exhibit a signiﬁcantly higher degree of persis-
tence with higher level of trend inﬂation than they do under zero or moderate
trend inﬂation across all shocks. In particular, with baseline parametrisation,
the largest eﬀect of inﬂation with four percent trend inﬂation or above after
a monetary policy shock does not happen on impact; there is a clear hump
shape of inﬂation for higher trend inﬂation. Inﬂation response peaks only after
4th quarter with eight percent trend inﬂation after this transitory (ρm = 0.10)
monetary policy shock. Interestingly, this Generalised New Keynesian (GNK)
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model without indexation can actually generate a hump shape response for
inﬂation with a moderate level of trend inﬂation.
The monetary policy response exercise test what is the best policy response
from the central bank to stabilise the economy after exogenous shocks when
the economy is experiencing a very high level of trend inﬂation (8%). The re-
sults come with some surprises; targeting variables that are generally believed
to have a great and positive inﬂuence on the determinacy of the model in high
trend inﬂation trend to play a very diﬀerent role when it comes to optimal
monetary stabilisation. More speciﬁcally, in the two shocks tested: productiv-
ity and monetary shocks, responding heavily to output gap can actually help
the central bank to stabilise the economy in general. This is in contrast to
the conclusion regarding determinacy where academics ﬁnd by responding less
to output gap can help the monetary authority to achieve local uniqueness of
REE. Moreover, heavy response to inﬂation, and output growth generally all
help the central bank to stabilise the economy after a monetary shock under
high level of trend inﬂation. However, the central bank faces a clear trade-oﬀ
between stabilising output and stabilising inﬂation after a shock to TFP for
all targeting variables.
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Concluding Remarks
This thesis conducts three chapters that together focus on three major issues in
monetary economics: trend inﬂation, inﬂation persistence, and optimal mon-
etary policy. The starting point of this thesis is to correct the theoretical
ﬂawed, empirically unfounded, and practically inconsistent assumption of zero
inﬂation steady state in modern DSGE models by showing that trend inﬂa-
tion makes huge impacts on the overall macroeconomic dynamics and optimal
monetary response.
In Chapter 1, I derive a small-scale Generalised New Keynesian (GNK)
model that is based on a non-zero inﬂation steady state. I ﬁnd that due to
the presence of trend inﬂation, the Generalised NKPC becomes ﬂatter as trend
inﬂation increases, while price setting ﬁrms become more forward looking. The
model generates a higher level of deviations in output and inﬂation as trend
inﬂation rises, this leads to a large welfare loss. The increase in price dispersion
caused by trend inﬂation plays a signiﬁcant role in the process as it mutually
feeds back with inﬂation. An optimal monetary policy exercise shows some new
ﬁndings: using a quadratic welfare loss function that is approximated based
on non-zero inﬂation steady state, the weight assigned to output stabilisation
drops as trend increases, and this makes two countering eﬀects to monetary
stabilisation policy. The overall eﬀect very much depends on the model's
parametrisation. Furthermore, the famous divine coincidence (Blanchard and
Galí, 2007) disappears as price dispersion now appears in the GNKPC. In
addition, most of the key results from the well-known paper of Clarida, Galí
and Gertler (1999) on monetary policy study still hold under this GNK model,
such as the inﬂationary bias under discretion.
Chapter 2 develops a medium-scale GNK model based on the state-of-the-
art Smets and Wouters (2007) by log-linearising the model around a positive
inﬂation state in order to study the eﬀects of trend inﬂation in a more compli-
cated environment. The model is then estimated using a Bayesian technique
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with four US quarterly times series, the estimated model can ﬁt the macro
data well even though with a few losses of persistence in some macro vari-
ables compared with SW07 results. This may due to the diﬀerent selection of
observables and diﬀerent detrending methods. The estimated average trend
inﬂation between 1970 and 2017 is around 3.2 percent annually, this is broadly
consistent with the major literature. A subsequent sub-sample estimation ﬁnds
this trend changes dramatically over time. It drops from 6.96 percent during
the Great Inﬂation time to just 2.28 percent in the Great Moderation period,
then further decline to just 1.6 percent in the Great Recession era. Further
study ﬁnds that trend inﬂation can still alter the macroeconomic dynamics;
some macro variables become more persistent after some shocks with higher
trend inﬂation, even though the eﬀects are not signiﬁcant for moderate levels
of trend inﬂation. This may due to the relatively high degree of estimated
backward indexation (χ = 0.60), which mutes the eﬀect of trend inﬂation on
model dynamics.
Chapter 3 further develop this medium-scale GNK model by removing
the highly-criticised assumption of backward indexation for its inconsistency
with micro level evidence and lack of microeconomic foundation regarding
nominal rigidities. The model is re-estimated using a Bayesian technique and
the estimated IRFs demonstrate that the model is capable of generating enough
persistence in the output and inﬂation, although inﬂation does not show a
hump-shaped response. The study of macro dynamics illustrates that once
indexation is removed, trend inﬂation has much more signiﬁcant eﬀects on the
model dynamics, as compared with the Chapter 2 case. In particular, this
model is able to produce a hump-shaped response for inﬂation with 4 percent
trend inﬂation or above after a very transitory monetary policy (ρm = 0.10).
Furthermore, inﬂation reacts less on impact but becomes much more persistent
as trend inﬂation increases. This has both policy and theoretical implications.
On the policy front, it implies that improper account of trend inﬂation can lead
to huge miscalculation for the timing of maximum policy eﬀect and damaging
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consequence for the optimal monetary response, and this ﬁnding has serious
policy implications for central banks. On the theoretical front, it shows that
once trend inﬂation is properly taken into account, one does not need backward
indexation to generate a hump-shaped response of inﬂation with Calvo price
setting. To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper has done so without additional
assumptions.
Based on all the above ﬁndings, trend inﬂation makes a signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ence to modern macroeconomic DSGE models for all the theoretical, empirical
and monetary policymaking reasons. Therefore, I believe economists should
not ignore trend inﬂation in modern macroeconomic models.
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Appendix A: Data Summary
All the data used for estimation in this thesis is available from the FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS website: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
The four observables used in the Bayesian estimation in Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3 are output, inﬂation, nominal interest rate, and labour hours:
Output = ln ((GDPC1/GDPDEF)/CNP16OVIndex) * 100
Inﬂation = ln (GDPDEF/GDPDEF(-1)) * 100
Interest rate = FEDFUNDS/4
Labour hours = ln (PRS85006023*CE16OV/100)/CNP16OVIndex) * 100
GDPC1: Real Gross Domestic Product, Billions of Chained 2012 Dollars,
Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate
GDPDEF: Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deﬂator, Index 2012=100,
Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted
FEDFUNDS: Eﬀective Federal Funds Rate, Percent, Quarterly, Not Sea-
sonally Adjusted
CNP16OV: Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Thousands of Persons,
Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted
CNP16OVIndex: CNP16OV(2012 Q2)=1
PRS85006023: Nonfarm Business Sector: Average Weekly Hours, Index
2012=100, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted
CE16OV: Civilian Employment Level, Thousands of Persons, Quarterly,
Seasonally Adjusted
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Appendix B: Bayesian Estimation
The ﬁnal Bayesian estimation is performed on Dynare version 4.5.5, which is
downloadable from http://www.dynare.org/download.
Here is a summary of the estimation-related graphs
Figure 3.15: Priors and Posteriors
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Figure 3.16: Priors and Posteriors
Figure 3.17: Priors and Posteriors
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Figure 3.18: Multivariate Convergence Diagnostic
Figure 3.19: Updated Variables
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Figure 3.20: Updated Variables
Figure 3.21: Updated Variables
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Figure 3.22: Updated Variables
Figure 3.23: Updated Variables
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Figure 3.24: Smoothed Variables
Figure 3.25: Smoothed Variables
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Figure 3.26: Smoothed Variables
Figure 3.27: Smoothed Variables
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Figure 3.28: Smoothed Shocks
Figure 3.29: One Step Ahead Forecast
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Figure 3.30: One Step Ahead Forecast
Figure 3.31: One Step Ahead Forecast
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Figure 3.32: One Step Ahead Forecast
Figure 3.33: One Step Ahead Forecast
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Appendix C: Inﬂation Target Sources
Here is the summary of sources used in Introduction for targeting level of
central banks
United State:
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/economy_14400.html
United Kingdom
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/inflation
Eurozone
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/strategy/pricestab/html/index.en.
html
Japan
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outline/qqe.htm/
New Zealand
https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monetary-policy/policy-targets-agreements
Norway
https://www.norges-bank.no/en/about/Mandate-and-core-responsibilities/
Monetary-policy-in-Norway/
Sweden
https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/monetary-policy/the-inflation-target/
Switzerland
https://www.snb.ch/en/iabout/monpol/id/monpol_strat#t3
Australia
https://www.rba.gov.au/inflation/inflation-target.html
Canada
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/core-functions/monetary-policy/inflation/
Brazil
https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/#!/n/INFLATION
Chile
https://www.bcentral.cl/web/central-bank-of-chile/-/central-bank-of-chile-monetary-policy-in-an-inflation-targeting-framewo-1
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South Africa
https://www.resbank.co.za/MonetaryPolicy/DecisionMaking/Pages/
InflationMeasures.aspx
South Korea
https://www.bok.or.kr/eng/main/contents.do?menuNo=400015
Colombia
http://www.banrep.gov.co/en/monetary-policy
Czech Republic
https://www.cnb.cz/en/monetary_policy/inflation_targeting.html
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